Privacy-preserving Statistical Tools:   Differential Privacy and Beyond by Zhang, Wanrong








of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Engineering
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
May 2021
© Wanrong Zhang 2021
PRIVACY-PRESERVING STATISTICAL TOOLS: DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
AND BEYOND
Thesis committee:
Dr. Rachel Cummings, advisor
School of Industrial and Systems Engi-
neering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Yajun Mei, advisor
School of Industrial and Systems Engi-
neering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Mark Davenport
School of Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Sara Krehbiel




School of Industrial and Systems Engi-
neering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date approved: April 21, 2021
To my beloved mom and grandparents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors, Rachel Cummings
and Yajun Mei. I was very fortunate to have them sharing knowledge in both statistics and
computer science. Yajun is a great statistician and teacher. It was him who first guided
me as a fresh Ph.D. student to the research world. He not only taught me knowledge in
mathematical statistics, but also supported me to explore several research directions and
find my research interest. I am so grateful to also have Rachel as my advisor since my
second year when she joined Georgia Tech. She introduced me to the exciting research
area in privacy and security, and has always been supportive in every angle of my research.
I wish to highlight her contagious enthusiasm for research, which encouraged me to pursue
a career in research. This thesis would never be possible without my two advisors’ patient
support, valuable guidance, and all the opportunities to further my research. They helped
me to sharpen my thinking and become an independent researcher.
I would also like to express appreciation to my thesis committee members: Sara Kre-
hbiel, for her sage advice and being an incredible collaborator; Jeff Wu, for his insightful
feedback and discussion on my thesis proposal; and Mark Davenport, for providing valu-
able input on my thesis.
I visited several wonderful institutions during my Ph.D.: the Simons Institute for the
Theory of Computing, Microsoft Research Cambridge, and Microsoft Research Redmond.
I owe my gratitude to all my hosts and friends, who helped shed light on many of my
ideas, including but not limited to Jana Kulkarni, Robert Sim, Nalin Singal and Priyanka
Kulkarni. I would also like to thank all my collaborators include: Olya Ohrimenko, for her
patient mentorship and being a constant source of inspiration; Gautam Kamath, for fruitful
discussions and encouragement and his tweets to increase my visibility in my research
community; Rui Tuo, for introducing me many useful advanced probability tools that have a
profound impact on my research; Shruti Tople, for sharing her expertise on security attacks;
iv
Yuliia Lut, for being a reliable collaborator and generous friend. All of their expertise has
been greatly beneficial to my research and career development.
I was very fortunate to meet many amazing friends at Georgia Tech, Simons, and Mi-
crosoft Research, including but not limited to Shanshan, Liyan, Junqi, Chelsea, Chuanping,
Siawpeng, Brendan, and Jack. They made my experience in graduate school so enjoyable.
Especially, I want to thank Helen and Ruqi, who have always been there for me. Thanks
for the calls, tea times, and all the fun and moral support. I also want to thank Juba for his
help on my job search, and Nancy for helping me settle down in Atlanta. Special thanks to
my dear hamster for the companionship and comfort during the five years, and especially
the quarantine time.
Finally, but not least, I have my most heartfelt thanks to my mom and my grandparents
for their love and support throughout my life. Without them, I would never have enjoyed
so many opportunities and experiences that have made me who I am. My cousin deserve
my wholehearted thanks as well.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Private Online Statistical Decision-making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Beyond Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Background on Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Definition and Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Algorithmic Tools for Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 2: Differentially Private Change-point Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
vi
2.2.1 Change-point Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Differential Privacy Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.3 Concentration Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Offline Private Change-point Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Finite Sample Accuracy Guarantees for the MLE . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 Offline Algorithm under the Uniform Bound Assumption . . . . . . 28
2.3.3 Offline Algorithm for Arbitrary Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Online Private Change-point Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.1 Single Change-point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.2 Multiple Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Numerical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.1 Evaluating the Offline Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.2 Evaluating the Online Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Chapter 3: PAPRIKA: Private Online False Discovery Rate Control . . . . . . 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.1 Background on Online False Discovery Rate Control . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.2 Background on Offline Private False Discovery Rate Control . . . . 66
3.3 Private online false discovery rate control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4.1 Testing with Bernoulli Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
vii
3.4.2 Testing with Truncated Exponential Observations . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.3 Comparison with Other Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.4 Choice of shift A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chapter 4: Dataset-Level Attribute Leakage in Collaborative Learning . . . . . 95
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Data Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Threat Model and Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.5.1 Benchmark Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.5.2 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.6 Attack Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.6.1 Multi-Party Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.6.2 Single-Party Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6.3 Fine-grained Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.6.4 Attack Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.8 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Chapter 5: Attribute Privacy: Framework and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
viii
5.1.1 Our Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.3 Attribute Privacy Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.4 The Gaussian Mechanism for Dataset Attribute Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.4.1 Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4.2 Instantiation with Gaussian distributed data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.4.3 Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.5 The Wasserstein Mechanism for General Attribute Privacy . . . . . . . . . 151
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Appendix A: Additional Baselines and Numerical Results for PAPRIKA(Chapter
3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Appendix B: Additional Experimental Setup and Results for Dataset-Level At-
tribute Leakage (Chapter 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
ix
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Summary of accuracy guarantees for non-private and private offline change-point
detection under the alternate hypothesis H1. The expressions k̂, ∆(`), C, CM and
CA are defined in (2.2), (2.6), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1 Comparison of attacks on leakage of dataset properties. . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Dataset split during the attack where #Dattack is the number of inference
queries the attacker makes to the model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3 Datasets, tasks and attribute-label correlation where ∼ and ⊥ indicate cor-
relation and no correlation, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4 Multi-Party Setting: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting the value of
the distribution of sensitive variableA in the dataset of Phonest. The attacker
tries to guess whether values ofA are split as 33:67 or 67:33 inDhonest when
its own data Dadv has 33:67 split. Columns A and Ā report the accuracy
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SUMMARY
Differential privacy has emerged as the de facto gold standard in protecting the privacy
of individuals when processing sensitive data, because of its powerful formal guarantees.
Several companies, including Google, Apple, Microsoft, and the U.S. Census Bureau, have
deployed differentially private tools, but barriers remain between such systems and full-
featured privacy-preserving data analytics.
In this thesis, we will focus on two main challenges: private online decision-making
and privacy of dataset-level properties. Most of the existing differentially private tools are
for static databases with non-adaptive analysis. However, modern data analysts interact
with the dataset in an inherently adaptive fashion, and we are confronted with databases
that arrive online. To address these challenges, we study private algorithms for two clas-
sical statistical online decision-making problems: change-point detection and online false
discovery rate control. Second, we demonstrate a new dataset-level privacy vulnerability.
Classical differential privacy provides individual-level guarantees, but does not protect sen-
sitive global properties of a dataset, such as the distribution of race and gender among users
in the training set or proprietary information. Therefore, we introduce new privacy notions






Data-driven algorithmic decision-making plays a central role in critical human-centered
applications, determining everything from social media content to job/insurance eligibility
to government policy-making. In an ideal world, we might hope that people would be
willing to share their data in exchange for convenience or information. However, in reality,
in the wake of numerous digital privacy scandals—such as Facebook-Cambridge Analytica
data scandal [1]—a majority of Americans are concerned about how both companies and
governments collect, store, and use their data [2], and share less information as a result.
Increasingly, privacy is not merely a question of philosophy, but table stakes in the course
of business. Classical data analyses tools were not developed with privacy in mind and
have been shown can unintentionally store and memorize personal data [3, 4, 5, 6].
One might be thinking we can simply anonymize the data—removing personally iden-
tifying information in the dataset. The issue is that the information contained in the dataset
might be available in other forms on the internet. The richness of the data enables naming
an individual by a combination of the attributes, such as a combination of location, gender
and income, which allows us to match anonymized records with non-anonymized records
available in a different dataset. As an example, Netflix released a customer rating dataset
for competition in 2009, and the data was fully anonymized prior to the launch of the com-
petition. However, researchers successfully recovered up to 99% of the identity by using
some information publicly available on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb), see [7]. Thus,
data cannot be fully anonymized and remain useful.
The field of differential privacy [8] overcomes such challenges and offers data analysis
2
tools that provide powerful worst-case privacy guarantees; it has become a de facto gold
standard in privacy-preserving data analysis. Informally, a differentially private algorithm
ensures that the output of the algorithm will still have approximately the same distribution
when a small number of data entries are changed. The privacy is quantified by a parameter
ε. This parameterized privacy notion allows for a smooth tradeoff between accurate analy-
sis and privacy to the individuals. Recently, we have seen several real-world deployments
at Google [9], Apple [10], Microsoft [11], and the U.S. Census Bureau [12]. yet, there are
still barriers to fully deploy differential privacy in practice. First, most of the existing tools
are for static databases with non-adaptive analysis, while modern data analysts interact
with the data set in an inherently adaptive fashion, and we are confronted with databases
that arrive online. To address this challenge, in this thesis, we study two private statistical
online/sequential decision-making problems, including change-point detection and online
false discovery rate control—both are fundamental and widely used in data analytics. Sec-
ond, differential privacy does not protect sensitive global properties of a dataset, such as the
distribution of race and gender among users in the training set or proprietary information.
In this thesis, We identify the dataset-level privacy vulnerabilities in collaborative learning
and propose the appropriate privacy notions to protect the vulnerabilities beyond individual
privacy.
1.1.1 Private Online Statistical Decision-making
In Chapter 2, based on joint work with Rachel Cummings, Sara Krehbiel, Rui Tuo, and
Yajun Mei that appeared in NeurIPS 2018 [13] and Journal of Machine Learning Re-
search in 2021 [14], we study the statistical problem of change-point detection through
the lens of differential privacy. The change-point detection problem seeks to identify dis-
tributional changes at an unknown change-point k∗ in a stream of data. Increasingly, tools
for change-point detection are applied in settings where data may be highly sensitive and
formal privacy guarantees are required, such as identifying disease outbreaks based on
3
hospital records, or IoT devices detecting activity within a home. We give the first private
algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection. We prove a differential pri-
vacy guarantee for our algorithms and accuracy guarantees that bound the additive error of
our estimate of the true change-point with high probability. Since traditional statistics typi-
cally focuses on the asymptotic consistency and unbiasedness of the estimator, we also give
the first finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the standard (non-private MLE). Addition-
ally, we provide empirical validation, which enhances our theoretical results, and provides
evidence that our algorithms perform well for practical use.
In Chapter 3, based on joint work with Rachel Cummings and Gautam Kamath [15],
we study False Discovery Rate (FDR) control in multiple hypothesis testing under the con-
straint of differential privacy for the sample. In hypothesis testing, a false discovery occurs
when a hypothesis is incorrectly rejected due to noise in the sample. When adaptively
testing multiple hypotheses, the probability of a false discovery increases as more tests are
performed. Thus the problem of False Discovery Rate (FDR) control is to find a proce-
dure for testing multiple hypotheses that accounts for this effect in determining the set of
hypotheses to reject. The goal is to minimize the number (or fraction) of false discover-
ies, while maintaining a high true positive rate (i.e., correct discoveries). Unlike previous
work in this direction, we focus on the online setting, meaning that a decision about each
hypothesis must be made immediately after the test is performed, rather than waiting for
the output of all tests as in the offline setting. We provide new private algorithms based on
state-of-the-art results in non-private online FDR control. Our algorithms have strong prov-
able guarantees for privacy and statistical performance as measured by FDR and power. We
also provide experimental results to demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms in a variety
of data environments.
4
1.1.2 Beyond Differential Privacy
Modern machine learning models have been shown to memorize information about their
training data, leading to privacy concerns regarding their use and release in practice [4,
5]. Much attention has been devoted to identifying and preventing vulnerabilities of indi-
vidual privacy. However, in many settings, the global properties of a dataset may also be
sensitive—e.g., the distribution of race and gender among user in the dataset for training a
voice or facial recognition models, the overall mortality rate in a hospital, and proprietary
information such as sales distribution of products.
In Chapter 4, based on joint work with Shruti Tople and Olya Ohrimenko [16], we
study the leakage of dataset properties at the population-level. Concerns of leaking global
properties of a sensitive attribute (e.g., sales numbers or gender) through training machine-
learned models arise in several different communication models, including a single party
releasing a trained model and in multi-party machine learning. Our primary focus in this
work is on attacks to infer dataset properties in the centralized multi-party machine learning
setting, where the model is securely trained on several parties’ data, and parties only have
black-box access to the final model. We propose an effective attack strategy that requires
only a few hundred queries to the model and relies on a simple attack architecture that
even a computationally bound attacker can use. We show that global properties about
one of the parties’ sensitive attributes can be inferred by the second party, even when the
attacker has limited access to the model. Our attack successes on different types of datasets
including tabular, text, and graph data. To understand and measure the source of leakage,
we consider several models of correlation between a sensitive attribute and the rest of the
data. Using multiple machine learning models, we show that leakage occurs even if the
sensitive attribute is not included in the training data and has a low correlation with other
attributes and the target variable. Our attack suggests that sensitive attribute leakage is a
significant privacy vulnerability, motivating our work in chapter 5 that studies methods for
protecting dataset-level attribute privacy.
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Differential privacy guarantees individual-level privacy when publishing an output com-
puted on a database, but it does not aim to protect population-level information, and was
designed to learn the global properties of a dataset without sacrificing individual privacy.
The study of tools to protect attribute privacy, where an analyst must prevent global prop-
erties of sensitive attributes in her dataset from leaking during analysis, is limited, both in
terms of a framework for reasoning about it and mechanisms for protecting it. In Chapter
5, based on joint work with Rachel Cummings and Olya Ohrimenko [17], we depart from
individual privacy to initiate the study of attribute privacy, where a data owner is concerned
about revealing sensitive properties of a whole dataset during analysis. We propose defini-
tions to capture attribute privacy in two relevant cases where global attributes may need to
be protected:(1) properties of a specific dataset and (2) parameters of the underlying distri-
bution from which dataset is sampled. We also provide two efficient mechanisms and one
inefficient mechanism that satisfy attribute privacy for these settings. We base our results
on a novel use of the Pufferfish framework to account for correlations across attributes in
the data, thus addressing” the challenging problem of developing Pufferfish instantiations
and algorithms for general aggregate secrets” that was left open by[18].
1.2 Background on Differential Privacy
This section introduces the relevant background on differential privacy that will be used
throughout this thesis. We begin in Section 1.2.1 with the formal definition of differen-
tial privacy and several properties. Section 1.2.2 provides a brief introduction to several
fundamental algorithmic tools for differential privacy, which can be used as subroutines to
design more sophisticated algorithms. For details, we refer the interested reader to [19].
1.2.1 Definition and Properties
Differential privacy bounds the maximum amount that a single data entry can affect analysis
performed on the database. Two databases X,X ′ are neighboring if they differ in at most
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one entry.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [8]). An algorithmM : Rn → R is (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for every pair of neighboring databases X,X ′ ∈ Rn, and for every subset of
possible outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(X ′) ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, we say thatM is ε-differentially private.
Differential privacy has a number of desirable properties. First, differential privacy is
robust to post-processing. It means no data analysts can increase privacy loss by taking a
differentially private output and performing additional computations.
Theorem 1. Let M : Rn → R be a randomized algorithm that is (ε, δ)-differentially
private. Let f : R → R′ be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f · M : Rn → R′ is
(ε, δ)-differentially private.
Differentially private algorithms compose. It means the privacy loss degrades grace-
fully over multiple computations, which allows us to design differentially private algo-
rithms from several building blocks.
Theorem 2. Let Mi : Rn → Ri be an (εi, δi)−differentially private algorithm for i ∈






Differential privacy allows the analysis and control of privacy loss incurred by groups,
with the strength of the privacy guarantee drops linearly with the size of the group. Any
ε-differentially private mechanismM is kε-differentially private for groups of size k.
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1.2.2 Algorithmic Tools for Differential Privacy
The additive sensitivity of a real-valued query f : X n → R is denoted ∆f , and is defined




|f(X)− f(X ′)| .
If f is a vector-valued query, the expression above can be modified with the appropriate
norm in place of the absolute value. Differential privacy guarantees are often achieved by
adding Laplace noise at various places in the computation, where the noise scales with
∆f/ε, where ∆f is the additive sensitivity with `1-norm. A Laplace random variable with










We may sometimes abuse notation and also use Lap(b) to denote the realization of a random
variable with this distribution.
An alternative to adding Laplacian noise is to add Gaussian noise. In this case, rather
than scaling the noise to the `1-sensitivity, we instead scale to the `2 sensitivity. The Gaus-
sian mechanism with parameter b adds zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance b in each
of the k coordinates.
Theorem 3 ([19]). The Gaussian mechanism with parameter σ ≥ c∆2(f)/ε is (ε, δ)−differentially
private for c2 > 2 log(1.25/δ).
Differentially private selection is one of the fundamental problems: the space of out-
comes is discrete and the task is to produce a “best” answer. A common algorithm to
determine which of m queries with sensitivity ∆ has the highest value is Report Noisy
Max [20, 19]. It Adds independently generated Laplace noise Lap(∆/ε to each count and
returns the index of the largest noisy count (we ignore the possibility of a tie).
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Algorithm 1 Report Noisy Max: REPORTMAX(X,∆, {f1, . . . , fm}, ε)
Input: database X , set of queries {f1, . . . , fm} each with sensitivity ∆, privacy param-
eter ε
for i = 1, . . . ,m do
Compute fi(X)
Sample Zi ∼ Lap(∆ε )
end for
Output i∗ = argmax
i∈[m]
(fi(X) + Zi)
Theorem 4 ([20, 19]). REPORTMAX is ε-differentially private.
The exponential mechanism [19] is another common algorithm for differentially private
selection, and it was designed for situations in which we wish to choose the “best” response
to queries with arbitrary utilities while preserving differential privacy. Given some arbitrary
output rangeR, the exponential mechanism is defined with respect to some utility function
u, which maps databases and output pairs to utility scores. The sensitivity of the utility
function is thus ∆u = maxr∈Rmaxx,y:||x−y||1≤1 |u(x, r)− u(y, r)|. The exponential mech-
anism outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp(εu(x, r)/(2∆u)).
Theorem 5 ([19]). The exponential mechanism is ε-differentially private.
In some situations, we might be facing a very large number of questions to answer,
but we only care to know the answers of the queries that lie above a certain threshold. In
the offline case, this problem can be handled by running the REPORTMAXor the expo-
nential mechanism iteratively. In the online setting, we introduce the ABOVETHRESH and
SPARSEVECTOR techniques.
The ABOVETHRESH algorithm, first introduced by [21] and refined to its current form
by [19], takes in a potentially unbounded stream of queries, compares the answer of each
9
query to a fixed noisy threshold, and halts when it finds a noisy answer that exceeds the
noisy threshold. We state the privacy and accuracy guarantees of ABOVETHRESH below.
Algorithm 2 Above Noisy Threshold: ABOVETHRESH(X,∆, {f1, f2, . . .}, T, ε)
Input: database X , stream of queries {f1, f2, . . .} each with sensitivity ∆, threshold T ,
privacy parameter ε
Let T̂ = T + Lap(2∆
ε
)
for each query i do
Let Zi ∼ Lap(4∆ε )
if fi(X) + Zi > T̂ then
Output ai = >
Halt
else
Output ai = ⊥
end if
end for
Theorem 6 ([21]). ABOVETHRESH is ε-differentially private.
Theorem 7 ([21]). For any sequence of m queries f1, . . . , fm with sensitivity ∆ such that
|{i < m : fi(X) ≥ T −α}| = 0, ABOVETHRESH outputs with probability at least 1− β a
stream of a1, . . . , am ∈ {>,⊥} such that ai = ⊥ for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) < T − α and
ai = > for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) > T + α as long as
α ≥ 8∆ log(2m/β)
ε
.
The SPARSEVECTOR algorithm can be thought of as making repeated calls to ABOVETHRESH
: Each time an above threshold query is reported, the algorithm simply restarts the re-
maining stream of queries on a new instantiation of ABOVETHRESH . It halts after it has
restarted ABOVETHRESH c times. The privacy guarantee follows from the composition
theorem. The accuracy guarantee is stated in Theorem 9.
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Algorithm 3 Sparse Vector: SPARSEVECTOR(X,∆, {f1, f2, . . .}, T, c, ε)
Input: database X , stream of queries {f1, f2, . . .} each with sensitivity ∆, threshold T ,
a cutoff point c, privacy parameter ε
Let T̂0 = T + Lap(2∆cε )
Let count = 0
for each query i do
Let Zi ∼ Lap(4∆cε )
if fi(X) + Zi > T̂ then
Output ai = >
Let count = count +1
Let T̂count = T + Lap(2∆cε )
else
Output ai = ⊥
end if




Theorem 8 ([21]). SPARSEVECTOR is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Theorem 9 ([21]). For any sequence of k queries f1, . . . , fk with sensitivity ∆ such that
|{i : fi(X) ≥ T − α}| ≤ c, SPARSEVECTOR outputs with probability at least 1 − β a
stream of a1, . . . , ak ∈ {>,⊥} such that ai = ⊥ for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) < T − αSV
and ai = > for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) > T + αSV as long as αSV ≥ 8∆c log(2kc/β)ε .
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CHAPTER 2
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE CHANGE-POINT DETECTION
2.1 Introduction
The change-point detection problem seeks to identify distributional changes at an unknown
change-point k∗ in a stream of data. The estimated change-point should be consistent with
the hypothesis that the data are initially drawn from pre-change distribution P0 but from
post-change distribution P1 starting at the change-point. This problem appears in many
important practical settings, including biosurveillance [22], fault detection [23], finance
[24], signal detection [25], and security systems [26, 27]. For example, the CDC may
wish to detect a disease outbreak based on real-time data about hospital visits, or smart
home IoT devices may want to detect changes in activity within the home. In both of these
applications, the data contain sensitive personal information.
In this work we study the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens
of differential privacy. We give private algorithms for both online and offline change-point
detection, analyze these algorithms theoretically, and then provide empirical validation of
these results.
2.1.1 Related Work
The change-point detection problem originally arose from industrial quality control, and
has since been applied in a wide variety of other contexts including climatology [28],
econometrics [29], and DNA analysis [30]. The problem is studied both in the offline set-
ting, in which the algorithm has access to the full dataset X = {x1, . . . , xn} up front, and
in the online setting, in which data points arrive one at a time X = {x1, . . .}. Change-point
detection is a canonical problem in statistics that has been studied for nearly a century;
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selected results include [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45].
Our approach is inspired by the commonly used Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) procedure







for each k ∈ [n] and declaring that a change occurs if and only if `(k̂) ≥ T for MLE
k̂ = argmaxk `(k) and appropriate threshold T > 0. The existing change-point literature
works primarily in the asymptotic setting when k∗n/n → r for some r ∈ (0, 1) as n → ∞
(see, e.g., [46, 47]). In contrast, we consider finite databases and provide the first accuracy
guarantees for the MLE from a finite sample (n <∞).
In offering the first algorithms for private change-point detection, we primarily use
two powerful tools from the differential privacy literature. REPORTMAX [20, 19] cal-
culates noisy approximations of a stream of queries on the database and reports which
query produced the largest noisy value. We instantiate this with partial log-likelihood
queries to produce a private approximation of the the change-point MLE in the offline
setting. ABOVETHRESH [21] calculates noisy approximations on a stream of queries on
the database iteratively and aborts as soon as a noisy approximation exceeds a specified
threshold. We extend our offline results to the harder online setting, in which a bound on
k∗ is not known a priori, by using ABOVETHRESH to identify a window of fixed size n in
which a change is likely to have occurred so that we can call our offline algorithm on that
window to estimate the true change-point.
Recently, [48] also provided a private change-point detection algorithm based on the
more general problem of private hypothesis testing. Their algorithm partitions time series
data into batches of size equal to the sample complexity of the hypothesis testing prob-
lem, and then outputs the batch number most consistent with a change-point. Their bound
gives the minimum number of data points needed to distinguish between two distributions
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with constant advantage but does not necessarily imply the closest possible approximation
of the true change-point. Their accuracy guarantees and ours alike are quantified with re-
spect to distance measures between modified versions of the hypothesized distributions,
and comparability of the bounds depends on the specific distributions from which data are
drawn.
2.1.2 Our Results
We use existing tools from differential privacy to solve the change-point detection problem
in both offline and online settings, neither of which have been studied in the private setting
before.
Private offline change-point detection. We develop an offline private change-point de-
tection algorithm OFFLINEPCPD (Algorithm 4) that is accurate under one of two assump-
tions about the distributions from which data are drawn. As is standard in the privacy
literature, we give accuracy guarantees that bound the additive error of our estimate of the
true change-point with high probability. Our accuracy theorem statements (Theorems 12
and 14) also provide guarantees for the non-private estimator for comparison. Since tradi-
tional statistics typically focuses on the the asymptotic consistency and unbiasedness of the
estimator, ours are the first finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the standard (non-private)
MLE. As expected, MLE accuracy decreases with the sensitivity of the measured quantity
but increases as the pre- and post-change distribution grow apart. Interestingly, it is con-
stant with respect to the size of the database. In providing MLE bounds alongside accuracy
guarantees for our private algorithms, we are able to quantify the cost of privacy as roughly
DKL(P0||P1)/ε.
We are able to prove ε-differential privacy regardless of how the data are generated
by instantiating the general-purpose REPORTMAX algorithm from the privacy literature
with our log-likelihood queries (Theorem 11). Noting that when the measured quantity
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has unbounded sensitivity, we introduce a clamping function so that the sensitivity is still
bounded by a certain threshold. Importantly and in contrast to our accuracy results, the
distributional assumption need only apply to the hypothesized distributions from which
data are drawn; privacy holds for arbitrary input databases.
Private online change-point detection. In ONLINEPCPD (Algorithm 6), we extend our
offline results to the online setting by using the ABOVETHRESH framework to first identify
a window in which the change is likely to have happened and then call the offline algo-
rithm to identify a more precise approximation of when it occurred. Standard ε-differential
privacy under our first distributional assumption follows from composition of the under-
lying privacy mechanisms (Theorem 15). Accuracy of our online mechanism relies on
appropriate selection of the threshold that identifies a window in which a change-point has
likely occurred, at which point the error guarantees are inherited from the offline algorithm
(Theorem 16).
Empirical validation. Finally, we run several Monte Carlo experiments to validate our
theoretical results for both the online and offline settings. We consider data drawn from
Bernoulli distributions, which satisfies our first distributional assumption, as well as Gaus-
sian and Gamma distributions, which satisfy our second distributional assumptions. Our
offline experiments are summarized in 2.1, which shows that change-point detection is eas-
ier when P0 and P1 are further apart and harder when the privacy requirement is stronger
(ε is smaller). Additionally, these experiments enhance our theoretical results, finding that
OFFLINEPCPD performs well even when we relax the assumptions required for our theo-
retical accuracy bounds by running our algorithm on imperfect hypotheses P0 and P1 that
are closer together than the true distributions from which data are drawn. 2.3 shows that
ONLINEPCPD also performs well, consistent with our theoretical guarantees.
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2.2 Preliminaries
Our work considers the statistical problem of change-point detection through the lens of dif-
ferential privacy. Section 2.2.1 defines the change-point detection problem, Section 2.2.2
describes how we apply the differentially private tools, and Section 2.2.3 give several con-
centration inequalities which will be used in our proofs.
2.2.1 Change-point Background
Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be n real-valued data points. The change-point detection problem
is parametrized by two distributions, P0 and P1. The data points in X are hypothesized to
initially be sampled i.i.d. from P0, but at some unknown change time k∗ ∈ [n], where [n]
denotes the set {1, . . . , n}, an event may occur (e.g., epidemic disease outbreak) and change
the underlying distribution to P1. The goal of a data analyst is to announce that a change
has occurred as quickly as possible after k∗. Since the xi may be sensitive information—
such as individuals’ medical information or behaviors inside their home—the analyst will
wish to announce the change-point time in a privacy-preserving manner.
In the standard non-private offline change-point literature, the analyst wants to test the
null hypothesis H0 : k∗ = ∞, where x1, . . . , xn ∼iid P0, against the composite alternate
hypothesis H1 : k∗ ∈ [n], where x1, . . . , xk∗−1 ∼iid P0 and xk∗ , . . . , xn ∼iid P1. The








The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of the change time k∗ is given by
k̂(X) = argmaxk∈[n]`(k,X). (2.2)
When X is clear from context, we will simply write `(k) and k̂.
16
We always use log to refer to the natural logarithm, and when necessary, we inter-
pret log 0
0
= 0. An important quantity in our accuracy analysis will be the Kullback-




dx = Ex∼P1 [log
P1(x)
P0(x)
]. For given distributions P0, P1, our proofs will
use the following three variations of KL-divergence:

















































−A/2 if x < −A/2
A/2 if x > A/2
x otherwise.
We will measure the additive error of our estimations of the true change point as fol-
lows.
Definition 2 ((α, β)-accuracy). A change-point detection algorithm that produces a change-
point estimator k̃(X) where a distribution change occurred at time k∗ is (α, β)-accurate if
Pr[|k̃ − k∗| < α] ≥ 1 − β, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the
algorithm and sampling of X .
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2.2.2 Differential Privacy Tools
The sensitivity of a function or query f is defined as ∆(f) = maxneighbors X,X′ |f(X) −
f(X ′)|. Since our algorithms estimate a change-point based on log-likelihood ratios, it will














Our algorithms rely on two existing differentially private algorithms, REPORTMAX [20,
19] in Algorithm 1 and ABOVETHRESH [21] in Algorithm 2. We use the REPORTMAX
algorithm as the framework for our offline private change-point detector OFFLINEPCPD in
Section 2.3 to privately select the time k with the highest log-likelihood ratio `(k). We use
the ABOVETHRESH algorithm as a framework for our online private change-point detector
ONLINEPCPD in Section 2.4 when new data points arrive online in a streaming fashion.
2.2.3 Concentration Inequalities
Our proofs will use the following bounds on partial sums of independent random variables.
Lemma 1 (Ottaviani’s inequality [49]). For independent random variables U1, . . . , Um, for
Sk =
∑





|Sk| > λ1 + λ2
]
≤ Pr [|Sm| > λ1]
1−maxk∈[m] Pr [|Sm − Sk| > λ2]
.
If we additionally assume the Ui above are i.i.d. with mean 0 and take values from
an interval of bounded length L, we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality for the following
corollary:
Corollary 2. For independent and identically distributed random variables U1, . . . , Um




for k ∈ [m], and for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
Pr[max
k∈[m]




When our random variables do not come from a bounded-length interval, we will re-
quire Bernstein’s inequality instead of Hoeffding’s to attain a similar result on their partial
sums.
Lemma 3 (Bernstein’s inequality [49]). For independent random variables Y1, . . . , Ym with
mean zero such that E
[





vi for constantsM and vi for all i ∈ [m],
we have








for v ≥ v1 + . . .+ vm.
Corollary 4. For independent and identically distributed random variables Y1, . . . , Ym
with mean zero such that E
[




v, for constant v for all i ∈ [m], and
for Sk =
∑
i∈[k] Yi for k ∈ [m], and for λ1, λ2 > 0, we have
Pr[max
k∈[m]
|Sk| > λ1 + λ2] ≤
2 exp(−λ21/(2mv + 2λ1))
1− 2 exp(−λ22/(2mv + 2λ2))
.
2.3 Offline Private Change-point Detection
In this section, we investigate the differentially private change-point detection problem in
the setting that n data points X = {x1, . . . , xn} are known to the algorithm in advance.
Given two hypothesized distributions P0 and P1, our algorithms privately approximate the
MLE k̂ of the change time k∗. We consider accuracy of change-point estimation with and
without the assumption that the distributions have uniformly bounded likelihood ratios.
First, we provide finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the MLE in each of these cases
in Section 2.3.1. Second, we offer an algorithm OFFLINEPCPD in Section 2.3.2 that
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achieves privacy by introducing noise proportional to the sensitivity of the log-likelihood
calculation. To detect changes in certain distributions such as Gaussians, our OFFLINEPCPD
algorithm requires infinite noise and therefore provides no accuracy. Therefore, we finally
provide a second private algorithm OFFLINEPTCPD in Section 2.3.3, which has no re-
striction on the distributions and instead uses a truncation parameter A > 0 to control the
sensitivity of the log-likelihood calculation. In 2.1 we summarize accuracy bounds for both
the MLE and the output of our algorithms under these assumptions.
Table 2.1: Summary of accuracy guarantees for non-private and private offline change-
point detection under the alternate hypothesis H1. The expressions k̂, ∆(`), C, CM and
CA are defined in (2.2), (2.6), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), respectively.


































Although our algorithms only guarantee accuracy if the analyst supplies the true dis-
tributions P0, P1 from which data are drawn, it is important to note that the algorithms
are ε-differentially private for any hypothesized distributions P0, P1 and privacy parameter
ε > 0 regardless of the distributions from which X is drawn. In the change-point or sta-
tistical process control (SPC) literature, when the pre- and post- change distributions are
unknown in practical settings, researchers often choose hypotheses P0, P1 with the small-
est justifiable distance. While it is easier to detect and accurately estimate a larger change,
larger changes are often associated with a higher-sensitivity MLE, requiring more noise
(and therefore additional error) or truncation (and therefore information loss) to preserve
privacy. We propose that practitioners using our private change-point detection algorithm
choose input hypotheses accordingly. This practical setting is considered in our numerical
studies, presented in Section 2.5.
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2.3.1 Finite Sample Accuracy Guarantees for the MLE
Here we provide two accuracy bounds for the standard (non-private) MLE. These are the
first finite-sample accuracy guarantees for this estimator. Such non-asymptotic properties
have not been previously studied in traditional statistics, which typically focuses on con-
sistency and unbiasedness of the estimator, with less attention to the convergence rate. We
show that the additive error of the MLE is constant with respect to the sample size, which
means that the convergence rate is OP (1). These results provide a baseline for quantifying
the cost of privacy, since the techniques used in the theorem below mirror those used later
in the accuracy proofs for our private algorithms.
A technical challenge that arises in proving accuracy of the estimator is that the xi are
not identically distributed when the true change-point k∗ ∈ (1, n], and so the partial log-
likelihood ratios `(k) are dependent across k. Hence we need to investigate a sequence
of `(k) that may be neither independent nor identically distributed. Fortunately, the dif-
ferences `(k) − `(k + 1) = log P1(xk)
P0(xk)
are piecewise i.i.d.; that is, the differences are i.i.d.
before the change point k∗, and i.i.d. after the change point k∗. This property is key in our
proof. Moreover, we show that we can divide the possible outputs of the algorithm into
regions of doubling size with exponentially decreasing probability of being selected by the
algorithm, resulting in accuracy bounds that are independent of the number of data points
n.
Note that our first accuracy guarantee depends on two measures ∆(`) and C of the
distances between distributions P0 and P1. Accuracy is best for distributions for which
∆(`) is small relative to KL-divergence, which is consistent with the intuition that larger
changes are easier to detect but output sensitivity degrades the robustness of the estimator,
harming accuracy. This will be true for our first private algorithm OFFLINEPCPD, whose
accuracy is additionally harmed by the extra noise required to protect privacy when output
sensitivity is higher.
This dependence on ∆(`) is not inherent, however. Allowing ∆(`) to be infinite pre-
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cludes our use of the same concentration inequalities in obtaining the accuracy guarantee,
but the main idea in the proof can be salvaged by decomposing the change from P0 to P1
into a change from P0 to the average distribution (P0 + P1)/2 and then the average dis-

















which will allow us to provide an MLE accuracy guarantee for arbitrary distributions.
Theorem 10. For n data points drawn from P0, P1 such that ∆(`) < ∞ with true change








For n data points drawn from arbitrary P0, P1 with true change time k∗ ∈ (1, n), the








where C and CM are defined in (2.3) and (2.4), respectively.
Proof. Given some true change-point k∗ and error tolerance α > 0, we can partition the
set of bad possible outputs k̂ into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as follows.
For i ≥ 1, let
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α),
R+i = (k





Then we can bound the probability of the bad event as follows:
β = Pr
[









{`(k)− `(k∗)} > 0
]
. (2.9)
This requires us to reason about the probability that the log-likelihood ratios for the
data are not too far away from their expectation. Although the `(k) are not independent
across k, their pairwise differences `(k+ 1)− `(k) are. When ∆(`) <∞ we can apply our
corollary of Ottaviani’s inequality (Corollary 2) to bound the probability that `(k) exceeds
`(k∗) by appropriately defining several random variables corresponding to a data stream X
drawn according to the change-point model.
Specifically, we can decompose the empirical log-likelihood difference between the
true change-point k∗ and any candidate k into the expected value of this difference and the





+DKL(P0||P1), j < k∗
− log P1(xj)
P0(xj)




j=k Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P1), k < k∗∑k−1
j=k∗ Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0), k ≥ k∗
We can rewrite `(k) − `(k∗) as a zero-mean random variable subtracting a positive
deterministic quantity |k∗−k|DKL(P0||P1). In other words, `(k)− `(k∗) is positive only if
the zero-mean random variable takes a sufficiently large positive value, which we will prove
is a rare event. In this problem, we have to study the event {maxk{`(k) − `(k∗)} > 0},






k∗+m≤j<k∗ Uj, m < 0∑
k∗≤j<k∗+m Uj m > 0.
With these random variables, we bound the probability that the MLE lives in any par-




























































≤ 4 · exp(−2
i−2αC2/∆(`)2)
1− 2 · exp(−2i−2αC2/∆(`)2)
(2.10)









where the first inequality comes from the definitions of Ri and C, inequality (2.10) follows
from an application of Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2i−2αC and L = ∆(`), and the




is satisfied by the final bound on α in (2.7).
We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final
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bound on Equation (2.9). We note that this sum is bounded above by a geometric series
with ratio exp(−αC2/(2∆(`)2)) since 2i−1 ≥ i, yielding the second and third inequalities.
For the fourth inequality, the same assumed lower bound on α is used to simplify the













































Equations (2.12)–(2.14) involve a standard technique in bounding geometric series. This
technique will be invoked several times throughout the remainder of this paper. When it
is used again in future proofs, we will omit the intermediate steps and only show the final
results. For α as in (2.7) in the theorem statement, the expression above is bounded by β
as required.
In the case that ∆(`) is infinite, we instead define i.i.d. random variables Vj with mean
















, j ≥ k∗
This new set of random variables is necessary when ∆(`) is infinite, because the Uj no
longer have bounded support, so we cannot apply Corollary 2. Instead we will apply a
corollary of Bernstein’s inequality (Corollary 4) to get similar bounds.
With these random variables, we can bound the empirical log-likelihood difference
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, k < k∗∑k−1




, k ≥ k∗.







for any x. Next we bound each term in (2.9) for any i ≥ 1 as follows,








































































































where (2.15) follows from the definitions of Ri and CM , and (2.16) follows from an ap-
plication of Corollary 4 with λ1 = λ2 = 2i−2αCM and v = 4. The denominator is sim-













To verify the application of Corollary 4 used in Equation (2.16), we need to show that
for all j,
E [exp(|Vj|)− 1− |Vj|] ≤ 2. (2.18)





, j < k∗
(P0+P12 )(xj)
P1(xj)






(x) ≤ 2 for i = 0, 1, we have
0 ≤ DKL(Pi||(P0 + P1)/2) ≤ log 2, (2.19)
and thus eDKL(Pi||(P0+P1)/2) ∈ [1, 2]. It suffices to note that E [exp(|Vj|)] ≤ 3, because
E [exp(|Vj|)− 1− |Vj|] ≤ E [exp(|Vj|)− 1]. We present the analysis when j < k∗, and
the following expectation is taken under P0. Note that the other side j ≥ k∗ is similar with
the expectation taken under P1.
E [exp(|Vj|)] = E [exp(| log Yj − E [log Yj] |)]
≤ E [exp(log Yj − E [log Yj])] + E [exp(E [log Yj]− log Yj)]
= E [Yj] eDKL(P0||(P0+P1)/2) +
E [1/Yj]
eDKL(P0||(P0+P1)/2)





2 ≤ 3, (2.21)








(2.21) follows from the optimization that x+ 2/x ≤ 2
√
2 for x ∈ [1, 3].
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where inequality (2.22) uses the standard technique as in Equations (2.12)–(2.13). The








also use the fact that CM ≤ log 2 according to (2.19). For α as in (2.8) in the theorem
statement, the expression above is bounded by β, completing the proof.
2.3.2 Offline Algorithm under the Uniform Bound Assumption
Our first private offline algorithm OFFLINEPCPD applies the REPORTMAX algorithm [19]
to the change-point problem by adding Laplace noise with parameter ∆(`)/ε to each finite-
sensitivity partial log-likelihood ratio `(k) in order to estimate the private change-point.
We note that our algorithm can be easily modified to additionally output an approximation
of `(k̃) and incur 2ε privacy cost by composition.
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Algorithm 4 Offline private change-point detector: OFFLINEPCPD(X,P0, P1, ε, n)
Input: database X , distributions P0, P1, privacy parameters ε, database size n












Sample Zk ∼ Lap(∆(`)ε )
end for
Output k̃ = argmax
1≤k≤n
{`(k) + Zk}
Privacy of OFFLINEPCPD follows by instantiation of REPORTMAX [19] with queries
`(k) for k ∈ [n], which have sensitivity ∆(`); this proof is included for completeness.
Theorem 11. For arbitrary dataX and ε > 0, OFFLINEPCPD(X,P0, P1, ε) is ε-differentially
private.
Proof. Fix any two neighboring databases X,X ′ that differ on index j. For any k ∈ [n],
denote the respective partial log-likelihood ratios as `(k) and `′(k). By (2.1), we have








Next, for a given 1 ≤ i ≤ n, fix Z−i, a draw from [Lap(∆(`)/ε)]n−1 used for all the
noisy log likelihood ratio values except the ith one. We will bound from above and below
the ratio of the probabilities that the algorithm outputs k̃ = i on inputs X and X ′. Define
the minimum noisy value in order for i to be select with X:
Z∗i = min{Zi : `(i) + Zi > `(k) + Zk ∀k 6= i}
If ∆ < 0, then for all k 6= i we have
`′(i) + ∆(`) + Z∗i ≥ `(i) + Z∗i > `(k) + Zk ≥ `′(k) + Zk.
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If ∆ ≥ 0, then for all k 6= i we have
`′(i) + Z∗i ≥ `(i) + Z∗i > `(k) + Zk ≥ `′(k)−∆(`) + Zk.
Hence, Z ′i ≥ Z∗i + ∆(`) ensures that the algorithm outputs i on input X ′, and the theorem
follows from the following inequalities for any fixed Z−i, with probabilities over the choice
of Zi ∼ Lap(∆(`)/ε).
Pr[k̃ = i | X ′, Z−i] ≥ Pr[Z ′i ≥ Z∗i + A | Z−i] ≥ e−ε Pr[Zi ≥ Z∗i | Z−i] = e−ε Pr[k̃ = i | X,Z−i].
Next we provide an accuracy guarantee for the output k̃ of our private algorithm OF-
FLINEPCPD when the data are drawn from P0, P1 with true change point k∗ ∈ (1, n). By
providing this bound using a technique mirroring that of Theorem 10 to bound the error
of the non-private MLE, Theorem 12 quantifies the marginal cost of requiring privacy in
change-point detection. This additional cost comes from the fact that not only may the
randomness of the n data points X result in an incorrect MLE, but the randomness of the
Laplace noise added for privacy may also result in an incorrect noisy estimate of the MLE.
Theorem 12. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆(`) <∞ and n data points X drawn from
P0, P1 with true change time k∗ ∈ (1, n], and for privacy parameter ε > 0, the algorithm
















Proof. Our proof is structured around the observation that the algorithm only outputs a
particular incorrect k̃ 6= k∗ if there exists some k in which `(k) + Zk > `(k∗) + Zk∗ for
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a set of random noise values {Zk}k∈[n] selected by the algorithm. For the algorithm to
output an incorrect value, there must either be a k that nearly beats the true change point on
the noiseless data or there must be a k that receives much more noise than k∗. Intuitively,
this captures the respective scenarios that unusual data causes non-private ERM to perform
poorly and that unusual noise draws causes our private algorithm to perform poorly.
As in the proof of Theorem 10, given some true change-point k∗ and error tolerance
α > 0, we partition the set of bad possible outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially
increasing size. For i ≥ 1, let:
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α),
R+i = (k




Then for any range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, our previous observations allow us
to bound the probability of the bad event as follows:
















{Zk − Zk∗} ≥ ti
]
(2.26)
We bound each term in the above expression separately for ti = 2i−2αC, and we will
set α to ensure that each term is at most β/2. As in Theorem 10, we can bound the first set
of terms using Corollary 2 to bound the probability that `(k) significantly exceeds `(k∗) by
appropriately defining several random variables corresponding to a data stream X drawn






+DKL(P0||P1), j < k∗
− log P1(xj)
P0(xj)




j=k Uj − (k∗ − k)DKL(P0||P1), k < k∗∑k−1
j=k∗ Uj − (k − k∗)DKL(P1||P0), k ≥ k∗
We also define random variable Sm to denote the sum of m i.i.d. random variables as
follows, noting that Sm is distributed like
∑k∗−1







k∗+m≤j<k∗ Uj, m < 0∑
k∗≤j<k∗+m Uj m > 0
With these random variables, we bound each term in the first set of terms in (2.26) for









































≤ 4 · exp(−2
i−4αC2/∆(`)2)
1− 2 · exp(−2i−4αC2/∆(`)2)
(2.27)










where (2.27) follows from an application of Corollary 2 with λ1 = λ2 = 2i−3αC and




, which is satisfied by our final bounds.
We now consider the sum of these terms over all i, which will be needed for the final
bound on Equation (2.26). The same technique that was used to bound geometric series in
Equations (2.12)–(2.14) is applied here. For the fourth inequality, the same assumed lower


































The first term in (2.25) in the theorem statement ensures that the expression above is
bounded by β/2. It remains to show that the second term in (2.25) is enough to guarantee
that the Laplace noise added for privacy will not harm accuracy except with probability
β/2.
Next we bound the second set of terms of (2.26). We can easily bound one term in this
set for any i ≥ 1 since each Zk and Zk∗ are independent draws from a Laplace distribution













≤ 2iαPr[|Lap(∆(`)/ε)| ≥ 2i−3αC]














Then by summing over all ranges and assuming in (2.30) that α ≥ 4∆(`) log 2
Cε
to simplify
the denominator, which will be satisfied by our final bound on α, we obtain a bound on the




































































suffices to bound (2.30)
above by β/2.
2.3.3 Offline Algorithm for Arbitrary Distributions
In this subsection, we give an offline private change-point detector OFFLINEPTCPD that
offers guarantees even when ∆(`) is infinite. Relaxing the uniform bound assumption
means that we may have a single data point xj that dramatically increases `(k) for k ≥ j,
so we cannot add noise proportional to ∆(`). Instead we truncate the log-likelihood ratio
and add noise proportional to the post-truncation range. We compute the A-truncated log-












where [x]ba denotes the projection of x onto the interval [a, b]. This truncation scheme yields
privacy immediately by instantiation of REPORTMAX [19] with queries `A(k) for k ∈ [n],
which have sensitivity ∆(`A) = A.
Algorithm 5 Offline private change-point detector: OFFLINEPTCPD(X,P0, P1, ε, n, A)
Input: database X , distributions P0, P1, privacy parameter ε, database size n, truncation
parameter A









Sample Zk ∼ Lap(Aε )
end for
Output k̃ = argmax
1≤k≤n
{`A(k) + Zk} . Report noisy argmax
Theorem 13. For arbitrary data X and ε > 0, OFFLINEPTCPD(X,P0, P1, ε, A) is ε-
differentially private.
Since we are no longer able to uniformly bound P1(x)/P0(x), our accuracy results
include a truncation parameter A in place of ∆(`) since A is the sensitivity of `A. Rather
than C, the distributional difference measure parametrizing our results correspondingly



















We note that for Gaussian and Gamma distributions, any A > 0 ensures CA > 0. In
Section 2.5 we illustrate that for these distributions, it is best to choose small A to avoid
excess noise and effectively rely on the sign of the log-likelihood ratio for accuracy. For
general P0 6= P1, A > 2 is a sufficient condition by the following argument. When A > 2,



























With these definitions, we are ready to present the accuracy of OFFLINEPTCPD, in






play roles analogous to `(k) and DKL in
Theorem 12.
Theorem 14. For arbitrary hypotheses P0, P1 and n data points X drawn from P0, P1 with
true change time k∗ ∈ (1, n), for privacy parameter ε > 0, and for truncation parameter A

















where CA is defined in (2.5).
Proof. Given some true change-point k∗ and error tolerance α > 0, we can partition the
set of bad possible outputs k into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size as follows.
Following the notation of Theorem 12, for i ≥ 1 we let
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α),
R+i = (k




and for range-specific thresholds ti for i ≥ 1, we will bound the probability of a bad output
as follows:










{Zk − Zk∗} ≥ ti].
(2.32)
In order to do this, we decompose the truncated log-likelihood difference between the
true change-point k∗ and any candidate k into the sum of i.i.d. random variables with mean









































, k < k∗∑k−1






, k ≥ k∗
The rest of the proof follows exactly as the proof of the accuracy of OFFLINEPCPD
from Theorem 12 with ` replaced with `A, with ∆(`) replaced with A, and with C replaced
with CA. As before, we set ti = 2i−2αCA, and the constants are inherited exactly as is
because the truncated log-likelihood is applicable to the concentration inequalities in the
same way that the non-truncated but uniformly bounded log-likelihood was in Theorem 12.
2.4 Online Private Change-point Detection
In this section, we give new differentially private algorithms for change-point detection in
the online setting. In this setting, the algorithm initially receives n data points x1, . . . , xn
and then continues to receive data points one at a time. As before, the goal is to privately
identify an approximation of the time k∗ when the data change from distribution P0 to P1,
and now we additionally want to identify this change shortly after it occurs. We first give
an algorithm ONLINEPCPD for detecting a single change-point, and then we show how it
can be extended to ONLINEPMCPD to detect multiple change-points. Our algorithms use
OFFLINEPCPD as a subroutine, but can be modified in a straightforward way to use log-




Even in the single change-point setting, our offline algorithm is not directly applicable
because we do not know a priori how many points must arrive before a true change-point
occurs. To resolve this, ONLINEPCPD works like ABOVETHRESH (presented in Section
2.2.2), determining after each new data entry arrives whether it is likely that a change
occurred in the most recent n entries. When ONLINEPCPD at time j detects a sufficiently





for some k within n data
points of j, it calls OFFLINEPCPD to privately determine the most likely change point k̃ in
the window {xj−n+1, . . . , xj}.
Privacy of ONLINEPCPD is immediate from composition of ABOVETHRESH and OF-
FLINEPCPD, each with privacy loss ε/2. As before, accuracy requires X to be drawn
from P0, P1 with some true change point k∗. This algorithm also requires a suitable choice
of log-likelihood threshold T to guarantee that OFFLINEPCPD is called for a window of
data that actually contains k∗. Specifically, T should be large enough that the algorithm is
unlikely to call OFFLINEPCPD when j < k∗ but small enough so that it is likely to call
OFFLINEPCPD by time j = k∗ + n/2. When both of these conditions hold, we inherit the
accuracy of OFFLINEPCPD.
With our final bounds, we note that n  ∆(`)
C
log(k∗/β) suffices for existence of a
suitable threshold, and an analyst must have a reasonable approximation of k∗ in order to
choose such a threshold. Otherwise, the accuracy bound itself has no dependence on the
change-point k∗.
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Algorithm 6 Online private change-point detector: ONLINEPCPD(X,P0, P1, ε, n, T )
Input: database X , distributions P0, P1, privacy parameter ε, starting size n, threshold
T






Let T̂ = T + Lap(4∆(`)/ε)
for each new data point xj, j ≥ n do






Sample Zj ∼ Lap(8∆(`)ε )
if `j + Zj > T̂ then




Theorem 15. For arbitrary data X and ε > 0, ONLINEPCPD(X,P0, P1, ε, n, T ) is ε-
differentially private.
Theorem 16. For hypotheses P0, P1 such that ∆(`) < ∞, a stream of data points X with
starting size n drawn from P0, P1 with true change time k∗ ≥ n/2, privacy parameter









































In the above expressions, C = min{DKL(P0||P1), DKL(P1||P0)}.
Proof. We first give a range [TL, TU ] of thresholds that ensure that except with probability
β/4, the randomly sampled data stream satisfies the following two conditions for some
α′. These conditions are inherited from the requirements for ABOVETHRESH accuracy,
respectively capturing the requirements that the threshold is not reached too early and that
it is reached at least by the time the window is centered around k∗:
1. For T ≥ TL, maxk∈[j−n+1,j] `(k, j) < T − α′ for every j < k∗.
2. For T ≤ TU , maxk∈[k∗−n/2,k∗+n/2−1] `(k, k + n/2) > T + α′.
When these conditions are satisfied, the ABOVETHRESH guarantee ensures that except
with probability β/4, the randomness of the online algorithm ensures that it calls the of-
fline algorithm on a window of data containing the true change-point. Then we will argue
that our overall accuracy follows from the offline guarantee, where we will allow failure
probability β/2.
We will get the first condition by taking a union bound over all windows tested be-
fore the change-point, of the probability that the maximum log-likelihood maxk `(k) for
n elements X = {x1, . . . , xn} sampled from P0 exceeds a given threshold. To bound this
probability, we first define the following random variables.







We note that each `(k) is the sum of i.i.d. random variables, and that the maximum log-
likelihood overm consecutive elements is equal in distribution to maxk∈[m] Sk−kDKL(P0||P1).
This yields the first inequality below. Inequality (2.33) comes from applying Corollary 2
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2 exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2∆(`)2))





exp(−(2i−2C + t/2)2/(2i−2∆(`)2)) (2.34)










This ensures that 1−2 exp(−(2i−2C+t/2)2/(2i−2∆(`)2)) ≥ 1/2, giving Inequality (2.34),
and that the series is increasing exponentially in i, so we can collapse the sum with another
factor of 2 by considering only i = 1 as in Inequality (2.35). Plugging in this same value
of t to Inequality (2.35) also immediately gives Inequality (2.36). Taking a union bound






− C + α′ except with probability β/8.
To show that the second condition holds except with additional probability β/8, we
consider the window of data with the first half of data drawn from P0 and the second half
drawn from P1 and bound the probability that `(k∗) in this window is less than a given
threshold as follows. We note that `(k∗, k∗ + n/2 − 1) is the sum of n/2 i.i.d. random
variables log P1(xi)
P0(xi)
, although these variables are not mean-zero. Instead, we define mean-
zero random variables Vj = − log P1(xj)P0(xj) +DKL(P1||P0), and write `(k
∗, k∗ + n/2− 1) in
terms of these new variables, analogously to above. We can then bound the sum of the Vj
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{`(k, k∗ + n/2− 1)} < t
]
















n log(8/β) in this final expression ensures that (2.37) ≤ β/8.




Then we can instantiate the ABOVETHRESH accuracy guarantee with privacy parameter




1 and 2 are satisfied, ABOVETHRESH will identify a window containing the true change-
point except with probability β/4. Combining this with the β/4 probability that Conditions
1 and 2 fail to hold when T ∈ [TL, TU ], we get that ONLINEPCPD calls OFFLINEPCPD
in a window containing the change-point except with probability β/2 over the randomness
of the data and of the online portion of the algorithm.
We next instantiate OFFLINEPCPD with appropriate parameters to ensure that condi-
tioned on being called in the correct window, it will output a k̃ that is within α of the true
change-point k∗ with probability at most β/2. We can then complete the proof by taking a
union bound over all the failure probabilities.
Our offline accuracy guarantee requires data points are sampled i.i.d. from P0 before the
change point and from P1 thereafter. However, it remains to be shown that conditioning on
the event that we call the offline algorithm in a correct window does not harm the accuracy
guarantee too much. For a window size n, change-point k∗, stream X of at least k∗ + n/2
data points, set of random coins required by ONLINEPCPD and its call to OFFLINEPCPD,
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and a stopping index ν > n/2, let N(ν) denote the event that ONLINEPCPD calls OF-
FLINEPCPD on a window centered at ν, i.e., {xν−n/2, . . . , xν+n/2−1}, and let F (ν) denote
the event that OFFLINEPCPD on the window centered at ν fails to output an approximation
within α of k∗. Our previous arguments bound the probability of all N(ν) for ν outside of
a good range G = (k∗−n/2, k∗], and our offline guarantee bounds the probability of F (ν)
for any ν ∈ G as long as the data are truly distributed according to the change-point model.
Failure of the online algorithm can be due to either failure to halt on a correct window
or failure of the offline algorithm on a window containing the true change. Thus we can
then bound the probability of failure of the online algorithm as:







The first summation is at most β/2 by our previous arguments on the accuracy of the
online portion of the algorithm. It remains to calculate the second term. We can still
partition the set of bad possible output into sub-intervals of exponentially increasing size
as follows. For i ≥ 1, let
R−i = [k
∗ − 2iα, k∗ − 2i−1α),
R+i = (k

















{`(k, ν + n/2− 1)


















































{Zk − Zk∗} > ti]
Notice that the final line above is identical to Equation (2.26) in the proof of Theo-
rem 12 for the accuracy of OFFLINEPCPD: the first term is the empirical log-likelihood
difference between the true change-point k∗ and any candidate k, and the second term is
difference between two independent draws of Laplace noise. Thus the remainder of the
analysis follows that of Theorem 12 instantiated with parameters β/2 and ε/2. This in-
stantiation of Theorem 12 gives that Pr[
⋃













Combining this with our previous bound on the N(ν) terms, we get that Pr[|k̃ − k∗| >
α] ≤ β for the desired α value in the theorem statement.
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2.4.2 Multiple Changes
We now show how to extend our ONLINEPCPD algorithm to detect multiple change-
points. In this setting, the data change from distribution P0 to P1, from P1 to P2, . . .,
and from Pm−1 to Pm at times k∗1 , k
∗
2 , . . . , k
∗
m, respectively. As data arrive, ONLINEPM-
CPD makes online determinations about when the current window is sufficiently likely to
contain a change-point and calls OFFLINEPCPD when so. After each private report of a
change-point k̃i the algorithm simply restarts the remaining stream of data points after the
next n data points arrive and resumes scanning for subsequent change-points.
The idea of this algorithm is similar to the extension from ABOVETHRESH to SPARSE,
but by assuming that the m change-points are separated pairwise by at least the starting
database size n and by setting the thresholds to ensure that with high probability a change-
point k∗i is detected by time k
∗
i + n/2, we can update our sliding window between change-
point detections to ensure that each entry only participates in one call to ONLINEPCPD and
we never miss a change-point. This means that privacy of ONLINEPMCPD is immediate





Algorithm 7 Online private multiple change-point detector:
ONLINEPMCPD(X,P0, . . . , Pm, ε, n, T1, . . . , Tm)
Input: databaseX , distributions P0, . . . , Pm, privacy parameter ε, starting size n, thresh-
olds T1, . . . , Tm






Let T̂1 = T1 + Lap(4∆1/ε)
Let i = 1
for each new data point xj, j ≥ n do






Sample Zj ∼ Lap(8∆iε )
if `j + Zj > T̂i then
Output k̃i = (j − n) + OFFLINEPCPD({xj−n+1, . . . , xj}, Pi−1, Pi, ε/2, n)
if i = m then
Halt
else
Let i = i+ 1






Let T̂i = Ti + Lap(4∆i/ε)




Theorem 17. For arbitrary dataX and ε > 0, ONLINEPMCPD(X,P0, . . . , Pm, ε, n, T1, . . . , Tm)
is ε-differentially private.
We do not incur privacy composition across the multiple runs of ONLINEPCPD be-
cause each subroutine runs on a disjoint database. After OFFLINEPCPD is called in the
above algorithm, the algorithm waits for n new data points to arrive before beginning the
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for loop again (which corresponds to starting the next instantiation of ONLINEPCPD).
This means that none of the data points used in the algorithmic steps corresponding to
the previous instantiation of ONLINEPCPD will be used in the next instantiation. Thus
each instantiation of the ONLINEPCPD subroutine will operate on a disjoint subset of the
database, so they together satisfy ε-differential privacy, and composition is not needed [50].
One might be concerned that the starting point of (and hence the database that is input
to) the next instantiation of ONLINEPCPD inside ONLINEPMCPD depends on the halting
time of the previous instantiation. In particular, it will be exactly n data points after the
halting time of the previous instantiation. However, the halting time of ONLINEPCPD is
computed in a differentially private manner, so any function of it—such as the halting time
plus n—will be automatically differentially private by the post-processing guarantees of
differential privacy.
It remains to prove accuracy for ONLINEPMCPD. As before, accuracy requires X to
be drawn from P0, P1, . . . , Pm with some true change-points k∗1 , k
∗
2 , . . . , k
∗
m. To detect
each change-point k∗i , the choice of log-likelihood threshold Ti may need to be modified
according to the hypothesized distributions and possibly to the expected time until the next
change-point, which depends on the accuracy of the previous output.





∞ for i = 1, . . . ,m, a stream of data pointsX with starting size n drawn from P0, P1, . . . , Pm
with true change times k∗0, k
∗




0 = 0, k
∗
1 ≥ n/2, k∗i − k∗i−1 ≥ 3n/2 for
























for i = 1, . . . ,m, we have that ONLINEPMCPD(X,P0, . . . , Pm, ε, n, T1, . . . , Tm) is (α, β)-
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In the above expressions, ∆ = max{∆1, . . . ,∆m},Ci = min{DKL(Pi−1||Pi), DKL(Pi||Pi−1)}
and C = min{C1, . . . , Cm}.
Proof. For α as in the theorem statement, we will decompose the probability that the algo-
rithm fails to output α-approximations for every k∗i into the sum of m conditional proba-
bilities, each of which can be bounded by β/m by an instantiation of our accuracy theorem
for ONLINEPCPD. In the proof below, we let Si for i ∈ [m] denote the event that ON-
LINEPMCPD calls ONLINEPCPD for the ith time with k∗i in the latter half of the window
and ONLINEPCPD outputs an α-approximation of k∗i . Then we have that












Pr[ONLINEPCPD(X ′i, Pi−1, Pi, ε, n, Ti) fails], (2.38)
for X ′i drawn according to the single change-point model with initial distribution Pi−1 and
post-change distribution Pi with change-point k∗i − k∗i−1. The third inequality is because
the event S̄i conditioned on S1 ∩ · · · ∩ Si−1 is equivalent to the failure of ONLINEPCPD
on a data stream consistent with the single change-point model, and in particular, failure
is most likely when there are as many data points drawn from Pi−1 as possible. Then
bounding each term follows from instantiation of the theorem for ONLINEPCPD because
we can treat the ending point of the previous detection window as the starting point of a
new detection procedure.
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To be more mathematically rigorous, for i = 2, . . . ,m, we have
Pr[S̄i ∩ Si−1] ≤ Pr[S̄i|Si−1] = E[Pr(S̄i|Si−1, ji−1)|Si−1] = E[Pr(S̄i|ji−1)|Si−1], (2.39)
where the last equality follows from the fact that Si−1 and S̄i are independent conditional
on ji−1. This conditional independence is an immediate consequence of the fact that Si−1
depends only on the data x1, . . . , xji−1 and S̄i depends only on the data xji−1+1, xji−1+2, . . .,
which are mutually independent conditional on ji−1, as ji−1 is a stopping time.
Our final goal is to bound Pr(S̄i|ji−1), which can be done by invoking Theorem 16.
The only difference here is that the index of the first sample is ji−1 + 1, instead of 1. Thus



















































we have TL,i ≤ TL,i(j) ≤ Ti ≤ TU,i(j) ≤ TU,i(j) for any j ∈ [k∗i−1, k∗i−1 + n/2]. Then
by instantiation of Theorem 16, we have that Pr(S̄i|ji−1 = j) ≤ β/m provided that j ∈
[k∗i−1, k
∗
i−1 + n/2]. Note that the event Si−1 implies ji−1 ∈ [k∗i−1, k∗i−1 + n/2]. Thus,
Pr[S̄i ∩ Si−1] is bounded above by β/m, and (2.38) is bounded above by β.
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2.5 Numerical Studies
In this section, we present results from Monte Carlo experiments designed to validate the
theoretical results of previous sections. The theoretical privacy guarantees hold in the
worst-case over all databases and over all outputs of the algorithm, so it is only neces-
sary to empirically validate the accuracy of our algorithms. Our simulations consider both
offline (Section 2.5.1) and online settings (Section 2.5.2) for the canonical problems of de-
tecting a change in the mean of Bernoulli or Gaussian distributions. In the offline setting,
we additionally show that our algorithms can accurately detect changes in the variance of
Gaussian distribution and detect changes in the shape parameter of a Gamma distribution.
For completeness, we state the PMF of a Bernoulli distribution, and the PDF of Gaus-
sian and Gamma distributions below.
• Bernoulli distribution: Pr(x = 1) = p and Pr(x = 0) = 1− p.
• Gaussian distribution: f(x;µ, σ) = (2πσ2)1/2 exp(−(x−µ)2/(2σ2)), where µ is the
mean and σ is the standard deviation.
• Gamma distribution: f(x; k, θ) = (Γ(k)θk)−1xk−1 exp(−x/θ), where θ is the scale
parameter and k is the shape parameter.
2.5.1 Evaluating the Offline Algorithms
Each simulation is characterized by a probability distribution family (Bernoulli, Gaussian,
or Gamma), a distribution parameter that changes (mean, standard deviation, or shape),
and a change magnitude (large, small, or underspecified). The large and small change
regimes correspond respectively to large and small changes in the distribution parameter
of interest. The underspecified regime corresponds to the setting where the true change
is large, but the input parameters correspond to a small change. This setting goes beyond
our theoretical results to suggest that our algorithm still performs well, even when the
distributional parameters are misspecified. All parameters are stated in the caption.
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For Bernoulli distributions, the log-likelihood ratio is uniformly bounded and so we
use OFFLINEPCPD; for Gaussian and Gamma distributions, we set A = 0.1 (for reasons
discussed later in this section) and use OFFLINEPTCPD. We vary privacy parameter ε =
0.1, 0.5, 1 and ∞, representing the non-private case. For each of our simulations, we use
n = 200 observations where the true change occurs at time k∗ = 100. This process is
repeated 104 times. The results of these simulations are presented in 2.1, which plots the
empirical probabilities β = Pr[|k̃− k∗| > α] as a function of α. All the parameters of each
simulation are stated in the caption.
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(a) Bernoulli: p0 = 0.2; p1 =
0.8



















(b) Bernoulli: p0 = 0.2; p1 =
0.4








































(d) Gaussian σ = 1: µ0 =
0;µ1 = 1



















(e) Gaussian σ = 1: µ0 =
0;µ1 = 0.5








































(g) Gaussian µ = 0: σ0 =
1;σ1 = 5



















(h) Gaussian µ = 0: σ0 =
1;σ1 = 3








































(j) Gamma θ = 2: k0 =
3; k1 = 1



















(k) Gamma θ = 2: k0 =
3; k1 = 2



















(l) Gamma: underspecified k
change
Figure 2.1: Measured accuracy of offline algorithms on simulated change-point data. For
large and small changes (Columns 1 and 2, resp.), parameters specify distributions from
which data are drawn and hypothesized distributions given as inputs to the algorithm; for
underspecified changes (Column 3), data are drawn according to large change values but
algorithm is provided hypothesized distributions consistent with small change values.
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2.1 illustrates three important results for our offline algorithms when data are drawn
from Bernoulli, Gaussian, or Gamma distributions: accuracy deteriorates as privacy im-
proves but performs quite well even for strong privacy guarantees (ε < 1), accuracy is
best when the true change in distribution is large (Columns 1 vs 2), and the algorithm per-
forms well even when the true change is larger than that hypothesized (Column 3). The
performance in the underspecified change experiments bolster our theoretical results sub-
stantially, indicating that our hypotheses can be quite far from the distributions of the true
data and our algorithms will still identify a change-point relatively accurately.
Choice of truncation parameter A. The OFFLINEPCPD algorithm does not provide
meaningful results when the sensitivity of the log-likelihood ratio is infinite, as in the case
of Gaussian and Gamma distributions, so we must instead use OFFLINEPTCPD with some
truncation parameter A. Theorem 14 shows that accuracy guarantees are strongest when
A/CA is smallest. Since CA is a function of the hypothesized distributions as well as A,
the value of A should be chosen on a case-by-case basis.
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(a) Gaussian large mean
change





















(b) Gaussian large variance
change

















(c) Gamma large shape
change




















(d) Gaussian large mean
change




















(e) Gaussian large variance
change




















(f) Gamma large shape
change
Figure 2.2: First row plotsA/CA as a function ofA varying from 0 to 4 for different types
of changes; theoretical accuracy bounds are strongest when A/CA is smallest. Second
row shows simulated accuracy under different choices of A for different types of change.
Each simulation involves 104 runs of OFFLINEPTCPD on data generated by 200 i.i.d.
samples from appropriate distributions with change-point k∗ = 100.
The first row of Figure 2.2 numerically plots A against A/CA for the large change
cases we simulated. The plots suggest that a small A also leads to a small A/CA, and
A/CA converges to a constant as A goes to 0. The second row verifies optimality of small
A by simulation, plotting the empirical probabilities β as a function of accuracy α under
different choices of A.











there is a trade-off between how much information is lost from truncation in the first term
and how much noise is added in the second term. As A→ 0+, each data point contributes
±A/2. For natural distributions, it appears that giving some data points more weight than
others does not provide enough additional information to offset the additional required
noise.
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2.5.2 Evaluating the Online Algorithm
We also run Monte Carlo simulations of our online change-point detection algorithm ON-
LINEPCPD when the data points arrive sequentially and the true change occurs at time
k∗ = 5000. We consider only large mean changes in Bernoulli and Gaussian distributions.
For the Gaussian distributions, we truncate the log-likelihoods in the main algorithm and
call OFFLINEPTCPD with A = 0.1. The new challenge is to choose an appropriate sliding
window size n and corresponding threshold T in order to achieve good overall accuracy.
The window size of n = 200 used in the offline simulations does not permit any threshold
that reasonably controls both false positive and false negative rates, so we choose a larger
window size of n = 700 and restrict our online simulations to ε = 0.5, 1,∞. We choose
the appropriate threshold T by setting a constraint that an algorithm must have positive and
negative false alarm rates both at most 0.1.
For the online simulations, we chose the lower and upper bounds of T via numerical
methods in both Bernoulli and Gaussian models instead of using the theoretical bounds, as
these bounds are overly conservative for the Bernoulli model and do not immediately apply
for truncation method that is necessary in Gaussian model. We use several key ideas from
Section 2.4 to speed up the numerical search of the threshold T . To limit the false positive
rate to 0.10 with up to k∗ = 5000 sliding windows, a conservative lower bound for threshold
T is the 1−0.10/5000 = 0.99998 quantile of the noisy versions ofWn = max1≤k≤n `(k) or
Wn = max1≤k≤n `A(k) with n = 700 under the pre-change distribution. To limit the false
negative rate, an upper bound for threshold T is the 10% quantile of the noisy versions
of CUSUM statistics Wn with n = 700 when the change occurs at time 350. This will
guarantee that the online algorithms raise an alarm with probability at least 0.9 during the
time interval [4650, 5350].
To determine these lower and upper bounds for T , we simulate 106 realizations of
the CUSUM statistics W700 in both the pre-change and post-change cases. In each case,
we speed up the computation of Wi by using the recursive form Wi = max{Wi−1, 0} +
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log(P1(Xi)/P0(Xi)) or Wi = max{Wi−1, 0} + [log(P1(Xi)/P0(Xi))]A/2A/2 for i ≥ 1. The
empirical quantiles of the noisy versions of W700 under the pre- and post- change cases
will yield the lower and upper bounds of the threshold T . When the range of acceptable
thresholds T was non-empty, we chose the upper bound. For the Bernoulli model, this
resulted in a choice of T = 220 for all values of ε = 0.5, 1,∞. In the Gaussian model,
we chose T = 8, 4.5, 100 for ε = 0.5, 1,∞, respectively. Figure 2.3 (a and c) indeed show
that with these parameters, the algorithm works well except with probability about 0.2, and
comparison with plots b and d, we can see that almost all of the error for reasonable values
of α is due to failure to abort on a window containing the true change-point. This indicates
that the primary challenge in the online setting is determining when to raise an alarm in
a sequence of sliding windows of observations. Once such window is identified correctly,
the offline estimation algorithm can be used to accurately estimate the change-point.
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(a) Bernoulli: Online accuracy


















(b) Bernoulli: Accuracy when on-
line halts on correct window


















(c) Gaussian: Online accuracy


















(d) Gaussian: Accuracy when on-
line halts on correct window
Figure 2.3: Probability that the online algorithm produces an inaccurate estimate (left)
and probability that the online algorithm produces an inaccurate estimate conditioned on
halting in a window containing k∗ (right) for Bernoulli and Gaussian large mean changes.
Each simulation involves 106 runs of ONLINEPCPD or its 0.1-truncated variant with
window size n = 700 and varying ε on data generated by i.i.d. samples from appropriate
distributions with change point k∗ = 5000. See text for description of choices of threshold
T .
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter gives private algorithms for both online and offline change-point detection,
including the problem of detecting multiple change-points. Our analysis involves providing
new finite-sample accuracy guarantees for the standard (non-private) MLE task, and we
incorporate tools from differential privacy to add noise to ensure that no individual’s data is
compromised in the estimation process while maintaining statistical accuracy at a modest
privacy cost that depends on the difference between the pre- and post-change distributions.
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We extend these results to the online setting by carefully analyzing a range of thresholds
for which we can accurately detect a range in a sliding window in which a change-point
has likely occurred.
Our empirical results show that change-points in data drawn from well-behaved distri-
butions can be detected relatively accurately even if the hypothesized distributions differ
from the real ones. The choice of hypothesized pre- and post-change distributions remains
a domain-specific problem, and so rather than provide concrete guidance about how a prac-
titioner should choose these distributions to use our algorithms in a particular setting, this
work offers worst-case error bounds on the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy assum-
ing these distributions are chosen correctly, and our algorithms ensure privacy even when
they are not. More extensive, domain-specific empirical studies on hypothesis classes of
interest is important future work to establish appropriate rules of thumb for practitioners
who wish to apply our private change-point tools.
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CHAPTER 3
PAPRIKA: PRIVATE ONLINE FALSE DISCOVERY RATE CONTROL
3.1 Introduction
In the modern era of big data, data analyses play an important role in decision-making in
healthcare, information technology, and government agencies. The growing availability
of large-scale datasets and ease of data analysis, while beneficial to society, has created
a severe crisis of reproducibility in science. In 2011, Bayer HealthCare reviewed 67 in-
house projects and found that they could replicate fewer than 25 percent, and found that
over two-thirds of the projects had major inconsistencies [51]. One major reason is that
random noise in the data can often be mistaken for interesting signals, which does not
lead to valid and reproducible results. This problem is particularly relevant when testing
multiple hypotheses, when there is an increased chance of false discoveries based on noise
in the data. For example, an analyst may conduct 250 hypothesis tests and find that 11 are
significant at the 5% level. This may be exciting to the researcher who publishes a paper
based on these findings, but elementary statistics suggests that (in expectation) 12.5 of those
tests should be significant at that level purely by chance, even if the null hypotheses were
all true. To avoid such problems, statisticians have developed tools for controlling overall
error rates when performing multiple hypothesis tests.
In hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis of no interesting scientific discovery (e.g.,
a drug has no effect), is tested against the alternative hypothesis of a particular scientific
theory being true (e.g., a drug has a particular effect). The significance of each test is
measured by a p-value, which is the probability of the observed data occurring under the
null hypothesis, and a hypothesis is rejected if the corresponding p-value is below some
(fixed) significance level. Each rejection is called a discovery, and a rejected hypothesis is
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a false discovery if the null hypothesis is actually true. When testing multiple hypotheses,
the probability of a false discovery increases as more tests are performed. The problem of
false discovery rate (FDR) control is to find a procedure for testing multiple hypotheses
that takes in the p-values of each test, and outputs a set of hypotheses to reject. The goal is
to minimize the number of false discoveries, while maintaining high true positive rate (i.e.,
true discoveries).
In many applications, the dataset may contain sensitive personal information, and the
analysis must be conducted in a privacy-preserving way. For example, in genome-wide
association studies (GWAS), a large number of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
are tested for an association with a disease simultaneously or adaptively. Prior work has
shown that the statistical analysis of these datasets can lead to privacy concerns, and it
is possible to identify an individual’s genotype when only minor allele frequencies are
revealed [52]. Therefore, we need formal privacy guarantees for the FDR control problem.
Related Work. The only prior work on differentially private FDR control [53] considers
the classic offline multiple testing problem, where an analyst has all the hypotheses and cor-
responding p-values upfront. Their private method repeatedly applies REPORTNOISYMIN
[19] to the celebrated Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure [54] in offline multiple testing
to privately pre-screen the p-values, and then applies the BH procedure again to select the
significant p-values. The (non-private) BH procedure first sorts all p-values, and then se-
quentially compares them to an increasing threshold, where all p-values below their (ranked
and sequential) threshold are rejected. The REPORTNOISYMIN mechanism privatizes this
procedure by repeatedly (and privately) finding the hypothesis with the lowest p-value.
Although the work of [53] showed that it was possible to integrate differential privacy
with FDR control in multiple hypothesis testing, the assumption of having all hypotheses
and p-values upfront is not reasonable in many practical settings. For example, a hospital
may conduct multi-phase clinical trials where more patients join over time, or a market-
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ing company may perform A/B testings sequentially. In this chapter, we focus on the
more practical online hypothesis testing problem, where a stream of hypotheses arrive se-
quentially, and decisions to reject hypotheses must be made based on current and previous
results before the next hypothesis arrives. This sequence of the hypotheses could be in-
dependent or adaptively chosen. Due to the fundamental difference between the offline
and online FDR procedures, the method of [53] based on REPORTNOISYMIN cannot be
applied to the online setting. Instead, we use SPARSEVECTOR, described in Section 1.2,
as a starting point. Discussion of non-private online multiple hypothesis testing appears in
Section 3.2.1.
Our Results. We develop a differentially private online FDR control procedure for multi-
ple hypothesis testing, which takes a stream of p-values and a target FDR level and privacy
parameter ε, and outputs discoveries that can control the FDR at a certain level at any time
point. Such a procedure provides unconditional differential privacy guarantees (to ensure
that privacy will be protected even in the worst case) and satisfy the theoretical guarantees
dictated by the FDR control problem.
Our algorithm, Private Alpha-investing P-value Rejecting Iterative sparse veKtor Al-
gorithm (PAPRIKA, Algorithm 10), is presented in Section 3.3. Its privacy and accuracy
guarantees are stated in Theorem 20 and 21, respectively. In Section 3.4, we provide a
thorough empirical investigation of PAPRIKA .
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Background on Online False Discovery Rate Control
In the online false discovery rate (FDR) control problem, a data analyst receives a stream of
hypotheses on the database D, or equivalently, a stream of p-values p1, p2, . . .. The analyst
must pick a threshold αt at each time t to reject the hypothesis when pt ≤ αt; this threshold
can depend on previous hypotheses and discoveries, and rejection must be decided before
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the next hypothesis arrives.






, whereH0 is the (unknown to the analyst) set of hypotheses where the null hy-
pothesis is true, andR is the set of rejected hypotheses. We will also write these terms as a
function of time t to indicate their values after the first t hypotheses: FDR(t), FDP(t), H0(t),
R(t). The goal of FDR control is to guarantee that for any time t, the FDR up to time t is
less than a pre-determined quantity α ∈ (0, 1).
Such a problem was first investigated by [56], who proposed a framework known as
online alpha-investing that models the hypothesis testing problem as an investment prob-
lem. The analyst is endowed with an initial budget, can test hypotheses at a unit cost, and
receives an additional reward for each discovery. The alpha-investing procedure ensures
that the analyst always maintains an α-fraction of their wealth, and can therefore continue
testing future hypotheses indefinitely. Unfortunately, this approach only controls a slightly
relaxed version of FDR, known as mFDR, which is given by mFDR(t) =
E[|H0∩R|]
E[|R|] . This
approach was later extended to a class of generalized alpha-investing (GAI) rules [57]. One
subclass of GAI rules, the Level based On Recent Discovery (LORD), was shown to have
consistently good performance in practice [58, 59]. GAI++ in [60] improves the class
of GAI, with LORD++ as an explicit example. The SAFFRON procedure, proposed by
[61], further improves the LORD procedures by adaptively estimating the proportion of
true nulls, and is the current state-of-the-art in online FDR control for multiple hypothesis
testing.
To understand the main differences between the SAFFRON and the LORD proce-






j≤t,j∈H0 αj overestimates the number of false discoveries, so FDP
∗(t) over-
estimates the FDP. The oracle estimator FDP∗(t) cannot be calculated since H0 is un-
known. LORD’s naive estimator
∑
j≤t αj/|R(t)| is a natural overestimate of FDP
∗(t). The








j=1 is a sequence of user-chosen parameters in the interval (0, 1),
which can be a constant or a deterministic function of the information up to time t−1. This
estimate provides the null-proportion adaptivity basis for SAFFRON.
Our private algorithm is built upon the LORD++ and the SAFFRON algorithms, which
are given formally in Algorithm 8 and 9. As a class of GAI, the LORD++ and the
SAFFRON both start off with an error budget, which will be allocated to different tests
over time. The wealth budget decays as each hypothesis is tested, and it earns back
wealth on every rejection except for the first. The decay factors γj that depreciate past
wealth is a non-increasing sequence summing to one, which ensures that the sum of the
wealth budget is always below the desired level α. SAFFRON involves an additional
candidacy checking step to be null-proportion adaptive: it never loses wealth when test-
ing candidate p-values with pj < λj . The sequence {λj}∞j=1 can be defined by any
coordinatewise non-decreasing function gt. For example, {λj}∞j=1 can be a determinis-
tic sequence of constants, or λt = αt, as in the case of alpha-investing. These λj val-
ues serve as a weak overestimate of αj . The algorithm first checks if a p-value is be-
low λj , and if so, adds it to the candidate set of hypotheses that may be rejected. It
then computes the αj threshold based on current wealth, current size of the candidate
set, and the number of rejections so far, and decides to reject the hypothesis if pj ≤ αj .
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Algorithm 8 SAFFRON(α,W0, {γj}∞j=0)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, target FDR level α, initial wealth W0 < α,
positive non-increasing sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to one.
Set rejection number i = 0
for each p-value pt do
Set λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1)
Set the indicator for candidacy Ct = I(pt < λt). Set the candidates after the j-th




if t = 1 then
Set α1 = (1− λ1)γ1W0
else




Output Rt = I(pt ≤ αt)
if Rt = 1 then




Algorithm 9 LORD++(α,W0, {γj}∞j=0)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, target FDR level α, initial wealth W0 < α,
positive non-increasing sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to one.
Set rejection number i = 0
for each p-value pt do
Compute αt = W0γt + (α−W0)γt−τ1 +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj
Output Rt = I(pt ≤ αt)
if Rt = 1 then
Update rejection number i = i+ 1. Set the i-th rejection time as τi = t
end if
end for
Both LORD++ and SAFFRON require that the input sequence of p-values are still
valid p-values given past information, which is formalized as conditional super-uniformity
of null p-values, with respect to a filtration process on the sequence of rejection decisions
{Rj} and candidacy {Cj} (for SAFFRON). It requires that the input sequence of p-values
are not too correlated under the null hypothesis. This condition is formalized through a
filtration on the sequence of candidacy and rejection decisions. Intuitively, this means that
the sequence of hypotheses cannot be too adaptively chosen, otherwise the p-values may
become overly correlated and violate this condition. Denote by Rj := I(pj ≤ αj) the
indicator for rejection, and let Cj := I(pj ≤ λj) be the indicator for candidacy. Define
the filtration formed by the sequences of σ-fields F t := σ(R1, . . . , Rt, C1, . . . , Ct), and let
αt := ft(R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1), where ft is an arbitrary function of the first t − 1
indicators for rejections and candidacy. The null p-values are said to be conditionally super-
uniformly distributed with respect to the filtration F if:
If null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ αt|F t−1) ≤ αt. (3.1)
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We note that independent p-values is a special case of the conditional super-uniformity
condition of (3.1). When p-values are independent, they satisfy the following condition:
If the null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ u) ≤ u for all u ∈ [0, 1].
SAFFRON provides the following accuracy guarantees under this condition.








≥ E [|H0 ∩R(t)|];
(b) The condition F̂DPSAFFRON(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N implies that mFDR(t) ≤ α for all
t ∈ N.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and of the non-null p-values, and {αt}






≥ E [FDP (t)] := FDR(t) for all t ∈ N;
(d) The condition F̂DPSAFFRON(t) ≤ α for all t implies that FDR(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N.
3.2.2 Background on Offline Private False Discovery Rate Control
Differential privacy guarantees are often achieved by adding noise scales with the additive
sensitivity. Unlike the conventional use of additive sensitivity, [53] defined the notion of
multiplicative sensitivity specifically for p-values. It is motivated by the observation that,
although the additive sensitivity of a p-value may be large, the relative change of the p-
value on two neighboring datasets is stable unless the p-value is very small. This notion
allows us to treat the logarithm of the p-values as having additive sensitivity η, substantially
reducing the scale of noise required to preserve privacy.
Definition 3 (Multiplicative Sensitivity [53]). A p-value function p is said to be (η, µ)-
multiplicative sensitive if for all neighboring databasesD andD′, either both p(D), p(D′) ≤
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µ or
exp(−η)p(D) ≤ p(D′) ≤ exp(η)p(D).
3.3 Private online false discovery rate control
In this section, we provide our algorithm for private online false discovery rate control,
PAPRIKA, given formally in Algorithm 10. It starts with SAFFRON, using SPARSE-
VECTOR to ensure privacy of the rejection set. However, the combination of these tools is
far from immediate, and several algorithmic innovations are required, including: dynamic
thresholds in SPARSEVECTOR to accommodate the alpha-investing rule, adding noise that
scales with the multiplicative sensitivity of p-values to reduce the noise required for pri-
vacy, shifting the SparseVector threshold to accommodate FDR as a novel accuracy metric,
and the candidacy indicator step which cannot be done privately and requires modifica-
tions to the wealth updates. We resolve this by using a similar wealth updating rule as
in LORD++. We provide new analysis for both privacy and accuracy. We elaborate on
the algorithmic details and why these modifications are needed to ensure privacy and FDR
control.
The non-private online false discovery rate control algorithms decide to reject hypothe-
sis t if the corresponding p-value pt is less than the rejection threshold αt; that is, if pt ≤ αt.
We instantiate the SPARSEVECTOR framework in this setting, where pt plays the role of the
tth query answer ft(X), and αt plays the role of the threshold. Note that SPARSEVECTOR
uses a single fixed threshold for all queries, while our algorithm PAPRIKA allows for a dy-
namic threshold that depends on the previous output. Our privacy analysis of the algorithm
accounts for this change and shows that dynamic thresholds do not affect the privacy guar-
antees of SPARSEVECTOR. However, the algorithm would not be private if the dynamic
thresholds also depend on the data. Note that SAFFRON never loses wealth when testing
candidate p-values with pj ≤ λj , and the threshold αj depends on the data since it is based
on current wealth. We remove such dependence in PAPRIKA by losing wealth at every
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step regardless of whether we test a candidate p-values, similar to LORD++. This will
result in stricter FDR control (and potentially weaker power) because our wealth decays
faster.
Algorithm 10 PAPRIKA(α, λ,W0, γ, c, ε, δ, s)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .} with mutiplicative sensitivity (η,µ), target FDR
level α, initial wealth W0 < α, positive non-increasing sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to
one, expected number of rejections c, privacy parameters ε, δ, threshold shift magnitude
s, maximum number of p-values k.





for each p-value pt do
if count ≥ c then Output Rt = 0
else
Sample Zt ∼ Lap(4ηc/ε). Set λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1). Set the indicator for
candidacy Ct = I(log pt < log 2λt).
if t = 1
then Set α1 = (1− 2λ1)γ1W0
else
Compute αt = (1− 2λt)(W0γt + (α−W0)γt−τ1 +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj)
if Ct = 1 and log pt + Zt ≤ logαt − A+ Zcountα
then Output Rt = 1. Set count = count +1 and sample Zcountα ∼
Lap(2ηc/ε)
else Output Rt = 0
end for
Similar to prior work on private offline FDR control [53], we use multiplicative sen-
sitivity as described in Definition 3, as p-values may have high sensitivity and require un-
acceptably large noise to be added to preserve privacy. We assume that our input stream
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of p-values p1, p2, . . . , each has multiplicative sensitivity (η, µ). As long as µ is small
enough (i.e., less than the rejection threshold), we can treat the logarithm of the p-values
as the queries with additive sensitivity η. Because of this change, we must make rejection
decisions based on the logarithm of the p-values, so our reject condition is log pt + Zt ≤
logαt + Zα for Laplace noise terms Zt, Zα drawn from the appropriate distributions.
The accuracy guarantees of SPARSEVECTOR ensure that if a value is reported to be
below threshold, then with high probability it will not be more than αSV above the thresh-
old. However, to ensure that our algorithm satisfies the desired bound FDR ≤ α, we
require that reports of “below threshold” truly do correspond to p-values that are below the
desired threshold αt. To accommodate this, we shift our rejection threshold logαt down
by a parameter A. A is chosen such that the algorithm satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy,
but the choice can be seen as inspired by the αSV -accuracy term of SPARSEVECTOR as
given in Theorem 7. Therefore our final reject condition is log pt + Zt ≤ logαt −A+ Zα.
This ensures that “below threshold” reports are below (logαt − A) + αSV ≈ logαt with
high probability. Empirically, we see that the bound of A in Theorem 20 may be overly
conservative and lead to no hypotheses being rejected, so we allow an additional scaling pa-
rameter s that will scale the magnitude of shift by a factor of s. The conservative bounds of
Theorem 20 correspond to s = 4, but in many scenarios a smaller value of s = 1 or 2 will
lead to better performance while still satisfying the privacy guarantee. Further guidance
choosing this shift parameter is given in Section 3.4.4.
Even with these modifications, a naive combination of SPARSEVECTOR and SAF-
FRON would still not satisfy differential privacy. This is due to the candidacy indicator
step of the algorithm. In the SAFFRON algorithm, a pre-processing candidacy step occurs
before any rejection decisions. This step checks whether each p-value pt is smaller than a
loose upper bound λt on the eventual reject threshold αt. The algorithm chooses αt using
an α-investing rule that depends on the number of candidate hypotheses seen so far, and
ensures that αt ≤ λt, so only hypotheses in this candidate set can be rejected. These λ
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values are used to control F̂DPSAFFRON(t), which serves as a conservative overestimate of
FDP(t). (For a discussion of how to choose λt, see Lemma 6 or our experimental results in
Section 3.4. Reasonable choices would be λt = αt or a small constant such as 0.2.)
Without adding noise to the candidacy condition, there may be neighboring databases
with p-values pt, p′t for some hypothesis such that log pt < log λt < log p
′
t, and hence the
hypothesis would have positive probability of being rejected under the first database and
zero probability of rejection under the neighbor. This would violate the (ε, 0)-differential
privacy guarantee intended under SPARSEVECTOR. If we were to privatize the condi-
tion for candidacy using, for example, a parallel instantiation of SPARSEVECTOR, then
we would have to reuse the same realizations of the noise when computing the rejection
threshold αt to still control FDP, but this would no longer be private.
Since we cannot add noise to the candidacy condition, we weaken it in PAPRIKA to
be log pt < log 2λt1 Then if a hypothesis has different candidacy results under neighboring
databases and the multiplicative sensitivity η is small, then the hypothesis is still extremely
unlikely to be rejected even under the database for which it was candidate. To see this,
consider a pair of neighboring databases that induce p-values where log pt < log 2λt <
log p′t. Due to the multiplicative sensitivity constraint, we know that log pt ≥ log 2λt − η.
Plugging this into the rejection condition log pt + Zt ≤ logαt − A + Zα, we see that we
would need the difference of the noise terms to satisfy Zt−Zα ≤ log 12 −A+ η, which by
analysis of the Laplace distribution, will happen with exponentially small probability in n
when η = poly−1(n).2 Our PAPRIKA algorithm is thus (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
we account for this failure probability in our (exponentially small) δ parameter, as stated in
Theorem 20.
1We note that although this change is algorithmically equivalent to scaling up the parameter λt by a
factor of 2, this slack is relevant for certain instantiations of PAPRIKA that set λt = αt, which we show
perform well empirically. (See Section 3.4 for more details.) We write this step as a relaxation of the
candidacy condition both for notational consistency with existing non-private alpha-investing-based FDR
control methods, such as SAFFRON AI [61], that also choose λt = αt, and to emphasize that this slack in
the candidacy condition is necessary in ensuring differential privacy of the overall algorithm.
2Such values of η are typical; see examples in Section 3.4 where η = 1√
n
. The shift term A also has
dependence on η which contributes to the bound.
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One may wonder whether this candidacy step in necessary at all. Since we have re-
moved the dependence of αt on the size of the candidate set in PAPRIKA, the threshold
αt is no longer null-proportion sensitive. The advantage of being null-proportion adaptive
in SAFFRON increases as the proportion of non-nulls increases, but we focus on the case
where the non-nulls are sparse, and thus it has little impact in our setting. In Section 3.4,
we empirically compare PAPRIKA to two private versions of LORD++, which we call
PrivLORD and PrivLORD2. The former combines SPARSEVECTOR and LORD++, with
the same threshold shifting as described earlier in this section. The latter adds the candi-
dacy checking step on top of PrivLORD. We see in Section 3.4.3 that both methods provide
poor FDR control relative to PAPRIKA, thus providing empirical evidence that the candi-
dacy step in PAPRIKA plays a vital role in FDR control, even if αt is not null-proportion
sensitive. Further details about PrivLORD and PrivLORD2 are deferred to Appendix ??.
Our PAPRIKA algorithm allows analysts to specify a maximum number of hypothe-
ses tested k and rejections c. We require a bound on the maximum number of hypotheses
tested because the accuracy guarantees of SPARSEVECTOR only allows exponentially (in
the size of the database) many queries to be answered accurately. Once the total number
of rejections reaches c, the algorithm will fail to reject all future hypotheses. We do not
halt the algorithm as in SPARSEVECTOR and therefore, PAPRIKA does not have a stop-
ping criterion, and we can safely talk about the FDR control at any fixed time, just like
SAFFRON and LORD++.





|R(t)| . We note
that this is equivalent to F̂DPSAFFRON(t) by scaling down λj by a factor of 2. By analyzing
and bounding this expression, we achieve FDR bounds for our PAPRIKA algorithm, as
stated in Theorem 21.
Theorem 20. For any stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, PAPRIKA is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
As a starting point, our privacy comes from SPARSEVECTOR, but as discussed above,
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many crucial modifications are required. To briefly summarize the key considerations,
we must handle different thresholds at different times, multiplicative rather than additive
sensitivity, a modified notion of the candidate set, and introducing a small delta parameter
to account for the new candidate set definition and the shift.
Before proving Theorem 20, we will state and prove the following lemma, which will
be useful in the proofs of Theorem 20 and Theorem 21.
Lemma 5. If Z1 ∼ Lap(2b), Z2 ∼ Lap(b) and C > 0 is a constant, we have Pr(Z1 ≥
























































































Now we are ready to prove Theorem 20.
Proof. Fix any two neighboring databases D and D′. Let R denote the random variable
representing the output of PAPRIKA(D,α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s) and let R′ denote the
random variable representing the output of PAPRIKA(D′, α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s). Let
k denote the total number of hypotheses. When log pt ≥ log 2λ and log p′t ≥ log 2λ for
all t, Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) = 1 = Pr(R′ = {0, 0, . . . , 0}). When log pt < log 2λ and
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log p′t < log 2λ for all t, privacy follows from the privacy of SPARSEVECTOR with dynamic
thresholds. Since the threshold at each time t only depends on the threshold at time t − 1
and and private rejection R(t − 1), by post-processing, the threshold αt is private. Then
by post-processing and the privacy of SPARSEVECTOR , the rejection R(t) is also private.
We give the formal probability argument as follows. For any neighboring D,D′ and any
sequence of hypotheses, we first consider the output up to the first rejection, which is
ABOVETHRESH . Consider any output r ∈ {0, 1}l. Let r = {r1, r2, . . . , rl}, with rl = 1
and r1 = . . . = rl−1 = 0. Let
fi(D, z, αi) = Pr(log pi(D) + Zi < logαi − A+ z)
gi(D, z, αi) = Pr(log pi(D) + Zi ≥ logαi − A+ z),






−∞ Pr(Zα = z) Pr(Rl(D) = rl|rl−1, . . . , r1) Pr(R2(D) = r2|r1) Pr(R1(D) = r1)dz∫∞
−∞ Pr(Zα = z) Pr(Rl(D
′) = rl|rl−1, . . . , r1) Pr(R2(D′) = r2|r1) Pr(R1(D′) = r1)dz
=
∫∞
−∞ Pr(Zα = z)gl(D, z, αl)
∏l−1
i=1 fi(D, z, αi)dz∫∞








−∞ Pr(Zα = z − η)gl(D, z − η, αl)
∏l−1
i=1 fi(D, z − η, αi)dz∫∞
































Equation (3.3) is from change of integration variable z to z− η. Inequality (3.4) is because
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Zα follows Lap(2ηc/ε) and log pi(D)− η ≤ log pi(D′). Inequality (3.5) is because
gl(D, z − η, αl) = Pr(log pl(D) + Zl ≥ logαl − A+ z − η)
≤ Pr(log pl(D′) + η + Zl ≥ logαl − A+ z − η)
≤ Pr(log pl(D′) + Zl ≥ logαl − A+ z − 2η)
≤ exp(ε/2c) Pr(log pl(D′) + Zl ≥ logαl − A+ z)
≤ exp(ε/2c)gl(D′, z, αl).
When we restart ABOVETHRESH after the first rejection, the inital threshold is the post-
processing of the previous ouputs, which is also private. Then by simple composition, the
overall privacy loss is ε.
For other cases, the worst case is that for all t, log pt < log 2λ and log p′t ≥ log 2λ. In
this setting, we have
Pr(R′ = r) =

1 if r = {0, 0, . . . , 0}
0 otherwise.
To satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy, we need to bound the probability of outputting r for
databaseD. We first consider r = {0, 0 . . . , 0}. We wish to bound Pr(R′ = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤
exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0})+δ and Pr(R = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R′ = {0, 0, . . . , 0})+
δ. The latter is trivial since exp(ε) Pr(R′ = {0, 0, . . . , 0})+δ = exp(ε)+δ, which is greater
than 1. It remains to satisfy Pr(R′ = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) + δ,
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which is equivalent to 1− δ ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}). We have




































where Inequality (3.7) is because the worst case happens when pt is η below the candidacy
threshold log 2λ, Equation (3.8) applies Lemma 5, and Inequality (3.9) follows from the
facts that αt ≤ λ for all t and that the third term in (3.8) is positive. Setting (3.9) to be















Next, we consider all other possible outputs r. Define the set
S := {r | there exists a t such that rt = 1}. We wish to bound Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R′ ∈
S)+δ and Pr(R′ ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R ∈ S)+δ. The latter is trivial since Pr(R′ ∈ S) = 0.
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It remains to bound Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ δ. For any t, we have
Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ Pr(Rt = 1)
= Pr(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt − A+ Zα)
≤ Pr(log 2λ+ Zt ≤ logαt − A+ Zα) (3.11)
= Pr(Zt ≤ Zα − (log(2λ/αt) + A))

























where Inequality (3.11) is because the worst case occurs when log pt = log 2λ, Equality
(3.12) applies Lemma 5, and Inequality (3.13) follows from the facts that αt ≤ λ for all t

















min{δ, 1− ((1− δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}.






3 min{δ, 1− ((1− δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}
− log 2 + η
)
,
which is how the shift term A is set in PAPRIKA.
Next we describe the theoretical guarantees of FDR control for our private algorithm
PAPRIKA which is an analog of Theorem 19. We modify the notation of the conditional
super-uniformity assumption of SAFFRON to incorporate the added Laplace noise. The
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conditions are otherwise identical. (See (3.1) for comparison.) We note that independent p-
values is a special case of conditional super-uniformity, but this requirement more generally
allows for a broader class of dependencies among p-values. Let Rj := I(pj + Zj ≤
αj + Zα) be the rejection decisions, and let Cj := I(pj ≤ 2λj) be the indicators for
candidacy. We let αt := ft(R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1), where ft is an arbitrary function
of the first t− 1 indicators for rejections and candidacy. Define the filtration formed by the
sequences of σ-fields F ′t := σ(R1, . . . , Rt, C1, . . . , Ct, Z1, . . . , Zt, Zα). The null p-values
are conditionally super-uniformly distributed with respect to the filtration F ′ if when the
null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ αt|F ′t−1) ≤ αt. We emphasize that this condition
is only needed for FDR control, and that our privacy guarantee of Theorem 20 holds for
arbitrary streams of p-values, even those which do not satisfy conditional super-uniformity.
Our FDR control guarantees for PAPRIKA mirror those of SAFFRON (Theorem 19).
The first two statements apply if p-values are conditionally super-uniform, and the last two
statements apply if the p-values are additionally independent under the null.








+ δt ≥ E [|H0 ∩R(t)|];
(b)The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N implies that mFDR(t) ≤ α + δt for all
t ∈ N.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and of the non-null p-values, and {αt}






+ δt ≥ E [FDP (t)] := FDR(t) for all t ∈ N;
(d) The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t implies that FDR(t) ≤ α+δt for all t ∈ N.
Relative to the non-private guarantees of Theorem 19, the FDR bounds provided by
PAPRIKA are weaker by an additive of δt. In most differential privacy applications, δ is
typically required to be cryptographically small (i.e., at most negligible in the size of the
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database) [19], so this additional term should have a minuscule effect on the FDR.3 We
note that ε plays a role in the analysis of Theorem 21, although it does not appear in FDR
bounds. Equation (3.22) shows that the additive slack term δt in Theorem 21 is in fact
min
{




t, which is upper bounded by δt.
Proof. For any time t > 0, before the total number of rejections reaches c we bound the
















E [αj] + Pr(Zj ≤ Zα − A), (3.16)
where Inequality (3.15) follows from the rejection rule before the total number of rejections
reaches c, and the number of false rejections is always 0 afterwards. Inequality (3.16)
follows from the conditional super-uniformity property. We bound each term in (3.16)
separately. Using the law of iterated expectations by conditioning on F ′t−1, we can bound




























where Equation (3.17) applies the conditional super-uniformity. Since F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α,
3Alternatively, δ could be treated like a tunable parameter to balance the tradeoff between privacy and
FDR control. If an analyst has an upper bound on the allowable slack in FDR, say 0.01, then she could set









 ≤ αE [|R(t)|] .
Next, we bound the second term in (3.16) as follows:
∑
j≤t,j∈H0













































If the null p-values are independent of each other and the non-nullls, and {αt} is a































+ Pr(Zj ≤ Zα − A), (3.19)
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where Inequality (3.18) applies the law of iterated expectations by conditioning on F ′t−1
and Lemma 6. Inequality (3.19) follows by a case analysis: if Zj > Zα−A, then exp(Zα−
Zj − A) < 1, and thus min{αj exp(Zα−Zj−A),1}|R(t)| reduces to
αj
|R(t)| . On the other hand, if Zj ≤
Zα−A, then min{αj exp(Zα−Zj−A),1}|R(t)| ≤
1
|R(t)| ≤ 1, allowing us to upper bound the expectation
by the probability of this event.



























where Inequality (3.20) applies Lemma 6.
It remains to bound the second term in (3.19), which we do using Lemma 5 as follows:
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
Pr(Zj ≤ Zα − A) ≤
∑
j≤t





















Combining (3.21) and (3.22), we reach the conclusion that FDR(t) ≤ α+min{δ, 1− ((1−
δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}t ≤ α + δt.
The following lemma is a key tool in the proof of Theorem 21. Though it is qualitatively
similar to Lemma 2 in [61], it is crucially modified to show an analogous statement holds
under the addition of Laplace noise.
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Lemma 6. Assume p1, p2, . . . are all independent and let h : {0, 1}k → R be any coordinate-
wise non-decreasing function. Assume ft and gt are coordinate-wise non-decreasing func-
tions and that αt = ft(R1:t−1, C1:t−1) and λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1). Then for any t ≤ k such


























Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in [61] with the addition of i.i.d. Laplace
noise.
In a high level, we hallucinate a vector of p-values that are same as the original vector
of p-values, except for the t-th index. This allows us to apply the conditional uniformity
property, since now pt is independent of the hallucinated rejections. We then connect the
original rejections and the hallucinated rejections by the monotonicity of the rejections.
We perform our analysis using a hallucinated process: let p̃t1:k be a copy of p1:k that is
identical everywhere except for the t-th p-value which is set to be 1. That is,
p̃i =

1 if i = t
pi otherwise.
Also let the hallucinated Laplace noises Z̃t1:k be an identical copy of Z1:k, and let Z̃α be an
identical copy of Zα. The t-th value of Z̃t1:k can be arbitrary since we have ensure the event
{p̃t > 2λt}, so it will fail to become a candidate and the values of Z̃t will not be relevant.
We denote C̃1:k and R̃1:k as the candidates and rejections made using p̃t1:k, Z̃
t
1:k, and Z̃α.
By construction, we have R̃1:t−1 = R1:t−1. On the event {pt > 2λt}, we have Rt =
R̃t = 0 and Ct = C̃t = 0 because p̃t = 1, so both will fail to become candidates, and hence







We note that when pt ≤ 2λt, the above equation still holds since both sides will be zero.
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where Inequality (3.23) is obtained by taking the expectation only with respect to pt by
invoking the conditional super-uniformity property and independence of pt and h(R̃1:k),
and Inequality (3.24) follows from the facts that Ri ≥ R̃i for all i and that the function h is
non-decreasing.
For the second inequality in the lemma statement, we hallucinate a vector of p-values
p̄t1:k that equals p1:k everywhere except for the t-th p-value which is set to be 0. That is,
p̄i =

0 if i = t
pi otherwise.
Also let the hallucinated Laplace noises Z̄t1:k be an identical copy of Z1:k, and let Z̄α be an
identical copy of Zα. We denote C̄1:k and R̄1:k as the candidates and rejections made using
p̄t1:k and Z̄
t
1:k. By construction, we have R̄i = Ri and C̄i = Ci for all i < t. On the event
that {log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα − A}, since p̄t = 0 and we inject the same Laplace noise,
we have R̄t = Rt = 1 and C̄t = Ct = 1, and hence also R̄1:k = R1:k. Then the following
equation holds:
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα − A)
h(R1:k)
=
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα − A)
h(R̄1:k)
.
We note that when log pt +Zt > logαt +Zα−A, the above equation still holds since both






























where Inequality (3.25) follows by taking expectation only with respect to pt by invoking
the conditional uniformity property and the fact that the support of p-values is [0, 1], and
Inequality (3.26) follows from the facts that h(R1:k) ≤ h(R̄1:k) since Ri ≤ R̄i for all i and
that the function h is non-decreasing.
There are no known theoretical bounds on the statistical power of SAFFRON even in
the non-private setting. Instead, we validate power empirically through the experimental
results in Section 3.4.
3.4 Experiments
We experimentally compare the FDR and the statistical power of variations of the PA-
PRIKA and SAFFRON procedures, under different sequences of {λj}. Following the
convention of [61], we define PAPRIKA-Alpha-Investing, or PAPRIKA AI, to be the
instantiation of Algorithm 10 with the sequence λj = αj , where the rejection threshold
matches the α-investing rule, and we use PAPRIKA to denote Algorithm 10 instantiated
with a sequence of constant of λj , which in our experiments is λj = 0.2. We use λj = 0.5 in
SAFFRON.4 We generally observe that, even under moderately stringent privacy restric-
tions, PAPRIKA and its AI variant perform comparably to the non-private alternatives,
4Recall from Section 3 that our λj is equivalent to the λj in SAFFRON scaling down by a factor of 2.
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with PAPRIKA AI typically outperforming PAPRIKA. This suggests that even though
setting λj as a fixed constant may be easier for implementation, parameter optimization
can lead to meaningful performance improvements. We chose the sequence {γj} to be a
constant 1/k up to time k. Note that the sequence can be decreasing such as of the form
γj ∝ j−s in [61], which controls the wealth to be more concentrated around small values
of j. See [61] for more discussion on the choice of {γj}. In our experiments, we set the
target FDR level α + δt = 0.2, and thus our privacy parameter δ is set to be bounded by
0.2/800 = 2.5 × 10−4. The maximum number of rejections c = 40. All the results are
averaged over 100 runs. We investigate two settings: the observations come Bernoulli dis-
tributions in Section 3.4.1, and the observations are generated from truncated exponential
distributions in Section 3.4.2. In Section 3.4.3, we compare our algorithm against other
private algorithms. In Section 3.4.4, we discuss our choice of the shift parameter A and
give guidance on how to choose this parameter in practice.
3.4.1 Testing with Bernoulli Observations
We assume that the database D contains n individuals with k independent features. The
ith feature is associated with n i.i.d. Bernoulli variables ξi1, . . . , ξ
i
n, each of which takes the
value 1 with probability θi, and takes the value 0 otherwise. Let ti be the sum of the ith
features. A p-value for testing null hypothesis H i0 : θi ≤ 1/2 against H i1 : θi > 1/2 is









. [53] showed that pi is (µ, η)-multiplicatively sensitive for




, where m ≤ poly(n) and c is any small positive constant. We
choose θi = 0.5 with probability 1 − π1, and θi = 0.75 with probability π1, for varying
values of π1, which represents the expected fraction of non-null hypotheses. We consider
relatively small values of π1 as most practical applications of FDR control (such as GWAS
studies) will have only a small fraction of true “discoveries” in the data.
In the following experiments, we sequentially test H i0 versus H
i
1 for i = 1, . . . , k.
We use n = 1000 as the size of the database D, and k = 800 as the number of fea-
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tures as well as the number of hypotheses. Our experiments are run under several differ-




3 min{δ,1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k} (i.e., when s = 1), which still satisfies our privacy
guarantee. Further discussion on the choice of A and additional results under other shift
parameters s are deferred to Section 3.4.4. The results are summarized in Figure 3.1,
which plots the FDR and statistical power against the expected fraction of non-nulls, π1.
In Figure 3.1(a) and (b), we compare our algorithms with privacy parameter ε = 5 to the
non-private baseline methods of LORD [58, 59], Alpha-investing [57], and SAFFRON
and SAFFRON AI from [61]. In Figure 3.1(c,d) and (e,f), we compare the performance of
PAPRIKA AI and PAPRIKA, respectively, with varying privacy parameters ε = 3, 5, 10.












































































Figure 3.1: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-null hypotheses π1 for PAPRIKA
(with λj = 0.2), PAPRIKA AI (with λj = αj), and non-private algorithms when the database
consists of Bernoulli observations.
As expected, the performance of PAPRIKA generally diminishes as ε decreases. A
notable exception is that FDR also decreases in Figure 3.1(c). This phenomenon is because
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we set λj = αj , resulting in a smaller candidacy set and leading to insufficient rejections.
Surprisingly, PAPRIKA AI also yields a lower FDR than many of the non-private algo-
rithms (Figure 3.1(a)), since it tends to make fewer rejections. We also see that PAPRIKA
AI performs dramatically better than PAPRIKA, suggesting that the choice of λj = αj
should be preferred to constant λj to ensure good performance in practice.
3.4.2 Testing with Truncated Exponential Observations
In this section, we also assume that have n individuals in the database D, and that each
individual’s data contains k independent features. The ith feature is associated with n i.i.d.
truncated exponential distributed variables ξi1, . . . , ξ
i
n, each of which is sampled according
to density
fi(x | θi, b) =
θi exp(−θix)
1− exp(−bθi)
I(0 ≤ x ≤ b),
for positive parameters b and θi. Let ti be the realized sum of the ith features, and let Ti
denote the random variable of the sum of the n truncated exponential distributed variables
in the ith entry. A p-value for testing the null hypothesis H i0 : θi = 1 against the alternative









where m ≤ poly(n) and c is any small positive constant. In the following experiments, we




1 with probability 1− π1
1.95 with probability π1,
where we vary the parameter π1, corresponding to the expected fraction of non-nulls.
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We sequentially test H i0 versus H
i
1 for i = 1, . . . , k. We use n = 1000 as the size of the
database D, and k = 800 as the number of features as well as the number of hypotheses.
While there is no closed form to compute the p-values, the sum of n = 1000 i.i.d. samples
is approximately normally distributed by the Central Limit Theorem. The expectation and






















, nVar[ξij]), and we




3 min{δ,1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k} (shift magnitude s = 1). The results are shown in














































































Figure 3.2: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-nulls π1 for PAPRIKA (with λj =
0.2), PAPRIKA AI (with λj = αj), and non-private algorithms when the database consists of
truncated exponential observations.
As in the case with binomial data, we see that the performance of PAPRIKA generally
diminishes as ε decreases, and that PAPRIKA AI outperforms PAPRIKA, again reinforc-
ing the need for tuning the parameters λj based on the alpha-investing rule. All methods
perform well in this setting, and the FDR of PAPRIKA AI is visually indistinguishable
from 0 at all levels of ε and π1 tested. Numerical values are listed in Table A.2 in Appendix
A.2 for ease of comparison.
We provide a further illustration of our experiments on truncated exponentials in Fig-
ure 3.3. In particular, we plot the rejection threshold αt and wealth versus the hypothesis
index. Each “jump” of the wealth corresponds to a rejection. We observe that the rejections
of our private algorithms are consistent with the rejections of the non-private algorithms,
another perspective which empirically confirms their accuracy.
One hypothesis for the good performance observed in Figure 3.2 is that the signal be-
tween the null and alternative hypotheses as parameterized by θi is very strong, meaning
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the algorithms can easily discriminate between the true null and true non-null hypotheses
based on the observed p-values. To measure this, we also varied the value of θi in the al-
ternative hypotheses. These results are shown in Figure 3.4, which plots FDR and power
of PAPRIKA and PAPRIKA AI with when the alternative hypotheses have parameter
θi = 1.90, 1.95, 2.00. As expected, the performance gets better as we increase the signal,































(b) ε = 5
Figure 3.3: Wealth and rejection threshold αt versus hypothesis index with privacy parameter ε = 5
when the database consists of truncated exponential observations. PAPRIKA AI and SAFFRON
















































Figure 3.4: FDR and statistical power versus expected fraction of non-null hypotheses π1 under
various choices of signal θi = 1.90, 1.95, 2.00 for alternative hypothesis parameters. The privacy
parameter is ε = 5, and the database consists of truncated exponential observations. The first row
shows performance of PAPRIKA AI where λj = αj , and the second row shows performance of
PAPRIKA where λj = 0.2.
3.4.3 Comparison with Other Private Algorithms
As PAPRIKA is the first algorithm for private online FDR control, there is no private
baseline for comparison. In Appendix A.2, we show that naı̈ve Laplace privatization of
SAFFRON is ineffective. This naı̈ve approach applies the Laplace Mechanism [8] to the
p-values of each hypothesis, and then uses these noisy p-values as input to SAFFRON.
We see that this baseline mechanism performs extremely poorly relative to PAPRIKA and
PAPRIKA AI.
We also compare our PAPRIKA against PrivLORD and PrivLORD2 with Bernoulli
observations in Figure 3.5 and truncated exponential observations in Figure 3.6. For com-
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parison, we use the same shiftA for the four algorithms, but we note thatA should be larger
in PrivLORD to control FDR at the level 0.2 as it lacking the candidate checking step, and











































































(f) ε = 10
Figure 3.5: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-nulls π1 for PAPRIKA (with λj =













































































(f) ε = 10
Figure 3.6: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-nulls π1 for PAPRIKA (with λj =
0.2), PAPRIKA AI (with λj = αj), and PrivLORD and PrivLORD2 when the database consists of
truncated exponential observations.
We make three key observations. First, PrivLORD makes significantly more false
discoveries than the other three algorithms, suggesting that the candidacy checking step
largely offsets against the added noise for private algorithms. The performance of PrivLORD
gets closer to PAPRIKA and PAPRIKA AI when we add less noise as ε goes large. Sec-
ond, PAPRIKA with constant λt has stricter FDR control and slightly weaker power com-
pared to PrivLORD2 as expected, since the threshold αt in PAPRIKA has an additional
constant (1 − 2λt) factor. Third, PAPRIKA AI provides dramatically better FDR and
power tradeoffs—it controls FDR at a much lower level while maintaining power at a simi-
lar level as other methods (even the best in Figure 3.5(f) and 3.6(d)), suggesting PAPRIKA
with a smart choice of the predictable sequence {λt} is preferred.
3.4.4 Choice of shift A
We now discuss how to choose the shift parameter A. Theorem 20 gives a theoretical lower
bound forA in terms of the privacy parameter δ, but this bound may be overly conservative.
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Since the shiftA is closely related to the performance of FDR and statistical power, we wish
to pick a value of A that yields good performance in practice. In Theorem 21, we show
that FDR(t) is less than our desired bound α plus the privacy parameter δt, which naturally
requires that the privacy loss parameter δ be small. For a more detailed explanation, we
bound Inequality (3.22) in the proof of Theorem 21 using Inequality (3.14) from the proof
of Theorem 20, and therefore, the empirical δ is naturally tied to the empirical FDR. As
long as we can guarantee the empirical FDR to be bounded by the target FDR level, our
privacy loss is bounded by the nominal δ.
We use the Bernoulli example in Section 3.4.1 to investigate the performance under
different choices of the shift A with privacy parameter ε = 5. The results are summarized
in Figure 3.7, which plots the FDR and power versus the expected fraction of non-nulls
when we vary the shift size with s = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.
Larger shifts (corresponding to larger values of s) will lower the rejection threshold,
which causes fewer hypotheses to be rejected. This improves FDR of the algorithm, but
harms Power, as the threshold may be too low to reject true nulls. Figure 3.7 shows that
the shift size parameter s should be chosen by the analyst to balance the tradeoff between




















































Figure 3.7: FDR and statistical power versus expected fraction of non-null hypotheses π1 under
various choices of shift magnitude s. The privacy parameter is ε = 5, and the database consists of
Bernoulli observations. The first row shows performance of PAPRIKA AI where λj = αj , and the
second row shows performance of PAPRIKA where λj = 0.2.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter gives realizable tools to handle the online private false discovery rate control
problem. Our algorithm is based upon two non-private online FDR control algorithms in
the GAI family: LORD++ and SAFFRON, and the SPARSEVECTORalgorithm in privacy
literature. It involves several algorithmic innovations needed to guarantee privacy and FDR
control simultaneously. Our algorithms have strong provable guarantees for privacy and
statistical performance as measured by FDR and power. We also provide experimental
results to demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms in a variety of data environments.
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CHAPTER 4
DATASET-LEVEL ATTRIBUTE LEAKAGE IN COLLABORATIVE LEARNING
4.1 Introduction
Modern machine learning models have been shown to memorize information about their
training data, leading to privacy concerns regarding their use and release in practice. Leak-
age of sensitive information about the data has been shown via membership attacks [62,
63], attribute inference attacks [64, 65], extraction of text [66] and data used in model up-
dates [67, 68]. These attacks focus on leakage of information about an individual record in
the training data, with several recent exceptions [69, 70] pointing out that leakage of global
properties about a dataset can also lead to confidentiality and privacy breaches.
In this chaper, we study the problem of leakage of dataset properties at the population-
level. Attacks on leakage of global properties about the data are concerned with learning
information about the data owner as opposed to individuals whose privacy may be violated
via membership or attribute inference attacks. The global properties of a dataset are confi-
dential when they are related to the proprietary information or IP that the data contains, and
its owner is not willing to share. As an example, consider the advantage one can gain from
learning demographic information of customers or sales distribution across competitor’s
products.
Our primary focus is on inferring dataset properties in the centralized multi-party ma-
chine learning setting. This setting allows multiple parties to increase utility of their data
since the model they obtain is trained on a larger data sample than available to them indi-
vidually. Benefits of computing on combined data have been identified in multiple sectors
including drug discovery, health services, manufacturing and finance [71]. For example,
anti-money laundering served as a use case for secure data sharing and computation during
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the TechSprint organized by the Financial Conduct Authority, UK in 2019 [72]. A poten-
tial machine learning task in this setting is to create a system that identifies a suspicious
activity based on financial transactions and demographic information of an entity (e.g., a
bank customer). Since multiple financial institutions have separate views of the activities,
such a system can be used to detect common patterns.
Deployments and availability of secure computation methods [73, 74, 75, 76] can en-
able multi-party machine-learning by alleviating immediate privacy concerns of the parties.
In particular, secure multi-party machine learning provides parties with a black-box access
to a model trained on their pooled data without requiring the parties to share plaintext data
with each other. Unfortunately, as we show in this chapter, this is insufficient to address
all privacy implications of collaborative machine learning. In particular, we demonstrate
that global properties about one party’s sensitive attributes can be inferred by the second
party, even when only black-box access to the model is available. Consider implications of
our attacks in the use case above. An attacker party (e.g., one of the banks) can learn dis-
tribution of demographic features pertaining to the customer population in the other bank
(e.g., whether the other bank has more female than other customers or what percentage of
customers has income over a certain threshold) that it can use in the future when developing
a marketing campaign to attract new customers.
Analysis of our attacks shows that leakage of population-level properties is possible
even in cases where sensitive attribute is irrelevant to the task, i.e., it has ≈ 0 correlation
with the task in hand. Though removing sensitive attributes may seem like a viable solution,
it is not provably secure due to correlations that are present in the data. Indeed, we show that
in many cases, information is still leaked regardless of whether training data contained the
sensitive attribute or not. We argue that this is possible due to correlation between sensitive
attributes and other attributes that exists in the data. For example, datasets we use indicate
that there is correlation between sets of attributes including gender, occupation and working
hours per week, as well as income, occupation and age. Such customer attributes are often
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Table 4.1: Comparison of attacks on leakage of dataset properties.
Attacker’s knowledge Single-party Multi-party Datasets
Melis et al. [70] training gradients X tabular, text, images
Ganju et al. [69] model parameters (white-box) X tabular, images
Ateniese et al. [77] model parameters (white-box) X tabular, speech
This work model predictions (black-box) X X tabular, text, graphs
recorded by financial institutions, as a result indicating potential leakage if institutions were
to collaborate towards detection of financial crime as described above.
Threat model. We consider the setting where the model is securely trained on the joined
data of the honest party and of an honest-but-curious party. Honest-but-curious adversary
considers a realistic setting where the malicious party (1) will not alter its own data — if it
does, the model may not perform well and, if detected, could undermine the trust from the
other party in the partnership — and (2) will not change the machine learning code — both
parties may wish to observe the code to be run on the data to ensure its quality and security.
The attacker is interested in learning global properties about a sensitive attribute at the
dataset level, that is, how values of this attribute are distributed in the other party’s dataset.
It may be interested in learning which attribute value is dominant (e.g., whether there are
more females) or what the precise ratio of attribute values is (e.g., 90% females vs. 70%
females).
Attack technique. We show that dataset property can be leaked merely from the black-
box access to the model. In particular, the attacker does not require access to the training
process of the model (e.g., via gradients [70]) or to model parameters (aka white-box at-
tack [69, 77]). Following other attacks in the space, the attacker also uses shadow models
and a meta classifier. However, individual predictions from the model are not sufficient
to extract global information about a dataset. To this end, we introduce an attack vector
based on a set of queries and use them in combination in order to infer a dataset property.
In contrast to previous work on property leakage, the attack requires less information and
assumptions on the attacker (see Table 4.1 and Section 4.8 for more details).
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Methodology. To understand what causes information leakage about a property we con-
sider several correlation relationships between the sensitive attribute A, the rest of the at-
tributesX , and the target variable Y that the machine learning model aims to learn. Surpris-
ingly, we show that dataset-level properties about A can be leaked in the setting where A
has low or no correlation with Y . We demonstrate this with experiments on real data and
experiments with a synthetic attribute where we control its influence on X and Y . The
attack persists across different model types such as logistic regression, multi-layer percep-
trons (MLPs), Long Short Term Memory networks (LSTMs), and Graphical Convolution
Networks (GCNs) models and for different dataset types such as tabular, text, and graph
data. The attack is efficient as it requires 100 shadow models and fewer than 1000 queries.
Machine learning settings. In addition to the multi-party setting, our property leakage
attack can be carried out in the following two settings. (1) single-party setting where an
owner of a dataset releases query interface of their model; (2) in the model update setting,
one can infer how the distribution of a sensitive property has changed since the previous
release of the model. The second attack also applies to multi-party machine learning, show-
ing that the party that joins last exposes its data distribution more than parties who were
already collaborating.
Contributions. Our contributions are as follows:
• Problem Formulation: We study leakage of properties about a dataset used to train a
machine learning model when only black-box access to the model is available to the
attacker.
• Attack Technique: We propose an effective attack strategy that requires only a few
hundred inference queries to the model (black-box access) and relies on a simple
attack architecture that even a computationally bound attacker can use.
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• Attack Setting: We show that leakage of dataset properties is an issue for an owner of
a dataset when the owner releases a model trained on their data (single-party setting);
when the owner participates in multi-party machine learning, and when the owner
contributes data to update an already trained model (e.g., either because it joins other
parties or because it has acquired new data).
• Empirical Results: We show that distribution of a sensitive attribute can be inferred
with high accuracy for several types of datasets (tabular, text, graph) and models,
even if the sensitive attribute is dropped from the training dataset and has low corre-
lation with the target variable.
Finally, we note that secure multi-party computation, based on cryptographic tech-
niques or secure hardware, [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87] guarantees that nothing
except the output of the computation is revealed to the individual parties. However, it is
not concerned with what this final output can reveal about the input data of each party. On
the other hand, defenses, such as differential privacy, are concerned with individual record
privacy and not dataset property privacy considered in this chapter. We discuss this further
in Section 4.7. In summary, we believe our work in this chapter identifies a potential gap
in multi-party machine learning research in terms of techniques that parties can deploy to
protect global properties about their dataset.
4.2 Preliminaries
We assume that there is an underlying data distributionD determined by variables X , A, Y
where X models a set of features, A models a feature that is deemed private (or sensitive)
and Y is the target variable, i.e., either a label or a real value (e.g., if using regression
models). We consider a supervised setting where the goal is to train a model f such that
f(X,A) predicts Y .
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Secure multi-party computation (MPC). MPC lets parties obtain a result of a compu-
tation on their combined datasets without requiring them to share plaintext data with each
other or anyone else. Methods that instantiate it include homomorphic encryption, secret
sharing, secure hardware and garbled circuits [88, 89, 90, 91, 92]. These methods vary in
terms of their security guarantees (e.g., availability of a trusted processor vs. non-colluding
servers) and efficiency. We abstract MPC using an ideal functionality [88]: a trusted third
entity accepts inputs from the parties, computes the desired function on the combined data,
and returns the output of the computation to each party. Security of protocols implement-
ing this functionality is often captured by proving the existence of a simulator that can
simulate adversary’s view in the protocol based only on adversary’s input and the output
of the computation. Hence, an MPC protocol guarantees that an adversarial party learns
only the output of the computation but does not learn the content of the inputs of other
parties beyond what it can infer based on its own data and the output. Since our at-
tacks are oblivious to the exact technique used for secure computation, we assume ideal
MPC functionality and specify additional information available to the adversary in the next
section.
Multi-party machine learning. Let Dhonest and Dadv be the datasets corresponding to
the data of the victim parties and Dadv be the data that belongs to the parties whose data is
known to the adversary. For simplicity, we model it using two parties Phonest and Padv who
own Dhonest and Dadv, respectively. Both Dhonest and Dadv are sampled from D but may
have a different — secret and unknown to the other party — distribution of A, conditional
on some latent variable, for example, a party identifier. Parties are interested in increasing
the utility of their model through collaboration with each other. To this end, they agree on
an algorithm to train a machine learning model, f , using their combined datasets Dhonest
and Dadv.
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The parties use secure multi-party computation to train f , as they are not willing to
share it either due to privacy concerns or regulations. Once the target model is trained, it
can be released to the parties either as a white- or black-box. In the former, f is sent to the
parties, and, in the latter, the model is available to the parties through an inference interface
(e.g., the model stays encrypted at the server such that inferences are made either using
secure hardware or cryptographic techniques [93]). We assume that f is trained faithfully
and, hence, Padv cannot tamper with how f is trained (e.g., this avoids attacks where a
malicious algorithm can encode training data in model weights [94]).
MPC guarantees that parties learn nothing about the computation besides the output,
i.e., they learn no other information about each other’s data besides what is revealed from
their access to f . The goal of this chapter is to show that even by having black-box access
to f one party can infer information about other parties’ data.
4.3 Data Modeling
To reason about leakage of A’s distribution in D, we consider different relationships be-
tween X, Y,A based on their correlation. We use ∼ to indicate that there is a correlation
between random variables and ⊥ if not. We consider four possible relationships between
Y , X and the sensitive attribute A.
Y⊥A: If Y is independent of A, and if f is faithfully modeling the underlying distribution,
A should not be leaked. That is, information about A that an adversary acquires from
f(X,A) and f ′(X) should be the same for models f and f ′ trained to predict Y . Two
scenarios arise depending on whether the rest of the features are correlated with A or not:
(X⊥A,Y⊥A) and (X ∼ A,Y⊥A). We argue that leakage in the latter case is possible
due to how machine learning models are trained. Below we describe why it is theoretically
feasible and experimentally validate this in Section 4.6.
A machine learning model is trying to learn the conditional probability distribution
Pr(Y = y|X = x) where X are the attributes and Y is the target variable. Suppose there is
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a latent variable Z, and the observed X is modeled by X = h(Z,A) where h is a function
capturing the relationship between the variables. Even if the target variable Y only depends
on Z through a random function g: Y = g(Z), the conditional distribution Pr(Y = y|X =
x) still depends on A. Thus, machine learning models will capture information about A.
For example, consider a task of predicting education level (Y ) based on data that contains
gender (A) and income (X). Suppose income can be modeled by a function of latent
variables skill and occupation, and education level is only associated with the skill. Though
gender is not correlated with education level (Y⊥A), it could be associated with occupation
and thus correlated with income (X).
The (X ∼ A, Y⊥A) scenario was also noted by Locatello et al. [95] when studying
fair representations. The authors indicated that even if the original data may not have a
bias (i.e., when the target variable and the protected variable are independent) using the
protected attribute in training can introduce bias.
To model (X ∼ A, Y⊥A) scenario in the experiments, we use correlation coefficients
to determine the split of dataset attributes into X and A. To have a more controlled exper-
iment, we also carry out experiments where we introduce a synthetic variable and inject
correlations between it and a subset of attributes in X .
Y ∼ A: We also consider two cases where there is a correlation between the target variable
Y and the sensitive attribute A: (X⊥A,Y ∼ A) and (X ∼ A,Y ∼ A). In the setting
of (X⊥A, Y ∼ A), attribute A and a set of attributes X may be relevant in predicting Y ,
while being uncorrelated with each other. For example, a reaction of an individual to a new
drug (Y ) could depend on the age and weight of an adult, while age and weight may be
regarded as independent between each other.
The final setting of (X ∼ A, Y ∼ A) is the most likely scenario to happen in practice
where the true distribution and dependence between variables maybe unknown. For exam-
ple, consider a task of predicting whether a financial transaction by an individual is suspi-
cious or not (Y ) based on customer information (e.g., occupation, age, gender) and their
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transaction history (X), where their income is the sensitive attribute A. The correlation
between attributes could either belong to cases (X ∼ A,Y⊥A) or to (X ∼ A, Y ∼ A)
since attributes such as occupation and age are likely to be correlated with income (as also
suggested by the correlations in the datasets we use in our experimental evaluation in Ap-
pendix B.1).
4.4 Threat Model and Attack
The goal of the adversarial party Padv is to learn population-level properties about the rest
of the dataset used in the multi-party machine learning setting (e.g., in the two-party setting
this corresponds to learning properties of the other party’s dataset). Since Padv is one of the
parties, it has black-box access to the joint model f trained on the data of all the parties (i.e.,
Dhonest and Dadv). Given this query interface to f , the attacker wants to infer how sensitive
attribute A is distributed in honest parties’ dataset Dhonest. Throughout the chapter, we use
attribute and feature interchangeably.
We model dataset property leakage as follows. Let ahonest denote attribute values of
A for all records in Dhonest (for example, if the sensitive attribute is gender, then ahonest
is a vector of gender values of all records in Phonest data). We define p(ahonest) to be the
property or information about ahonest that the adversary is trying to infer. For example,
the property could be related to determining whether there is a higher presence of female
patients in the dataset Dhonest or learn the exact ratio of female patients.
The attacker, besides knowing its own dataset Dadv and having black-box access to
the model f , is assumed to have auxiliary dataset Daux that is distributed according to D.
Similar to [62], an auxiliary dataset can be generated either via (1) model-based synthesis
approach — feeding synthetic data to f and using its output to guide the search towards data
samples on which the model returns predictions with high confidence, (2) statistics-based
synthesis that uses information about marginal distribution of the attributes, or (3) using a
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Figure 4.1: Attack model pipeline. Half of shadow models are trained with the property
p that the attacker is trying to learn and half without it. Each shadow model f ishadow is
queried on a dataset Dattack. Output probability vectors are concatenated to form a vector
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Figure 4.2: Execution of the attack on the target model to learn the prediction of the prop-
erty p(ahonest) in Dhonest, p̂.
merely using f , while Dadv provides it with statistics for (2). The availability of a dataset
that follows similar distribution to D depends on the setting. Consider the anti-money
laundering use case in the introduction. A party may have access to billions of financial
transactions that it can use either for approach (2) since record-level marginal distribution
between demographic features, income, education level is likely to be similar between the
parties, or for approach (3) by dividing its dataset into Daux and Dadv.
The attack follows the shadow model training approach [77, 62]. However, we modify
the attack vector to measure the signal about the distribution of a sensitive attribute in a
whole dataset. Our attack strategy is described below; Figure 4.1 shows graphical repre-
sentation of how the attack model is trained and Figure 4.2 shows the execution of an attack
on target model f .
We make an observation that to infer global properties about training data, the attacker
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needs to combine information from multiple inferences made by f . To this end, the attacker
measures how f performs on a sequence of k records, called Dattack, as opposed to a single
record used in work on attribute and membership inference. We obtain the “attack feature”
sequence F by setting it to the posterior probability vector across classes returned by f on
Dattack. Hence, if f is a classification model over l classes F consists of k × l values. In
the experiments, we construct Dattack by sampling from Daux at random. We leave open a
question of whether more sophisticated methods of constructing Dattack can lead to better
attacks.
Shadow models and attack meta-classifier. The attacker relies on shadow models in
order to determine whether F is generated from f trained on a dataset with property p or
not. To this end, the attacker trains n “shadow” models that resemble f . In particular,
it generates training datasets Dishadow, half of them exhibiting the property and half not,
labeled as p and p̄ accordingly. These datasets could be obtained by resampling from Daux.
Each shadow model f ishadow is trained on a dataset D
i
shadow ∪ Dadv using the same way as
the target central model f . Once f ishadow is trained, the attacker queries it using Dattack and
combines inference results to form a feature vector Fi associated with p or p̄, depending on
its training data.
After training all shadow models, the adversary has a set of features Fi with the cor-
responding property label pi ∈ {p, p̄}. The adversary then trains a meta-classifier on the
pairs {(Fi, pi)}i using any binary classification algorithm. For example, logistic regression
is sufficient for attacks in our experimental evaluation.
The attacker carries out its attack as follows. Once the target model f is trained on the
joined data of the attacker and honest party, the attacker queries the model using Dattack
to obtains the feature representation of the target model, F . It then feeds F to its meta-
classifier and obtains a prediction for the sensitive property p(ahonest).
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Single-party attack. We explained the attack strategy for the multi-party case since this
is the primary focus of this chapter. However, we can easily adapt the attack to the single-
party case: the only change that has to be made to the attack description above is by setting
Dadv to an empty set. As highlighted in Table 4.1, besides being the first attack on property
leakage in the centralized multi-party setting, our attack is also the first to show that dataset
properties can be leaked in the black-box setting.
Fine-grained attack. The above attack shows how an adversary can learn whether some
property is present in a dataset or not. The attacker can extend this binary property attack
and distinguish between multiple properties P = {p1, p2, . . .}. It simply generates shadow
training datasets for each property and then trains a meta-classifier to predict one of the
properties in P based on attack vector F . For example, P can be a set of possible ratios
of females to other values, and the attack meta-classifier will try to distinguish whether it
is 10:90, 50:50 or 90:10 split. In the experimental evaluation, we show that this attack is
effective in learning fine-grained distribution of sensitive attributes as well as identifying
how the distribution of a sensitive attribute has changed after the model was updated with
new data.
Scope. This chapter focuses on understanding the leakage of population-level properties
of the training dataset. Since our threat model is similar to that of the attacker who is able to
infer individual record-level attributes [64, 94, 65], our setting allows for record-level leak-
age as well. Albeit, the attack strategy needs to be changed in order to train shadow models
that capture the difference between inputs with different attribute values. Importantly, for
both the record-level and population-level attribute inference attack, the attacker — here
and in [64, 94] — is assumed to know the domain of an attribute it is trying to infer (e.g.,
Gender taking values male, female, or other). Hence, similar to prior work [69, 70], our
attack cannot infer a sensitive attribute with a large, potentially unbounded, domain (e.g.,
such as Name for which the attacker may not be able to enumerate all possible values).
106
4.5 Experimental Setup
The goal of our experiments is to evaluate the efficacy of the attack in Section 4.4 to learn
population-level properties about a sensitive attribute in the multi-party and single-party
machine learning setting. We then aim to understand how the difference in machine learn-
ing models (e.g., logistic regression and neural network models), dataset type (e.g., tabular
data, text or graph), access to the model through its weights or inference interface, and
attribute correlation influence attack accuracy.
4.5.1 Benchmark Datasets
We evaluate our attack on five datasets described below. The datasets, sensitive attributes,
machine learning model tasks, and the type of correlations between the sensitive attribute,
other attributes, and the final task are summarized in Table 4.3.
Health [96] The Health dataset (Heritage Health Prize) contains medical records of over
55 000 patients. Similar to the winners of the Kaggle competition, we use 141 features
with MemberID and Year removed. We group the DaysInHospital attribute into two
classes. The task, Y , is to predict if a patient will be discharged, DaysInHospital = 0,
or will stay in the hospital, DaysInHospital > 0. We consider two sensitive at-
tributes to perform our attack on learning their distribution in the dataset of the benign
party: Gender and the number of medical claims ClaimsTruncated.
Adult [97, 98] The Adult dataset contains US census information including race, gen-
der, income, and education level. The training dataset contains 32 561 records with 14 at-
tributes. We group the education level into four classes: ‘Low’, ‘Medium-Low’, ‘Medium-High’,
‘High’. We use 12 features with Education and Fnlwgt removed. The task is to
predict the class of the EducationLevel (i.e., variable Y for this dataset). We again
consider two sensitive features whose distribution the attacker is trying to infer: Gender
and Income.
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Communities and Crime [98] The Communities and Crime dataset contains 1 994 records
with 122 features relevant to per capita violent crime rates in the United States, which was
also used for evaluating fairness with respect to protected variables [99]. We remove the
attributes that have missing data, resulting in 100 attributes. The classification task is to pre-
dict the crime rate, i.e., the Y variable is CrimesPerPop. We group the crime rate into
three classes based on ranges: ‘< 0.15’, ‘[0.15, 0.5]’ and ‘> 0.5’, and the task is the multi-
class prediction for the crime rate. We consider total percentage of divorce TotalPctDiv
and Income as sensitive features.
Yelp-Health [100] The Yelp dataset contains 5 million reviews of businesses tagged with
numerical ratings (1-5) and attributes such as business type and location. We extract a
healthcare-related subset that has 2 384 reviews for pediatricians and 1 731 reviews for
ophthalmologists. The classification task is to predict whether the review is positive (rating
> 3) or negative (rating ≤ 3). The attack aims to predict the dominant value of the doctor
Specialty of the benign party.
Amazon [101, 102] The Amazon product co-purchasing network dataset contains prod-
uct metadata and reviews information about 548 552 different products such as books and
music CDs. For each product, the following information is available: the similar products
that get co-purchased, product type, and product reviews. We use a subset of 20 000 prod-
ucts and construct a product co-purchasing network, where each node represents a product
and the edge represents if there is at least one reviewer who rated both products, indicat-
ing that products are bought by the same user [103]. Each node is associated with one
of 4 product types and an average review score from 0 to 5, including half-score reviews
(i.e., 11 possible scores in total). The classification task (for a recommendation system) is
to predict the average review score of the node given the co-purchasing network and the
product types. Depending on the classification task, we split reviewer scores into 2 classes:
positive vs. negative review, 6 classes: rounded integer review between 0,1.., 5 and 11
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classes: the original review score. The attack aims to predict whether the dominant value
of the attribute ProductType of the benign party is “books”.
4.5.2 Evaluation Methodology
Target model f . We train different target models depending on the dataset type. For
tabular data, i.e., Adult, Health, and Crime, we train multinomial logistic regression and
fully-connected multi-layer perceptron neural networks (MLP). For the Adult and Crime
datasets, we use an MLP network with one hidden layer of size 12 and the last layer with
4 and 3 output classes, respectively. For the Health dataset, we use an MLP network with
one hidden layer of size 20 and binary output. In later sections, a neural network model
for tabular datasets always refers to an MLP network. In training our target models, we
use the Adam [104] optimizer, ReLu as the activation function, a learning rate of 0.01,
and a weight decay of 0.0001. For the Yelp-Health dataset, we use the pre-trained glove
embedding of dimension 50, a bidirectional LSTM layer of dimension 50. We then use
one hidden layer of size 50 and dropout regularization with parameter 0.1 between the last
hidden layer and the binary output. For the Amazon dataset, we train the target model using
the Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN) [105] with 1 hidden layer of 16 units, Adam as
the optimizer, ReLu as the activation function, a learning rate of 0.01, and a weight decay
of 0.0005. Each experiment is repeated 100 times, and all attack accuracies are averaged
over these runs.
Dataset split. In the multi-party setting, we consider two parties that contribute data for
training the target model where one of the parties is trying to learn information about the
data of the other party. For Adult and Health datasets, each party contributes 2 000 samples.
We use 10 000 or 4 000 samples as Daux to train the shadow models and the attacker uses
1 000 samples in Dattack to query the model and obtain the attack vector for the meta-
classifier. Table 4.2 summarizes the splits for all other datasets. In Section 4.6.4 we show
that a small number of samples inDattack can lead to high attack accuracy as well (e.g., 200
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Table 4.2: Dataset split during the attack where #Dattack is the number of inference queries
the attacker makes to the model.
Datasets #Dadv, #Dhonest #Daux #Dattack
Health [96] 2 000 10 000 / 4000 1 000
Adult [97, 98] 2 000 10 000 /4000 1 000
Crime [98] 200 1 500 / 400 94
Yelp-Health [100] 1 000 1 200 200
Amazon [101] 5 000 10 000 1 000
vs. 1 000 for the Amazon dataset).
The distribution of the values of the sensitive attribute A in datasets is determined as
follows. We consider the default split of 33:67 in the attacker’s data Dadv (e.g., 33% of
records are books). The attack is evaluated against severalDhonest datasets for each possible
split. For example, we evaluate our attack on 100 Dhonest datasets: half with 33:67 split and
half with 67:33 split in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2. Throughout all experiments, the Daux
always has 50:50 split.
Attack setting. We report our main results on attack in the black-box setting; white-box
results are deferred to Appendix B.3. We use two different meta-classifiers depending on
the target model. For multinomial logistic regression, LSTM and GCN, the meta-classifier
model is a binary logistic regression model. For MLP as the target model, we use a two-
layer network with 20 and 8 hidden units and a learning rate of 0.001. The meta-classifier
models are trained using Adam optimizer.
We perform the attack when the model is trained with the sensitive variable (A) and
without it (Ā). For the Ā setting, the attribute A is omitted from the machine learning
pipeline, including the shadow model training and construction of Dattack. This setting
allows us to understand the risk of leaking a sensitive attribute, even when that attribute is
censored during training. For Yelp-Health, we report only Ā results as LSTM takes the text
data, and A would be an additional feature.
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Table 4.3: Datasets, tasks and attribute-label correlation where∼ and⊥ indicate correlation
and no correlation, respectively.
Datasets Sensitive attribute A Task Y Correlation
Health [96]
Gender





X ∼ A, Y⊥A
Income X ∼ A, Y ∼ A
Crime [98]
TotalPctDivorce
CrimesPerPop X ∼ A, Y ∼ A
Income
Yelp-Health [100] Specialty ReviewRating X ∼ A, Y⊥A
Amazon [101] ProductType ReviewScore X ∼ A, Y ∼ A
Types of experiments. We study how correlations between attributes affect the attack.
We show that information is leaked even when A is not correlated with the final task.
We demonstrate our attack on attribute correlation as present in real dataset distributions
(shown in Table 4.3) as well as artificially injected correlation using a synthetic sensitive
variable. The latter allows us to control the correlation between the variables.
Real Data. For the experiments where all features are from the real data, including the
sensitive variable, we set different variables as sensitive (A) for each dataset and perform
a black-box attack using a default split of 33:67 for the sensitive attribute in the attacker’s
data (Dadv).
We compute the pairwise correlation among all the variables using Pearson correla-
tion coefficient [106] for numerical-numerical variables, Cramer’s V [107] for categorical-
categorical variables, point-biserial correlation coefficient [108] for binary categorical-
numerical variables, and ANOVA for multi-level categorical-numerical variables. Based
on the observed correlations, for each dataset, we identify the case among those introduced
in Section 4.3. Most scenarios correspond toX ∼ A, Y ∼ A. Details on correlation factors
for all datasets are deferred to Appendix B.1.
Synthetic Data. For synthetic experiments, we create a new synthetic attribute as our sen-
sitive variable A for the Adult and Health datasets. We add a correlation of A to a subset
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of variables in the dataset, denoted as X ′ ⊆ X , and the target variable Y , depending on the
cases outlined in Section 4.3. We introduce the correlation by replacing attribute values in
X ′ and/or Y for each record with values that have an injected correlation withA. For Adult
dataset, X ′ is Income, for Health dataset, X ′ = {DrugCountAve,LabCountAve,
ClaimsTruncated}. The variable A takes values < 5 or > 5 that are split using 33:67
ratio in the adversarial party’s dataset. The honest party has two possible splits: 33:67 ratio
and 67:33 ratio. The attacker’s goal is to guess the distribution of A in the data of Phonest.
4.6 Attack Results
We evaluate for attribute leakage in the following settings: the single-party case where
an attacker learns the distribution of an attribute in the training set and the multi-party case
where an attacker learns the distribution of an attribute in the data of the honest party. Apart
from inferring the dominant attribute (e.g., there are more females than males in a dataset),
we perform a fine-grained attack that learns a precise distribution of the two attribute values
(e.g., 70% of the dataset are females). We further use this fine-grained attack to infer the
change in the attribute distribution in a model update scenario where the model is updated
either due to a new party joining or new data arriving.
We report our attack results in the stronger black-box setting for real, synthetic, and
fine-grained experiments. We evaluate the white-box attack, where the attacker has access
to model parameters, only on the synthetic data. We summarize our key findings below:
• Leakage of sensitive dataset properties in honest party’s data is possible even when
the sensitive attribute itself is dropped during training and has low or no correlation
with the final task. We show that the attack accuracy drops only by a few percent
when A is not present in many cases.
• An adversary can learn the attribute properties of the honest party’s data irrespec-
tive of whether it contributes data (multi-party) or not (single-party) to the training
112
Table 4.4: Multi-Party Setting: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting the value of the
distribution of sensitive variable A in the dataset of Phonest. The attacker tries to guess
whether values of A are split as 33:67 or 67:33 in Dhonest when its own data Dadv has 33:67
split. Columns A and Ā report the accuracy when the sensitive variable is used for training
and not, respectively. X ′ indicates with which features in the dataset and with how many
of them A is correlated. Since attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5, the attacker
is always successful in determining the correct distribution.
Datasets
(Output Classes)
Model Type Attack Accuracy
A # X ′
A Ā
Health (2) Multi-layer Perceptron
.61 .59 Gender 24/139
.75 .71 ClaimsTruncated 54/139
Adult (4) Logistic Regression
.83 .81 Gender 5/11
.98 .96 Income 9/11
Crime (3) Multi-layer Perceptron
.61 .59 TotalPctDivorce 26/98
.78 .60 Income 38/98
Yelp-Health (2) LSTM - .74 Specialty review text
Amazon (2) GCN .86 .72 ProductType graph
Amazon (6) GCN .62 .63 ProductType graph
Amazon (11) GCN .67 .61 ProductType graph
dataset.
• For the models and datasets considered in this chapter, our property leakage attack is
dataset and model-agnostic and works on tabular, text, or graph data.
• Fine-grained attacks can be used to predict a precise distribution of the attribute as
well as learn the change in data distribution during model updates.
4.6.1 Multi-Party Setting
Real Data. Table 4.4 shows the attack accuracy for correlations observed in the real dis-
tribution of datasets, with the larger size of Daux as listed in Table 4.1. The attack accuracy
with the smaller size of Daux is deferred to Table B.3 in Appendix B.2. We see that the at-
tack accuracy is always better than a random guess in all experiments, regardless of whether
the sensitive attribute is included in the training data or not.
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We make the following observations. The attack accuracy for Adult data with Income
as the sensitive attribute is the highest with 98% and 96% when the target model is trained
with and without A, respectively. Overall, the attack accuracy ranges between 61-98%
when trained with sensitive variable (A) and 59-96% without (Ā), respectively. The results
for Ā are always lower than with A but are, however, above the random guess baseline of
50%. For the Amazon dataset, we observe that attack accuracy is higher for fewer output
classes. We confirm this observation later in Figure 4.4. We also note that the attack
accuracy decreases as the size of Daux decreases as shown in Appendix B.2.
To understand how the correlation between A and other features influences the attack,
we determine which attributes X ′ ⊆ X are correlated with A. We set X ′ to variables based
on their correlation factors. Details on how X ′ of each dataset was determined based on
correlation factors is deferred to Appendix B.1. In Table 4.4, # X ′ denotes the number of
attributes correlated with the sensitive attribute A. We note that simultaneously controlling
the number of correlated attributes and their correlation strength is hard on real data, so
we also use synthetic datasets. We observe that, for the same dataset, the attack accuracy
increases with a higher number of correlated attributes X ′ and the sensitive attribute A.
We show the accuracies for both the pooled model and the honest party’s local model
in Table B.4 in Appendix B.2. Across all these experiments, we observe a utility increase
ranging from 0.58% and 5.90% for the honest party, which motivates the honest party to
collaborate and train a joint target model with the other party.
Synthetic Data. Table 4.5 shows our results with a synthetic variable A introduced in
the Adult and Health dataset for the multi-party setting. Here, we train the same dataset
using both logistic regression and the neural network model (MLP). Recall that the syn-
thetic attribute is introduced to imitate a sensitive variable to control its correlation with
other variables. To this end, we create datasets for different correlation criteria among the
sensitive variable A, the output Y , and the remaining variables X . We report two findings.
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First, logistic regression models appear to be at a higher risk, with average attack accu-
racy being higher as compared to neural network models: 84.5% vs. 71.3% for Adult and
80.2% vs. 70.8% for Health datasets. We suspect that this is mainly due to their simple
architecture, which is easy to learn using a meta-classifier.
Second, the attack works well (greater than 74%) when the sensitive variableA is corre-
lated with the target variable Y irrespective of its relation with X , i.e., cases where Y ∼ A.
The attack accuracy is almost equal to a random guess when Y⊥A. Recall that in the case
of X ∼ A, not all features used for training are correlated with A but only those in a subset
of X , X ′. To understand this scenario further, we reduced the number of features used
during training to 3 (we refer to this setting as R in the tables). As the number of train-
ing features decreases, the correlation signal between A and X ′ becomes stronger, and the
logistic regression model can capture that.
Our experiments for the case when both X and Y are independent of the sensitive
variable A exhibit attack accuracy that is close to a random guess. This is expected as the
variable has no correlation that the model can memorize, and hence we exclude them from
Table 4.5.
4.6.2 Single-Party Setting
In addition to our motivating scenario of the multi-party setting, we evaluate the efficacy
of our attack in the single-party setting where the attacker does not contribute towards the
training data. For example, this corresponds to a scenario where a model is trained on data
from only one hospital and is offered as an inference service for other hospitals. Table 4.6
shows the result for our attack using synthetic data for the Adult and Health dataset when
the model is trained using both logistic regression and neural networks. We see that the
attack in the single party setting is stronger since the adversary does not provide its own
data, which may dilute the signal from the other party. For the case where Y ∼ A, the
attack accuracy is higher than 90%, even if the attribute itself is not used during training.
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Table 4.5: Multi-party setting: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting whether the values
of (sensitive) synthetic variable A in the data of the honest party are predominantly <5 or
>5. The attack accuracy is evaluated on 100 Dhonest datasets: half with 33:67 and half with
67:33 split. A synthetic correlation with A is added to the variables X and Y depending on
the specific case. R corresponds to the setting where only 3 attributes are used for training
instead of all data. Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
Model Logistic Regression Neural Network
Datasets Adult Health Adult Health
Synthetic Variable A Ā A Ā A Ā A Ā
X ∼ A, Y ∼ A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .90 .84 .79 .95
X⊥A, Y ∼ A 1.00 1.00 .99 1.00 .98 .98 .74 .98
X ∼ A, Y⊥A .65 .57 .52 .41 .52 .52 .52 .51
X ∼ A, Y⊥A (R) .79 .75 .78 .72 .51 .45 .54 .63
Table 4.6: Single-party setting: Black-box attack accuracy with synthetic data.
Model Logistic Regression Neural Network
Datasets Adult Health Adult Health
Synthetic Variable A Ā A Ā A Ā A Ā
X ∼ A, Y ∼ A 1.00 1.00 .98 1.00 .98 .99 .92 .95
X⊥A, Y ∼ A 1.00 1.00 .98 1.00 .99 1.00 .89 .98
X ∼ A, Y⊥A .67 .60 .48 .53 .56 .52 .52 .49
X ∼ A, Y⊥A (R) .86 .74 .61 .62 .68 .66 .54 .61
This shows that our attack is highly successful even when the attacker does not participate
in the training process.
4.6.3 Fine-grained Attack
Information leaked about attribute values can be either in terms of a binary signal, i.e.,
which attribute value is dominant in the dataset or an exact distribution. The results above
show the leakage of the former. To learn information about the exact distribution, we
present a variation of our main attack called the fine-grained attack. For this attack, we
train a 5-class meta-classifier model that outputs whether a particular value of the sensitive
attribute appears in 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90% of the dataset. Note that we train
only one meta-classifier model with 5 output classes, but the attacker can perform a more
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Table 4.7: Fine-grained attack accuracy for predicting the precise distribution of sensitive
variable A in Dhonest in the synthetic setting X⊥A, Y ∼ A, and real data setting when A is
Gender on the Adult dataset. Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.2.
Distribution







A Ā A Ā Ā
10 : 90 .994 .998 .84 .89 .44
30 : 70 .993 .991 .79 .79 .59
50 : 50 .999 .997 .79 .73 .50
70 : 30 .997 .989 .73 .71 .46
90 : 10 .993 .998 .72 .77 .53
systematic binary search over the distribution by training multiple meta-classifier models.
We apply this attack in two settings.
Leakage of Attribute Distribution. We evaluate on the Adult dataset using a synthetic
variable A as well as the gender variable. Table 4.7 shows the results for our fine-grained
attack for predicting the precise distribution of the sensitive variable. The row 30 : 70
corresponds to the setting where 30% of records in Dhonest have the value of the sensitive
attribute A less than 5. Here, the attacker tries to guess the split of 30 : 70 among five
possible splits of 10 : 90, 30 : 70, etc. The baseline accuracy is 20% because the attacker
wishes to distinguish between 5 splits. Since the attack accuracy is always higher than
the random guess, the attacker can successfully find the correct ratio by training a meta-
classifier that distinguishes between different splits of the sensitive attribute values. Similar
to the observation in Section 4.6.1, we observe that logistic regression has higher attack
accuracy than neural networks. The attack accuracy for the real data with gender as the
sensitive attribute is consistently greater than the 20% baseline for random guessing for all
the distributions.
Model Update Setting. We apply the fine-grained attack to learn the change in the dis-
tribution of an attribute value given access to an updated version of a model. In this attack,
the malicious party initially obtains a model that is jointly trained on Dhonest1 and Dadv.
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Table 4.8: Model update setting: attack accuracy for predicting the dominant value of
sensitive variable A in Dhonest2 in the synthetic setting X⊥A, Y ∼ A and real data setting
when A is Gender on Adult dataset when A is removed from the training data. Dadv has
50:50 split. Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
Distribution
of A in Dhonest1:
Distribution











Later, another honest party Dhonest2 joins, and a new model is trained on the three parties’
data. The attacker tries to infer the dominant value of the sensitive attribute of Phonest2 given
the original and the updated model. It uses a fine-grained attack against both models, as
result learning a dominant value in Dhonest1 and Dhonest1 ∪ Dhonest2. It then compares the
two and infers how Dhonest2 has affected the distribution. If the split is dominated by the
same attribute value in both models, the attacker uses this attribute value distribution as its
guess. Otherwise, the attacker makes a guess that the other attribute value is dominated in
Dhonest2. Table 4.8 shows the results for our attack in the model update setting using syn-
thetic data for the Adult dataset. We observe the attack accuracy is almost close to 100%
for the synthetic case and ranges from 63% to 86% for the Gender variable. The attack
accuracy is high compared to a random guess of 50%.
4.6.4 Attack Parameters
We perform ablation experiments to understand the effect of varying the number of queries,
distribution of the sensitive attribute and the number of output classes on the attack accu-
racy. We use the Amazon graph data for these experiments where, as before, ProductType
is the sensitive attribute, and ReviewScore is the target.
Number of queries. We compute the attack accuracy for two different splits of values of
the sensitive attribute, 0:100 (all books) and 30:70 (70% books, 30% of other products),
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Figure 4.3: Attack accuracy for leaking sensitive attribute ProductType on the Amazon
graph data (11 output classes) as the number of queries to the model increases.
and train the model to predict one of 11 review scores averaged over 10 runs. Figure 4.3
shows the effect of increasing the number of queries on the attack accuracy. Note that
the number of queries also correspond to the input features of our attacker classifier. We
observe that changing queries does not significantly impact the attack accuracy. With 1000
queries, attack accuracy is up to 80% for the 0:100 split and ≈59% for 30:70 split.
Attribute distribution and number of output classes. Figure 4.4 shows the results for
the GCN trained on the Amazon dataset for 2, 6 and 11 output classes for the review score.
We evaluate for all the splits between 0:100 to 100:0. First, we observe that the attack
accuracy drops as the ratio of the sensitive attribute values changes from 0:100 to 50:50
and increases again gradually from 50:50 to 100:0. This is because our primary attack
is designed to identify the dominant attribute value. For inferring the distribution in the
balanced range, the attacker can perform our fine-grained attack discussed in Section 4.6.3.
Next, we observe that the attack accuracy is lower for a higher number of output classes
such as 6 and 11 as compared to 2. This could be due to lower number of input features
that are given to the attack classifier when there are lower number of output classes —












































Figure 4.4: Attack accuracy for the Amazon graph data when the sensitive attribute
ProductType is not used during training for different numbers of output classes across
different distributions (splits).
among fewer features thus resulting in a lower dimension input. Similar trends are observed
in Figure B.1 in Appendix when A is used during training.
4.7 Defenses
In the previous section, we saw that removing the sensitive attribute from the dataset is
not an effective solution due to the correlations that exist between the attributes. Disen-
tangling data representation through variational-auto-encoders [109, 110, 99] allows one
to obtain mutually independent variables for representing the data. Intuitively, the removal
of this variable before decoding the record for further down-stream tasks would lead to
better censorship. Similarly, adversarial learning has also been proposed for learning a
privacy-preserving data filter in a multi-party setting [111] and a privacy-preserving record
representation [112]. Unfortunately, such techniques do not have provable worst-case guar-
antees and have been shown ineffective in the privacy context [64].
Differential privacy [113] guarantees record-level privacy, that is, whether a particular
record is in their dataset or not. However, differential privacy does not protect population-
level properties of a dataset [113, 114]. In fact, a differentially private algorithm with high
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utility aims to learn population properties without sacrificing individual privacy. Group
differential privacy is an extension of differential privacy that considers the privacy of a
group of k correlated records, as a result one way of achieving it is to increase, for example,
Laplace noise, proportional to k. Though it can be applied to preserve the privacy of all
records in each party’s dataset by setting k to the size of each party’s data, depending on
the setting, it can effect utility as even with k = 1 accuracy of models have been shown to
drop [115, 116].
In settings with more than two parties, where the attacker controls only one party, the
signal weakens as it is harder for the adversary to identify the mapping between a property
and a party whose data exhibits it. This was also noted by Melis et al. [70] in the federated
learning setting with a small number of parties.
4.8 Related work
Membership attacks on machine learning models aim to determine whether a certain record
was part of a training dataset or not [62, 63]. These attacks train shadow models that are
similar to the target model and use their output (e.g., posterior probabilities over all classes)
to build a meta-classifier that classifies records as members of the training data or not based
on inference results of the target model on the record in question. A recent link stealing
attack on graphs can be seen as a type of a membership attack that tries to infer whether
two nodes have a link between them in the training graph [117].
Attribute inference attacks [64, 65], on the other hand, aim to determine the value of a
sensitive attribute for a single record. For example, the authors of [64] study leakage of a
sensitive value from a latent representation of a record in the model (i.e., a feature extractor
layer); an attacker can obtain such intermediate record representations from having access
to model parameters. They show that an attribute of a record, even if censored using adver-
sarial learning, can be leaked. Hitaj et al [118] show that a malicious party can construct
class representatives from a model trained in federated learning setting.
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The work by Ganju et al. [69] and Ateniese et al. [77] are closest to ours as they also
consider leakage of dataset properties. Different from this chapter, their attack is set in
a single-party setting and requires a white-box access to the model, i.e., its parameters,
that may not always be possible (e.g., when the model access is via cloud-hosted inter-
face). Since the number of model parameters in neural networks can be very large (several
million), approaches that are based on sophisticated methods for reducing network repre-
sentation are required [69]. We show that attacks based on a combination of inferences and
logistic regression as a meta-classifier are sufficient to learn attribute distribution.
Property leakage in a multi-party learning has been demonstrated only in federated
setting [70]. In this setting an attacker obtains a gradient computed on a small batch of
records (e.g., 32) and tries to learn how a sensitive feature is distributed in the batch. This
setting is arguably easier from the attacker point of view: an attacker gains access to a much
more granular computation on the data compared to the access to a query interface of the
final model trained on the whole dataset, as considered in this chapter. Moreover, previous
work on dataset property leakage [69, 70, 77] did not consider the case when the sensitive
attribute is removed from the data and the effect it has on the success of their attacks.
Recently, Zanella-Béguelin et al. [68] have demonstrated leakage of text and general
trends in the data used to update next word prediction model. Salem et al. [67], on the other
hand, consider granular leakage about records used to update the model: record labels and
their features. Similar to our work, Salem et al.use a probing dataset to query the models to
obtain the posterior difference. This output is then given to an encoder-decoder framework
to reconstruct the meaning of the difference between posteriors of the initial and updated
models. Our model update attack, in comparison, is about identifying the distribution of




We demonstrate an attack, set in the centralized multi-party machine learning, that lets
one of the parties learn sensitive properties about other parties’ data. The attack requires
only black-box access to the model and can extract the distribution of a sensitive attribute
with small number of inference queries. We show that trivial defenses such as excluding
a sensitive attribute from training are insufficient to prevent leakage. Our attack works
on models for tabular, text, and graph data and datasets that exhibit various correlation
relationships among attributes and class labels. Finally, we note that existing techniques
for secure computation and differential privacy are either not directly applicable to protect
leakage of population-level properties or do so at a high cost.
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CHAPTER 5
ATTRIBUTE PRIVACY: FRAMEWORK AND MECHANISMS
5.1 Introduction
Privacy in the computer science literature has generally been defined at the individual level,
such as differential privacy [8], which protects the value of an individual’s data within anal-
ysis of a larger dataset. However, there are many settings where confidential information
contained in the data goes beyond presence or absence of an individual in the data and
instead relates to attributes at the dataset level. Global properties about attributes revealed
from data analysis may leak trade secrets, intellectual property and other valuable informa-
tion pertaining to the data owner.
In this chapter, we are interested in privacy of attributes in a dataset, where an analyst
must prevent global properties of sensitive attributes in her dataset from leaking during
analysis. For example, insurance quotes generated by a machine-learned model might leak
information about how many female and male drivers are insured by the company that
trained the model; voice and facial recognition models may leak the distribution of race
and gender among users in the training dataset [77, 119]. Under certain circumstances,
even releasing the distribution from which the data were sampled may be sensitive. For
example, experimental findings by a pharmaceutical company measuring the efficacy of a
new drug would be considered proprietary information.
The naive solution of removing sensitive attributes from the dataset is insufficient, as
attributes are often correlated, and protected information can still be leaked by releasing
non-sensitive information about the data. Machine learning models have been shown to
learn sensitive attributes even when censorship is applied or when the attributes are deemed
irrelevant for the actual learning task [64, 70, 120, 69]. In the algorithmic fairness literature,
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differential privacy has been used to protect sensitive attributes at the individual level by,
e.g., constructing classifiers where an individual’s label is differentially private with respect
to her race [121]. However, the study of attribute privacy at the dataset or distribution
level is limited, both in terms of a framework for reasoning about it and mechanisms for
protecting it.
5.1.1 Our Contributions
Problem formulation We initiate the study of attribute privacy at the dataset and dis-
tribution level and establish the first formal framework for reasoning about these privacy
notions. We identify two cases where information about global properties of a dataset may
need to be protected: (1) properties of a specific dataset and (2) parameters of the under-
lying distribution from which dataset is sampled. We refer to the first setting as dataset
attribute privacy, where the data owner wishes to protect properties of her sample from
a distribution, but is not concerned about revealing the distribution. For example, even
though the overall prevalence of a disease may be known, a hospital may wish to protect
the fraction of its patients with that disease. We refer to the second setting as distributional
attribute privacy, which considers the distribution parameter itself a secret. For example,
demographic information of the population targeted by a company may reveal informa-
tion about its proprietary marketing strategy. These two definitions distinguish between
protecting a sample and protecting the distribution from which the dataset is sampled.
Definitions of Attribute Privacy. We propose definitions for capturing dataset and distri-
butional attribute privacy by instantiating a general privacy framework called the Pufferfish
framework [18]. This framework was originally introduced to handle correlations across
individual entries in a database. Instantiating this framework for attribute privacy is non-
trivial as it requires reasoning about secrets and parameters at a dataset level.
For dataset attribute privacy, our definition considers the setting where individual records
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are independent of each other while correlations may exist between attribute values of each
record. Then, to be able to capture general global properties of a dataset that need to be
protected, we choose to express secrets as functions over attribute values across all records
in a dataset. For example, this allows one to express that the average income of individuals
in a dataset being below or above $50K is secret information.
Our second definition also instantiates the Pufferfish framework while explicitly captur-
ing the random variables used to generate attribute values of a record. Here, the parameters
of the distribution of protected attributes are treated as confidential information. For exam-
ple, in a dataset where records capture trials in a stochastic chemical environment, one can
express that determining whether the probability with which a certain compound is added
in each trial is 0.2 or 0.8 is a secret.
Mechanisms to Protect Attribute Privacy. Our definitions allow an analyst to specify
secrets about global properties of a dataset that they wish to protect. In order to satisfy
these definitions the analyst can use a general tool for providing Pufferfish privacy called
the Wasserstein mechanism proposed by Song et al. [122]. However, this mechanism is
computationally expensive and may require computing an exponential number of pairwise
Wasserstein distances, which is not feasible in most practical settings. To this end, we
propose efficient mechanisms in the following two settings.
For dataset attribute privacy, we consider a special class of functions and attribute prop-
erties and propose a mechanism based on Gaussian noise. Though the nature of the noise
is added from the same family of distributions as the differentially private Gaussian Mech-
anism, in Section 5.4 we articulate that the similarity between the two is based solely on
the nature of the noise. We show that the mechanism can be applied to datasets where (1)
attributes follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution and (2) the function to be computed
on the data and the attribute property to be protected are linear in the number of records
in the dataset (e.g., mean). We also relax the Gaussian assumption in Section 5.4.1. Note
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that with the help of variational auto-encoders (VAEs) [123], one can obtain a Gaussian
representation of the data even if a dataset does not come from a Gaussian distribution.
Moreover, such disentangled representations can be based on interpretable attributes [109]
that are easier for specifying which attributes require protection, particularly when the orig-
inal data are complex (e.g., pixels on an image vs. the gender of the person in it).1
For distributional attribute privacy, we consider a model where dependencies between
the attributes form a Bayesian network. This model helps us capture the extent to which a
sensitive attribute parameter affects parameters of attributes in the query, and we add noise
proportional to this influence. Although our mechanism is inspired by the Markov Quilt
mechanism [122], the difference in settings prompts several changes, including a different
metric for measuring influence between the variables.
Finally, we note that although [18] identified that “there is little focus in the literature
on rigorous and formal privacy guarantees for business data”, they leave “the challeng-
ing problem of developing Pufferfish instantiations and algorithms for general aggregate
secrets” as future work.
5.1.2 Related work
Machine learning models have been shown to memorize and leak data used to train them,
raising questions about the release and use of these models in practice. For example, mem-
bership attacks [62] show that models can leak whether certain records (e.g., patient data)
were part of the training dataset or not. Attribute (or feature) privacy attacks, on the other
hand, consider leakage of attribute values at an individual level [64, 65], and property in-
ference attacks show that global properties about datasets can be leaked [70, 69, 77].
Differential privacy (DP) [8, 113] guarantees individual-level privacy when publishing
an output computed on a database, by bounding the influence of any record on the output
1Though naive use of VAEs may not provide end-to-end privacy guarantees, it serves as an example that
it is possible to obtain a representation of non-Gaussian data with interpretable Gaussian features. We leave
it as an interesting open question on how to provide end-to-end privacy-preserving feature disentanglement.
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and adding noise. Importantly, DP does not aim to protect population-level information,
and was designed to learn global properties of a dataset without sacrificing individual pri-
vacy. DP does provide group privacy guarantees for groups of k correlated records, but
these quantitative guarantees are only meaningful when k is small relative to the size of the
dataset. Syntactically, DP guarantees that if any individual record were to be changed—
including all attributes of that record—the result of the analysis would be approximately the
same. For attribute privacy, we seek similar guarantees if an entire attribute of the dataset
were to be changed—including all individuals’ values for that attribute.
The Pufferfish framework [18] that we instantiate and describe in detail in the follow-
ing sections, can be seen as a generalization of differential privacy that explicitly states the
information that needs to be kept secret and the adversary’s background knowledge about
the data. Blowfish privacy [124] also allows one to express secrets and publicly known
information about the data, but expressed as constraints on the data rather than distribu-
tions over data. We adapt the Markov Quilt Mechanism from [122], who also employ the
Pufferfish framework [18] for private analysis of correlated data, although they focus on
individual-level privacy. Our focus instead on privacy of dataset properties and distribu-
tions leads to a substantially different instantiation of the Pufferfish framework where the
secrets are defined over attribute values rather than individual records in the dataset.
Research on algorithmic fairness has proposed several definitions formalizing the idea
that machine learning models should not exhibit discrimination based on protected at-
tributes (e.g., gender or race). Demographic parity formalizes fairness by requiring that a
classifier’s predicted label is independent of an individual’s protected attributes. Our notion
of dataset attribute privacy is a general framework where one can specify what information
about attributes need to be protected, with attribute independence being one such scenario.
However, our attribute privacy definitions would not be useful for satisfying other fairness
notions that explicitly incorporate protected attributes, such as affirmative action or fairness
through awareness [121]. Moreover, techniques proposed to obtain fair representations of
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the training data [125, 110] have been shown to still leak sensitive attributes [64] when
applied in the privacy context.
5.2 Preliminaries
Pufferfish Privacy. The Pufferfish privacy framework [18] consists of three components:
a set of secrets S, a set of discriminative pairsQ ⊆ S × S, and a class of data distributions
Θ. S is a set of possible facts about the database that we might wish to hide. Q is the set
of secret pairs (si, sj), si, sj ∈ S, that we wish to be indistinguishable. The class of data
distributions Θ can be viewed as a set of conservative assumptions about the underlying
distribution that generates the database.
Definition 4 ((ε, δ)-Pufferfish Privacy [18, 122]2). A mechanismM is (ε, δ)-Pufferfish pri-
vate in a framework (S,Q,Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with X ∼ θ, for all secret pairs (si, sj) ∈ Q
such that P (si|θ) 6= 0 and P (sj|θ) 6= 0, and for all T ⊆ Range(M), we have
PM,θ(M(X) ∈ T |si, θ) ≤ exp(ε)PM,θ(M(X) ∈ T |sj, θ) + δ.
The Wasserstein Mechanism proposed in [122] and defined formally in Section 5.5 is
the first general mechanism for satisfying instantiations of Pufferfish privacy framework.
It defines sensitivity of a function F as the maximum Wasserstein distance between the
distribution of F (X) given two different realizations of secrets si and sj for (si, sj) ∈ Q.
The mechanism then instantiates the Laplace mechanism by outputting F (X) plus Laplace
noise that scales with this sensitivity. Although this mechanism works in general for any
instantiation of the Pufferfish framework, computing Wasserstein distance for all pairs of
secrets is computationally expensive, and will typically not be feasible in practice.
Song et al. [122] also gave the Markov Quilt Mechanism for some special structures of
data dependence. It is more efficient than the Wasserstein Mechanism and also guarantees
2The original definition [18] and the one considered in [122] is (ε, 0)-Pufferfish. We extend the definition
to (ε, δ)-Pufferfish in the natural way.
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(ε, 0)-Pufferfish privacy. The Markov Quilt Mechanism of [122] assumes that the entries
in the input database Y form a Bayesian network, as defined below. These entires could
either be: (1) the multiple attributes of a single record when the database contained only one
record, or (2) the attribute values across multiple records for a single-fixed attribute when
the database contained multiple attributes. Hence, the original Markov Quilt Mechanism
could not accommodate correlations across multiple attributes in multiple records, as we
study in this chapter. Full details about the algorithm is given in Algorithm 11.
Definition 5 (Bayesian Networks). A Bayesian network is described by a set of variables
Y = {Y1, . . . , Yn} and a directed acyclic graph G = (Y,E) whose vertices are vari-
ables in Y . The probabilistic dependence on Y included by the network can be written as:
Pr(Y1, . . . , Yn) = Π
n
i=1 Pr(Yi|parent(Yi)).
Definition 6 (Variable-Max-Influence [122]). The maximum influence of a variable Yi on








P (YA = yA|Yi = a, θ)
P (YA = yA|Yi = b, θ)
.
The above definition measures influence of a variable value on values of other vari-
ables. One can compare this to Definition 12 used in the Attribute-Private Markov Quilt
Mechanism, which instead measures max-influence of a parameter of the probability dis-
tribution of a variable on the distribution of parameters of other variables, as is needed in
the attribute privacy setting.
Recall the definition of a Markov Quilt (Definition 11), which is used in this mecha-
nism.
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Algorithm 11 Markov Quilt Mechanism (Y, F, {S,Q,Θ}, ε) [122]
Input: database Y , L-Lipschitz query F , Pufferfish framework {S,Q,Θ}, privacy pa-
rameter ε.
for each Yi do
Let Gi := {(YQ, YN , YR) : YQ is a Markov Quilt of Yi}
for all YQ (with YN , YR ) in Gi do









Set bi = minYQ∈Gi b(YQ).
end for
Set bmax = maxi bi.
Sample Z ∼ Lap(L · bmax).
Return F (Y ) + Z
The Markov Quilt Mechanism [122] given in Algorithm 11 guarantees (ε, 0)-Pufferfish
Privacy.
Accuracy. We will measure accuracy of our mechanisms with the following definition.
For real-valued outputs, this definition says that the mechanism must output an answer that
is at most an additive α away from the true answer with probability 1−β. For vector-valued
outputs, this notion can be naturally extended using the appropriate norm.
Definition 7 ((α, β)-accuracy). A mechanismMwith real-valued outputs is (α, β)-accurate
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for a function F if for all databases X ,
P (|M(X)− F (X)| > α) ≤ β.
5.3 Attribute Privacy Definitions
Data model and representation. The dataset X contains n records, where each record
consists of m attributes. We view the dataset X as an n×m matrix. In this chapter, we are
interested in privacy of the columns, which represent attributes that a data owner wishes
to protect. Thus we refer to the matrix X as X = [X1, . . . , Xm], where Xi is the column
vector related to the ith attribute (column). In contrast, traditional differential privacy [8,
113] is concerned with privacy of the rows of the dataset matrix. We let Xji denote ith
attribute value for jth record.
Each record is assumed to be sampled i.i.d. from an unknown distribution, where at-
tributes within a single record can be correlated (e.g., consider height and weight). We use
C ⊆ [m] to denote a set of indices of the sensitive attributes that require privacy protection
(e.g., race and gender may be sensitive attributes; hair color may be non-sensitive). The
data owner wishes to compute a function F over her dataset and release the value (or esti-
mate of the value) F (X) while protecting some information about the sensitive attributes.
Privacy notions. We distinguish between three kinds of attribute privacy, corresponding
to three different types of information the data owner may wish to protect.
Individual attribute privacy protectsXji for sensitive attribute i when F (X) is released.
Note that differential privacy provides individual attribute privacy simultaneously for all
individuals and all attributes [8], but does not protect against individual-level inferences
from population-level statistics [114]. For example, if a DP result shows a correlation
between lung disease and smoking, one may infer that a known-smoker in the dataset has
an elevated likelihood of lung disease.
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Dataset attribute privacy is applicable when the owner wishes to reveal F (X) while
protecting the value of some function g(Xi) for sensitive attribute i ∈ C (e.g., whether
there were more Caucasians or Asians present in the dataset).
Distribution attribute privacy protects privacy of a parameter φi that governs the dis-
tribution of ith sensitive attribute in the underlying population from which the data are
sampled.
The last two notions are the ones put forward in this chapter and studied in detail. The
difference between them may be subtle depending on g and φ. For example, consider
one setting where the sensitive attribute is binary and g is the fraction of records where
this attribute is 1, and another setting where the sensitive attribute is a Bernoulli random
variable with parameter φ. In this case, g can be seen as an estimate of φ based on a
sample. The difference becomes particularly relevant in settings where privacy is required
for realizations of the dataset that are unlikely under the data distribution, or settings with
small datasets where g is a poor estimate of φ.
Formal framework for attribute privacy. The standard notion of differential privacy is
not directly applicable to our setting since we are interested in protecting population-level
information. Instead, we formalize our attribute privacy definitions using the Pufferfish pri-
vacy framework of Definition 4 by specifying the three components (S,Q,Θ). The distri-
butional assumptions of this framework are additionally useful for formalizing correlation
across attributes.
Definition 8 (Dataset Attribute Privacy). Let (Xj1 , X
j
2 , . . . , X
j
m) be a record with m at-
tributes that is sampled from an unknown distribution D, and let X = [X1, . . . , Xm] be a
dataset of n records sampled i.i.d. from D where Xi denotes the (column) vector contain-
ing values of ith attribute of every record. Let C ⊆ [m] be the set of indices of sensitive
attributes, and for each i ∈ C, let gi(Xi) be a function with codomain U i.
A mechanismM satisfies (ε, δ)-dataset attribute privacy if it is (ε, δ)-Pufferfish private
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for the following framework (S,Q,Θ):
Set of secrets: S = {sia := 1[gi(Xi) ∈ U ia] : U ia ⊆ U i, i ∈ C}.
Set of secret pairs: Q = {(sia, sib) ∈ S × S, i ∈ C}.
Distribution: Θ is a set of possible distributions θ over the dataset X . For each possible
distributionD over records, there exists a θD ∈ Θ that corresponds to the distribution
over n i.i.d. samples from D.
This definition defines each secret sia as the event that gi(Xi) takes a value in a particular
set U ia, and the set of secrets S is the collection of all such secrets for all sensitive attributes.
This collection may include all possible subsets of U i, or it may include only application-
relevant events. For example, if all U ia are singletons, this corresponds to protecting any
realization of gi(Xi). Alternatively, the data owner may only wish to protect whether gi(Xi)
is positive or negative, which requires only U ia = (−∞, 0) and U ib = [0,∞). The set of
secret pairs Q that must be protected includes all pairs of the events on the same sensitive
attribute. The Pufferfish framework considers distributions θ over the entire dataset X ,
whereas we require distributions D over records. We resolve this by defining Θ to be the
collection of distributions over datasets induced by the allowable i.i.d. distributions over
records.
Determining which functions gi to consider is an interesting question. For example,
in [126] the authors show that it is tractable to check whether the output of certain classes
of functions evaluated on a dataset reveals information about the output of another query
evaluated on the same dataset. Hence, given a function F whose output a data owner wishes
to release, the owner may consider either those gi’s about which F reveals information, or
those for which verifying perfect privacy w.r.t. F is infeasible.
Definition 9 (Distributional Attribute Privacy). Let (Xj1 , X
j
2 , . . . , X
j
m) be a record with m
attributes that is sampled from an unknown distribution described by a vector of random
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variables (φ1, . . . , φm), where φi parameterizes the marginal distribution of X
j
i condi-
tioned on the values of all φk for k 6= i. The (φ1, . . . , φm) are drawn from a known joint
distribution P , and each φi has support Φi. Let X = [X1, . . . , Xm] be a dataset of n
records sampled i.i.d. from the distribution described by (φ1, . . . , φm) where Xi denotes
the (column) vector containing values of ith attribute of every record. Let C ⊆ [m] be the
set of indices of sensitive attributes.
A mechanism M satisfies (ε, δ)-distributional attribute privacy if it is (ε, δ)-Pufferfish
private for the following framework (S,Q,Θ):
Set of secrets: S = {sia := 1[φi ∈ Φia] : Φia ⊂ Φi, i ∈ C}.
Set of secret pairs: Q = {(sia, sib) ∈ S × S, i ∈ C}.
Distribution: Θ is a set of possible distributions θ over the dataset X . For each possible
φ = (φ1, . . . , φm) describing the conditional marginal distributions for all attributes,
there exists a θφ ∈ Θ that corresponds to the distribution over n i.i.d. samples from
the distribution over records described by φ.
This definition naturally parallels Definition 8, with the attribute-specific random vari-
able φi taking the place of the attribute-specific function gi(Xi). Although it might seem
natural for φi to define the marginal distribution of the ith attribute, this would not capture
the correlation across attributes that we wish to study. Instead, φi defines the conditional
marginal distribution of the ith attribute given all other φ6=i, which does capture such cor-
relation. This also allows the distribution θ over datasets to be fully specified given these
parameters and the size of the dataset.
More specifically, we model attribute distributions using standard notion of Bayesian
hierarchical modeling. The (φ1, . . . , φm) can be viewed as a set of hyperparameters of the
distributions of the attributes, and P as hyper-priors of the hyperparameters. The distri-
bution P is captured in Θ, and the distribution of attribute Xi is governed by a realization
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of the random variable φi. The φi describes the conditional marginal distribution for at-
tribute i: it is the hyperparameter of the probability of Xi given hyperparameters of all
other attributes P (Xi|φ1, . . . , φi−1, φi+1, . . . , φm). We make the “naive” conditional inde-
pendence assumption that all attributes Xi are mutually independent conditional on the set
of parameters (φ1, . . . , φm), hence, (φ1, . . . , φm) fully capture the distribution of a record.
The “naive” conditional independence is a common assumption in probabilistic models,
and naive Bayes is a simple example that employs this assumption.
Since both of our attribute privacy definitions are instantiations of the Pufferfish pri-
vacy framework, one could easily apply the Wasserstein Mechanism [122] to satisfy (ε, 0)-
attribute privacy for either of our definitions. However, as described in Section 5.2, imple-
menting this mechanism requires computing Wasserstein distance between the conditional
distribution on F (X) for all pairs of secrets inQ. Computing exact Wasserstein distance is
known to be computationally expensive, and our settings may require exponentially many
computations in the worst case. In the remainder of the chapter, we provide efficient algo-
rithms that satisfy each of these privacy definitions, focusing on dataset attribute privacy
in Section 5.4 and distributional attribute privacy in Section 5.4.2, before returning to the
(inefficient) Wasserstein Mechanism in Section 5.5.
5.4 The Gaussian Mechanism for Dataset Attribute Privacy
In this section we consider dataset attribute privacy as introduced in Definition 8. In this set-
ting, an analyst wants to publish a function F evaluated on her dataset X , but is concerned
about an adversary observing F (X) and performing a Bayesian update to make inferences
about a protected quantity gi(Xi). We propose a variant of the Gaussian Mechanism [113]
that satisfies dataset attribute privacy when F (X) conditioned on gi(Xi) follows a Gaus-
sian distribution, with constant variance conditioned on gi(Xi) = a for all a. Although
this setting is more restrictive, it is still of practical interest. For example, it can be applied
when X follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution and gi and F are linear with respect
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to the entries of X , as we show in the instantiation of our mechanism in Section 5.4.2. We
also note that using variational auto-encoders (VAEs) [123, 109], it is possible to encode
data from other distributions using a Gaussian representation with interpretable features.
This would then allow an analyst to specify which latent features are deemed sensitive for
the data, even if the original features are less descriptive (e.g., pixels on an image vs. the
gender of the person in it).
5.4.1 Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism
Algorithm 12 presents the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism for answering a real-
valued query F (X) while protecting the values of gi(Xi) for i ∈ C. Much like the Gaussian
Mechanism for differential privacy [113], the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism first
computes the true value F (X), and then adds a Gaussian noise term with mean zero and
standard deviation that scales with the sensitivity of the function. However, sensitivity of
















This differs from the sensitivity notion used in differential privacy in two key ways. First,
we are concerned with measuring changes to the value of F (X) caused by changing se-
crets sia corresponding to realizations of gi(Xi), rather than by changing an individual’s
data. Second, we assume our data are drawn from an unknown underlying distribution
θ, so F (X) is a random variable. Our attribute privacy sensitivity bounds the maximum
change in posterior expected value of F (X) in the worst case over all distributions and pairs
of secrets for each attribute. We note that if F (X) is independent of the protected attribute
Xi, then ∆iF = 0 and no additional noise is needed for privacy. The Attribute-Private
Gaussian Mechanism of Algorithm 12 further benefits from the inherent randomness of the
output F (X). In particular, it reduces the variance σ2 of the noise added by the conditional
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variance of F (X) given gi(Xi) and θ, as the sampling noise can mask some of the correla-
tion. Hence, privacy also comes for free if the function of interest has low correlation with
the protected attributes.
Algorithm 12 can be easily extended to handle vector-valued queries with F (X) ∈ Rk
and sensitive functions gi over multiple attributes by changing ∆iF in Equation (5.1) to be
the maximum `2 distance rather than absolute value. Additionally, the noise adjustment for
each attribute should be based on the conditional covariance matrix of F (X) rather than
the conditional variance.
Algorithm 12 Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism,
APGM(X,F, {gi}, C, {S,Q,Θ}, ε, δ) for dataset attribute privacy.
Input: dataset X , query F , functions gi for protected attributes i ∈ C, framework
{S,Q,Θ} , privacy parameters ε, δ
Set σ2 = 0, c =
√
2 log(1.25/δ).
for each i ∈ C do







if (c∆iF/ε)2 −minθ∈Θ Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) ≥ σ2 then
Set σ2 = (c∆iF/ε)2 −minθ∈Θ Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ).
if σ2 > 0 then
Sample Z ∼ N (0, σ2).
Return F (X) + Z.
else Return F (X).
Theorem 22. The Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism
APGM(X,F, {gi}, C, {S,Q,Θ}, ε, δ) in Algorithm 12 is (ε, δ)-dataset attribute private when
F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed for any θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ C.
Privacy follows from the observation that the summation of F (X) and the Gaussian
noise Z is Gaussian distributed conditioned on any secrets, and the probabilities of the
output conditioned on any pairs of secrets have the same variance with mean difference
∆iF . Since we bound the ratio of the two probabilities caused by shifting this variable, the
analysis reduces to the proof of Gaussian mechanism in differential privacy.
Proof. Fix any pair of secrets (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q for a fixed secret attribute Xi under any
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θ ∈ Θ. Recall that sia denotes the event that gi(Xi) ∈ U ia. Let Z ∼ N (0, σ2) de-
note the Gaussian noise added in Algorithm 12. We have [M(X)|sia, θ] = [(F (X) +
Z)|sia, θ] = [F (X)|sia, θ] + Z, because Z is independent of sia and θ. Since we have as-
sumed that F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed and the summation of two Gaussians is
Gaussian, M(X)|sia follows a Gaussian distribution with mean E [F (X)|sia, θ] and vari-
ance Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2. The ratio of probabilities of seeing an output w on a pair
of secrets (sia, s
i








(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w − E [F (X)|sai , θ])2
exp(−1
2
(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w − E
[







(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)w2)
exp(−1
2
(Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2)(w + ∆)
|, (5.2)
where ∆ = max(sai ,sbi )∈Q E [F (X)|s
i
a, θ] − E [F (X)|sib, θ]. Equation (5.2) follows from
shifting the variable w to w + E [F (X)|sia, θ]. We observe that the probability ratio can be
viewed as the probability ratio in the Gaussian Mechanism in differential privacy with noise
draw fromN (0,Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ)+σ2), and query sensitivity max(sia,sib)∈Q E [F (X)|s
i
a]−
E [F (X)|sib]. Then, our analysis reduces to the proof of the Gaussian Mechanism in differ-
ential privacy. The Gaussian Mechanism for differential privacy with
Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ) + σ2
≥2 log(1.25/δ)
(
max(sia,sib)∈Q E [F (X)|s
i
a, θ]− E [F (X)|sib, θ]
ε
)2
ensures that with probability at least 1− δ, we have
P (M(X) ∈ T |sia, θ) ≤ exp(ε)P (M(X) ∈ T |sib, θ) + δ,
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for any T ⊆ Range(M). Equivalently, we have
σ2 ≥2 log(1.25/δ)
(
max(sia,sib)∈Q E [F (X)|s
i
a, θ]− E [F (X)|sib, θ]
ε
)2
− Var(F (X)|gi(Xi), θ).









which will ensure that the ratio of the probabilities that the algorithm M(X) outputs a
query value in any subset T on any pair of secrets for any θ ∈ Θ is bounded by ε with
probability at least 1− δ.
High probability additive accuracy bounds on the output of Algorithm 12 can be de-
rived using tail bounds on the noise term Z based on its variance σ2. The formal accuracy
guarantee is stated in Theorem 23, which follows immediately from tail bounds of a Gaus-
sian.
Theorem 23. The Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism













2 log(1.25/δ) and Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution.
In general, if F (X) is independent of, or only weakly correlated with the protected
functions gi(Xi), then no noise is needed is preserve dataset attribute privacy, and the mech-
anism can output the exact answer F (X). On the other hand, if F (X) is highly correlated
with gi(Xi), we then consider a tradeoff between the sensitivity and the variance of F (X).
If the variance of F (X) is relatively large, then F (X) is inherently private, and less noise
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is required. If the variance of F (X) is small and the sensitivity of F (X) is large, the mech-
anism must add a noise term with large σ2, resulting in low accuracy with respect to the
true answer. To make these statements more concrete and understandable, Section 5.4.2
provides a concrete instantiation of Algorithm 12.
Privacy guarantees without Gaussian assumptions
A natural question is what privacy guarantee we can offer when our distributional assump-
tion is violated. The following theorem states that if we can instead use Gaussian distribu-
tions that are close to the true distributions of F (X) conditioned on gi(Xi) in Algorithm
12, then the loss in privacy is not too large. We quantify this distributional closeness using
max-divergence.
Definition 10 (Max-Divergence). Let p and q be two distributions with the same support.




Pr(p(x) ∈ T )
Pr(q(x) ∈ T )
.




Pr(p(x) ∈ T )− δ
Pr(q(x) ∈ T )
.
Theorem 24. Let f ia denote the true distributon of F (X) conditioned on the secret sia :=
{gi(Xi) = a} for i ∈ C and sia ∈ S. For each f ia, if there exists a Gaussian distribution f̃ ia
that is close to f ia with max{Dδ2(f ia(x)||f̃ ia(x)), Dδ2(f̃ ia(x)||f ia(x))} bounded above by Dδ2
for any δ2 > 0, then the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism APGM(X,F, {gi}, C, {S,Q,Θ}, ε, δ)
in Algorithm 12 with f̃ ias as the hypothesized distributions is (ε + 2Dδ2 , exp(Dδ2)δ + δ2)-
dataset attribute private.




a(x)||f̃ ia(x)), D(f̃ ia(x)||f ia(x))} ≤ Dδ2}. Fix any pair of se-
crets (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q for a fixed sensitive attribute Xi under any θ ∈ Θ. Let Z ∼ N (0, σ2)
denote the Gaussian noise added in Algorithm 12. Let us partition R as R = R1 ∪ R2,
where
R1 = {F (X) + Z ∈ R : |F (X) + Z| ≤ c∆iF/ε},
and
R2 = {F (X) + Z ∈ R : |F (X) + Z| > c∆iF/ε}.
Fix any subset T ⊆ R, and define T1 = T ∩R1 and T2 = T ∩R2.
For any w ∈ T1, we can write the probability ratio of seeing the output w as follows:
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|sia, θ)
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|sib, θ)
=
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f
i
a)
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f̃ ia)
·
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|F (X)|sib,θ ∼ f̃
i
b)




Pr(F (X) + Z = w|F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f̃
i
a)




For any w ∈ T1, the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism ensures that the last ratio in
Equation (5.3) is bounded above by exp(ε). For the first ratio in Equation (5.3), since the
generation process for z is indepedent of the data, we have
Pr(F (X) + Z = w|F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f
i
a)








Pr(Z = w − f) Pr(F (X) = f |F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f̃ ia)df
≤max
f
Pr(F (X) = f |F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f
i
a)
Pr(F (X) = f |F (X)|sia,θ ∼ f̃ ia)
≤ exp(Dδ2)
Similarly, we can bound the second ratio by exp(Dδ2). Thus, Equation (5.3) is bounded by
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exp(ε+ 2Dδ2), which is equivalent to
Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T1|sia, θ) ≤ exp(ε+ 2Dδ2) Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T1|sib, θ) (5.4)
We also bound the probability that the output belongs to the subset T2 as follows:




Then, by (5.4) and (5.5), we have
Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T |sia, θ)
= Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T1|sia, θ) + Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T2|sia, θ)
≤ exp(ε+ 2Dδ2) Pr(F (X) + Z ∈ T1|sib, θ) + exp(Dδ2)δ. (5.6)
We then analyze the probability of the output when
maxi∈C maxsia∈S max{D(f
i
a(x)||f̃ ia(x)), D(f̃ ia(x)||f ia(x))} is bounded by Dδ2 with proba-





max{D(f ia(x)||f̃ ia(x)), D(f̃ ia(x)||f ia(x))} ≤ Dδ2}.
Let Ecδ2 denote the complement set. By the choice of Dδ2 , we have Pr[E
c
δ2
] ≤ δ2. Then by
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(5.6) and the observation that Pr[Ecδ2 ] ≤ δ2, we have that for any subset T ,
Pr[F (X) + Z ∈ T |sia, θ]
≤Pr[F (X) + Z ∈ T |sia, θ, Eδ2 ] Pr[Eδ2 ] + Pr[Ecδ2 ]
≤(exp(ε+ 2Dδ2) Pr[F (X) + Z ∈ T |sib, θ, Eδ2 ] + exp(Dδ2)δ) Pr[Eδ2 ]
+ Pr[Ecδ2 ]
= exp(ε+ 2Dδ2) Pr[F (X) + Z ∈ T |sib, θ, Eδ2 ] Pr[Eδ2 ]




≤ exp(ε+ 2Dδ2)Pr[F (X) + Z ∈ T |sib, θ] + exp(Dδ2)δ + δ2,
completing the proof.
5.4.2 Instantiation with Gaussian distributed data
In this section, we show an instantiation of our Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism
when the joint distribution of them attributes is multivariate Gaussian. The privacy guaran-
tee of this mechanism requires that F (X)|gi(Xi) is Gaussian distributed, which is satisfied
when gi and F are linear with respect to the entries of X . For simplicity of illustration, we
will choose both F (X) and all gi(Xi) to compute averages.
As a motivating example, consider a dataset that consists of students’ SAT scores Xs,
heights Xh, weights Xw, and their family income Xi. As a part of a wellness initiative, the






school also wants to prevent an adversary from inferring the average SAT scores or family




i for i ∈ C.
To instantiate our framework, let sia denote the event that g(Xi) = a, which means
the average value of column Xi is a. If g(Xi) has support U i, then the set of secrets is
S = {sia : a ∈ U i, i ∈ C}, and the set of secret pairs isQ = {(sia, sib) : a, b ∈ U i, a 6= b, i ∈
C}. Each θ ∈ Θ is a distribution over n i.i.d. samples from an underlying multivariate
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Gaussian distribution with mean (µ1, . . . , µm)T and covariance matrix (Vij), i, j ∈ [m],
where Vij = Vji is the covariance between Xi and Xj if i 6= j, and Vii is the variance of Xi.
Suppose we want to guarantee (ε, δ)-dataset attribute privacy through the Attribute-
Private Gaussian Mechanism. Then we need to first compute E [F (X)|sia] and Var(F (X)|sia)
for each i ∈ C. Let j denote the index of the attribute averaged in F (X). By the
properties of a multivariate Gaussian distribution, the distribution of F (X) conditional on







We define the diameter of U as d(U) = maxa,b∈U |a− b|. The sensitivity is: ∆iF =
max(sia,sib)∈Q|µ̄a − µ̄b| =
Vij
Vii
maxa,b∈U |a− b| = VijVii d(U). To ensure (ε, δ)-dataset attribute









) for c =
√
2 log(1.25/δ) as in Algorithm 12. Adding Gaussian






)} will provide (ε, δ)-dataset
attribute privacy for all protected attributes.
We note that σ2 is monotonically increasing with respect to Vij . That is, our Attribute-
Private Gaussian Mechanism will add less noise to the output if the query F is about an
attribute which has a low correlation with the protected attributes.
So far we have discussed about the case when Θ only consists of one distribution, in or-




and the noise is scaled with variance σ2 = maxi∈C{(cmaxθ∈Θ Vijd(U)Viiε )




sectionThe Markov Quilt Mechanism for Distributional Attribute Privacy
In this section we consider distributional attribute privacy, as introduced in Definition 9,
and develop a mechanism that satisfies this privacy definition. Recall that in this setting,
an analyst aims to release F (X) while protecting the realization of a random parameter
φi, which describes the conditional marginal distribution of the ith attribute, given the re-
alization of all φk for k 6= i for all other attributes. This formalization implies that all
(column) attribute vectors Xi are mutually independent, conditional on the set of parame-
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ters (φ1, . . . , φm).
5.4.3 Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism
We base our mechanism on the idea of a Markov Quilt, which partitions a network of
correlated random variables into those which are “near” (XN ) a particular variable Xi, and
those which are “remote” (XR). Intuitively, we will use this to partition attributes into those
which are highly correlated (XN ) with our sensitive attributes, and those which are only
weakly correlated (XR).
Definition 11 (Markov Quilt). A set of nodes XQ in a Bayesian network G = (X,E) is a
Markov Quilt for a node Xi if deleting XQ partitions G into parts XN and XR such that
Xi ∈ XN and XR is independent of Xi conditioned on XQ.
We quantify the effect that changing the distribution parameter φi of a sensitive attribute
Xi has on a set of distribution parameters φA (corresponding to a set of attributesXA) using
the max-influence. Since attributes are mutually independent conditioned on the vector
(φ1, . . . , φm), the max-influence is sufficient to quantify how much a change of all values
in attribute Xi will affect the values of XA. If φi and φA are independent, then XA and Xi
are also independent, and the max-influence is 0.










P (φA|φai , θ)
P (φA|φbi , θ)
.
The sensitivity of F with respect to a set of attributes A ⊆ [m], denoted ∆AF , is
defined as the maximum change that the value of F (X) caused by changing all columns
XA. Formally, we say that two datasets X,X ′ are A-column-neighbors if they are identical




|F (X)− F (X ′)|.
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Although changing XA may lead to changes in other columns, these changes are governed
by the max influence, and will not affect attributes that are nearly independent of Xi.
Observe that the event that XR and Xi are independent conditional on XN is equivalent
to the event when φR and φi are independent conditional on φN , which is why we can
define the Markov Quilt based on Xi. However, since the distribution of Xis are governed
by φis, the max-influence score must be computed using φis rather than Xis.
The mechanism. We extend the idea of the Markov Quilt Mechanism in [122] to the
attribute privacy setting as follows. Let A ⊆ [m] be a set of attributes over which F is com-
puted. For example, F may compute the average of a particular attribute or a regression on
several attributes. At a high level, we add noise to the output of F scaled based on the sen-
sitivity of F with respect to XNs. However, when computing the sensitivity of F we only
need to consider sensitivity of F with respect to A ∩N , i.e., the queried set of attributes
A that are in the “nearby” set of the protected attribute. If the query F is about attributes
that are all in the “remote” set XRi and the max-influence on the corresponding Markov
quilt is less than the privacy parameter ε, then ∆A∩NF is simply 0 and the mechanism will
not add noise to the query answer. We note that the original Markov Quilt Mechanism
was designed for protecting individual privacy, or one attribute record where the dataset
only consists of one person’s data. To extend the idea to protect dataset-level attribute in-
formation, non-trivial new data model and the corresponding max-influence definition is
required.
Theorem 25. The Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism
APMQM(X,F,A,C, {S,Q,Θ}, ε) in Algorithm 13 is (ε, 0)-distributional attribute private.
Proof. First, consider the case when G = ∅, which means there are no Markov quilt parti-
tions such that the max-influence score is less than ε. In this case, for a fixed secret attribute
Xi, the mechanism will simply add Laplace noise scaled with ∆AF . The privacy follows
from Laplace Mechanism in differential privacy.
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Algorithm 13 Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism,
APMQM(X,F,A,C, {S,Q,Θ}, ε) for distributional attribute privacy.
Input: dataset X , query F , index set of queried attributes A, index set of sensitive
attributes C, framework {S,Q,Θ}, privacy parameter ε.
for each i ∈ C do
Set bi = ∆AF/ε.
Set Gi := {(XQ, XN , XR) : eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ ε} to be all possible Markov quilts of
Xi with max-influence less than ε.
if Gi 6= ∅ do
for each (XQ, XN , XR) ∈ Gi do
if ∆A∩NF/(ε− eΘ(XQ|Xi)) ≤ bi then
Set bi = ∆A∩NF/(ε− eΘ(XQ|Xi)).
Sample Z ∼ Lap(maxi∈C bi).
Return F (X) + Z
Let us consider the case when G 6= ∅. Below we bound the probability distribution for
a single outcome w. For the set of outcomes T , the proof can be extended to bound the
integral of the probability distribution over the set T . We fix any pair of secrets (sia, s
i
b) ∈ Q
for a fixed secret attribute Xi under any θ ∈ Θ. Here sia denotes the event that φi = a,
and we consider the more general case later. Let Z be the Laplace noise as generated in
Algorithm 13. If there exists a Markov quilt for Xi, i ∈ C, with max-influence score less
than ε, then for any attribute Xj ∈ A:
max
a,b
P (M(X) = w|φi = a, θ)
P (M(X) = w|φi = b, θ)
= max
a,b
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = a, θ)





P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = a, φR∪Q = v̄, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|φi = b, φR∪Q = v̄, θ)
· P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi = a, θ)





P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = a, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = b, θ)
· P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|φR∪Q = v̄, θ)
P (XR∪Q = xR∪Q|φR∪Q = v̄, θ)
· P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi = a, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi = b, θ)
, (5.7)
where the final equality Equation (5.7) follows from the independence between XR∪Q and
φi given φR∪Q = v̄, and xR∪Q denotes a realization of the XR∪Q columns. For a fixed
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XR∪Q, F (X) can vary by at most ∆A∩NF , and therefore, the first ratio is bounded by
exp(ε − exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))). The second ratio in Equation (5.7) is 1, and the third ratio in
Equation (5.7) is bounded by exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)). Then Equation (5.7) is bounded above by
exp(ε − exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))) exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)) = exp(ε). For the general case when sia :=
1[φi ∈ Φia] : Φia ⊂ Φi, similarly, for any Φia and Φib, we have,
P (M(X) = w|φi ∈ Φia, θ)
P (M(X) = w|φi ∈ Φib, θ)
≤max
R∪Q
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi ∈ Φia, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi ∈ Φib, θ)
· P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi ∈ Φ
i
a, θ)






P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = a, θ)
P (F (X) + Z = w|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, φi = b, θ)
· max
a∈Φia,b∈Φib
P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi = a, θ)
P (φR∪Q = v̄|φi = b, θ)
. (5.9)
The first ratio in Equation (5.9) is bounded by exp(ε − exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi))) and the second
ratio is bounded by exp(eΘ(XQ|Xi)), so Equation (5.9) is bounded above by exp(ε), and
the theorem follows.
As before, the accuracy follows immediately from the tail bound on the noise term
based on the Laplace distribution parameter. The accuracy depends onA∩N and eΘ(XQ|Xi),
which measures the correlations between the sensitive attributes and the queried attributes.
Theorem 26. The Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism









where Gi := {(XQ, XN , XR) : eΘ(XQ|Xi) ≤ ε} is the set of all possible Markov quilts of








Figure 5.1: Bayesian Network of five attributes where income is a sensitive attribute.
Example 1. Consider a dataset that consists of students’ SAT scores Xs, heights Xh,
weightsXw, genderXg, and their family incomeXi, where these variables form a Bayesian
network as in Figure 5.1. The school wishes to release the number of students that are taller
than 5′6′′, while protecting the distribution of family income of their students with privacy






a Markov quilt for Xi: Q = {g}, N = {i, s}, R = {h,w}. Then A ∩ N = ∅, so we can





′6′′] without additional noise.
Next consider the case when the school wishes to release the number of students that are






1300)] and A = {h, s}. In this case we can still use the same Markov quilt as before,
but now A ∩ N = {s}. The mechanism will add Laplace noise scaled with ∆{s}F/(ε −
eΘ(Xg|Xi)).
It is instructive to contrast the above mechanism to the Markov Quilt Mechanism of
[122], presented fully in Appendix ??. The most important difference is that the mecha-
nism in [122] was not designed to guarantee attribute privacy. It provides privacy of the
valuesXji but does not protect the distribution from whichX
j
i is generated. This difference
in high-level goals leads to three key technical differences. Firstly, the definition of max-
influence in [122] measures influence of a variable value on values of other variables. This
is insufficient when one wants to protect distributional information, as Xi may take a range
of values while still following a particular distribution (e.g., hiding the gender of an indi-
vidual in a dataset vs. hiding the proportion of females to males in this dataset.) Secondly,
while it is natural to consider L-Lipschitz functions to bound sensitivity when one value
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changes (as is done in [122]), this is not applicable to settings where the distribution of data
changes, since this may change all values in a column. As a result, we do not restrict F
in this way. Finally, the mechanisms themselves are different as [122] consider answering
query F over all attributes of an individual. As a result, they need to consider sensitivity of
a function to all the “nearby” attributes. In contrast, we only consider sensitivity of those
“nearby” attributes that happen to be in the query (i.e., those in A).
5.5 The Wasserstein Mechanism for General Attribute Privacy
The Wasserstein Mechanism [122] (Algorithm 14) is a general mechanism for satisfying
Pufferfish privacy; Algorithm 14 is (ε, 0)-Pufferfish private for any instantiation of the
Pufferfish framework [122]. It defines sensitivity of a function F as the maximum Wasser-
stein distance W∞ between the distributions of F (X) under two different realizations of
secrets si and sj for (si, sj) ∈ Q, and then outputs F (X) plus Laplace noise that scales
with this sensitivity. The distance metric W∞ denotes the∞-Wasserstein distance between
two probability distributions, formally defined below.
Definition 13 (∞-Wasserstein distance, W∞). Let µ, ν be two probability distributions on
R,3 and let Γ(µ, ν) be the set of all joint distributions with marginals µ and ν. The ∞-
Wasserstein distance between µ and ν is defined as :





The ∞-Wasserstein distance is closely related to optimal transportation. Each γ ∈
Γ(µ, ν) can be viewed as a way to shift probability mass between µ and ν, and the cost
is max(x,y)∈support(γ)|x− y|. For discrete distributions, the ∞-Wasserstein distance is the
minimum of the maximum distance that any probability mass moves to transform µ to ν.
3In general, Wasserstein distance can be defined on any metric space. We will use it only over the real
numbers with the Euclidean metric.
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Algorithm 14 Wasserstein Mechanism (X,F, {S,Q,Θ}, ε) [122]
Input: dataset X , query F , Pufferfish framework {S,Q,Θ}, privacy parameter ε
for all (si, sj) ∈ Q and all θ ∈ Θ such that P (si|θ) 6= 0, and P (sj|θ) 6= 0 do
Set µi,θ = P (F (X)|si, θ), µj,θ = P (F (X)|sj, θ).
Calculate W∞(µi,θ, µj,θ).
end for
Set W = sup(si,sj)∈Q,θ∈ΘW∞(µi,θ, µj,θ).
Sample Z ∼ Lap(W/ε).
Return F (X) + Z
Since our framework is an instantiation of Pufferfish privacy, the Wasserstein Mech-
anism provides a general way to protect either dataset attribute privacy or distributional
attribute privacy, when instantiated with the appropriate Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ).
This is stated formally in Theorem 27 and illustrated in Examples 2 and 3 below.
Theorem 27. The Wasserstein Mechanism (X,F, {S,Q,Θ}, ε) in Algorithm 14 is (ε, 0)-
dataset attribute private and (ε, 0)-distributional attribute private.
Despite the general purpose nature of the Wasserstein Mechanism for achieving at-
tribute privacy, it is known that computing Wasserstein distance is computationally expen-
sive [127]. Instantiating Algorithm 14 to satisfy attribute privacy may require computing
Wasserstein distance for exponentially many pairs of secrets, one for each subset of values
of gi(Xi) or φi. This motivates our study of the Attribute-Private Gaussian Mechanism
(Algorithm 12) and the Attribute-Private Markov Quilt Mechanism (Algorithm 13), which
are both computationally efficient for practical use.
Example 2 (Wasserstein Mechanism for Dataset Attribute Privacy). Consider two binary
attributes X1 and X2, where X1 is the non-sensitive attribute and X2 is the sensitive at-
tribute. Suppose the dataset contains data from four people, and let the underlying distri-
bution and dependence between X1 and X2 is characterized by the following probability
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distributions:
P (X1 = 1|X2 = 1) = p1 and P (X1 = 1|X2 = 0) = p2, (5.11)
Suppose 0.4 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.6 and 0.4 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.6. The analyst wishes to release the summation









To instantiate our framework, let s2a denote the event that g(X2) = a. The support of g(X2)
is U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the set of secrets is S = {s2a : a ∈ U}, and the set of secret
pairs is Q = {(s2a, s2b) : a, b ∈ U , a 6= b}. Each θ ∈ Θ is a certain pair of p1 and p2 such
that 0.4 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.6 and 0.4 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.6.
Consider the pair of conditional probabilities µa,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2a, θ) and µb,θ =
P (F (X) = ·|s2b , θ). The worst case Wasserstein distribution between the pair of condi-
tional probability distributions is reached when p1 = 0.4, p2 = 0.6, and a = 0, b = 4 when
the two conditional probabilities differ the most. We list the conditional probabilities for
this case in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Conditional probability distributions under two extreme secrets for dataset at-
tribute privacy
j 0 1 2 3 4
P (F (X) = j|g(X2) = 0) 0.0256 0.1536 0.3456 0.3456 0.1296
P (F (X) = j|g(X2) = 4) 0.1296 0.3456 0.3456 0.1536 0.0256
Here, the Wasserstein distance W∞(P (F (X)|g(X2 = 0)), P (F (X)|g(X2 = 4)) =
1, since the optimal transportation is moving the mass from 1 to 2 and 4 to 3, and the
Wasserstein mechanism will add Lap(1/ε) noise to F (X).
The mechanism with group differential privacy would add Lap(4/ε), which gives worse
utility. We note that the noise we add depends largely on the underlying distribution class
Θ. For example, when Θ = {0.3 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 0.7}, the worst case Wasserstein distance is
2 and the mechanism will add Lap(2/ε) noise to F (X). When Θ = {0 ≤ p1, p2 ≤ 1},
the worst case Wasserstein distance is 4, and the Wassertein mechanism will add the same
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amount of noise as group differential privacy.
Example 3 (Wasserstein Mechanism for Distributional Attribute Privacy). Consider the
same setting as Example 2: a dataset of four people with two binary attributes X1 and
X2, where X1 is non-sensitive and X2 is sensitive. Let the underlying distribution and
dependence between realized attributes X1 and X2 still be governed by (5.11), and for
simplicity fix p1 = 0.4 and p2 = 0.6. In the setting of distributional attribute privacy, we
are interested in the conditional marginal distribution parameters ofXi given the parameter
for Xj , rather than the realization of Xj . We denote the Bernoulli distribution parameter
for X1 and X2 as φ1 and φ2, respectively. According to (5.11), we have φ1 = 0.4φ2 +
0.6(1− φ2) = 0.6− 0.2φ2.




1 , while protecting
the distribution parameter φ2 for X2. To instantiate our framework, we let s2a denote the
event that φ2 = a, and we suppose the support of φ2 is Φ2 = [0.2, 0.8]. The set of secrets is
S = {s2a : a ∈ Φ2}, and the set of secret pairs is Q = {(s2a, s2b) : a, b ∈ Φ2, a 6= b}. Each
θ ∈ Θ is a certain pair of φ1 and φ2 such that Φ2 = [0.2, 0.8] and φ1 = 0.6− 0.2φ2.
In this case, the support for φ1 is [0.44, 0.56]. Consider the pair of conditional proba-
bilities µa,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2a, θ) and µb,θ = P (F (X) = ·|s2b , θ). The worst case Wasser-
stein distribution between the pair of conditional probability distributions is reached when
a = 0.8 and b = 0.2 when the two conditional probabilities differ the most. We list the
conditional probabilities for this case in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Conditional probability distributions under two extreme secrets for distributional
attribute privacy
j 0 1 2 3 4
P (F (X) = j|φ2 = 0.8) 0.0983 0.3091 0.3643 0.1908 0.0375
P (F (X) = j|φ2 = 0.2) 0.0375 0.1908 0.3643 0.3091 0.0983
The Wasserstein distance W∞(P (F (X)|φ2 = 0.8), P (F (X)|φ2 = 0.2) = 1, since the
optimal transportation is moving the mass from 1 to 2 and 4 to 3, and the Wasserstein
mechanism will add Lap(1/ε) noise to F (X).
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study notions of privacy relevant for a data owner that releases statistics
computed on her data. The notion encapsulates privacy of dataset- and distribution-level
information and departs significantly from other notions studied in computer science that
mostly relate to individual privacy. We also provide two efficient mechanisms and one in-
efficient but general mechanism that satisfy attribute privacy for these settings. We base
our results on a novel use of the Pufferfish framework to account for correlations across
attributes in the data, thus addressing” the challenging problem of developing Pufferfish
instantiations and algorithms for general aggregate secrets” that was left open by[18]. Our
mechanisms for satisfying the new privacy definitions would (1) encourage for more infor-
mation about datasets to be released as they allow data owners to protect information they
deem proprietary or sensitive, and (2) prevent inadvertent exposure of private data when
information is released. Both of these can help improve the transparency of data-driven




ADDITIONAL BASELINES AND NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR
PAPRIKA(CHAPTER 3)
A.1 PrivLORD and PrivLORD2
In this section, we present two private versions of LORD++: PrivLORD in Algorithm 15
and PrivLORD2 in Algorithm 16. The former combines SPARSEVECTOR and LORD++,
with the same threshold shifting as in PAPRIKA. The latter adds the candidacy checking
step with constant λ on top of PrivLORD. The privacy of PrivLORD follows immediately
from SPARSEVECTOR , and the privacy proof for PAPRIKA also applies to PrivLORD2
with a different choice of αt.
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Algorithm 15 PrivLORD(α,W0, γ, c, ε, A)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .} with mutiplicative sensitivity (η,µ), target FDR
level α, initial wealth W0 < α, positive non-increasing sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to
one, expected number of rejections c, privacy parameters ε, threshold shift A.
Let Z0α ∼ Lap(2ηc/ε), count = 0
for each p-value pt do
if count ≥ c then Output Rt = 0
else
Sample Zt ∼ Lap(4ηc/ε).
if t = 1
then Set α1 = γ1W0
else
Compute αt = W0γt + (α−W0)γt−τ1 +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj
if log pt + Zt ≤ logαt − A+ Zcountα
then Output Rt = 1. Set count = count +1 and sample Zcountα ∼
Lap(2ηc/ε)
else Output Rt = 0
end for
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Algorithm 16 PrivLORD2(α, λ,W0, γ, c, ε, δ, A)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .} with mutiplicative sensitivity (η,µ), target FDR
level α, candidacy threshold λ, initial wealth W0 < α, positive non-increasing sequence
{γj}∞j=0 of summing to one, expected number of rejections c, privacy parameters ε, δ,
threshold shift A.
Let Z0α ∼ Lap(2ηc/ε), count = 0
for each p-value pt do
if count ≥ c then Output Rt = 0
else
Sample Zt ∼ Lap(4ηc/ε). Set the indicator for candidacy Ct = I(log pt <
log λ).
if t = 1
then Set α1 = γ1W0
else
Compute αt = W0γt + (α−W0)γt−τ1 +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj
if Ct = 1 and log pt + Zt ≤ logαt − A+ Zcountα
then Output Rt = 1. Set count = count +1 and sample Zcountα ∼
Lap(2ηc/ε)
else Output Rt = 0
end for
A.2 Additional Numerical Results
Tables A.1 and A.2 report the numerical values for our experiments on Bernoulli and trun-
cated exponential data, respectively. This information is also presented visually in Fig-
ures 3.1 and 3.2.
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Table A.1: Numerical values of FDR and power for Bernoulli observations experiments.
LapSAFFRON corresponds to running SAFFRON on the naı̈ve Laplace privatization of the
p-values.
π ε
PAPRIKA AI PAPRIKA SAFFRON AI SAFFRON LORD Alpha-investing LapSAFFRON
FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power
0.01
3 0 .825 0 .817
0 .833 0 .833 0 .833 0 .833 .990 .4855 0 .833 0 .833
10 0 .833 0 .833
0.02
3 0 .844 .017 .810
0 .938 0 .938 0 .938 0 .875 .973 .5095 0 .916 .001 .900
10 0 .941 0 .938
0.03
3 .008 .457 .103 .389
.077 .923 0 .846 0 .846 0 .692 .977 .5095 .006 .694 .018 .670
10 .015 .849 .007 .808
0.04
3 .003 .604 .120 .580
.030 .970 0 .879 0 .940 0 .848 .943 .5125 .003 .756 .035 .740
10 .060 .860 .008 .836
0.05
3 .009 .560 .168 .514
.056 .971 .056 .971 .105 .971 .056 .971 .940 .5055 .007 .815 .053 .785
10 .017 .938 .012 .922
Table A.2: Numerical values of FDR and power for truncated exponential observations
experiments. LapSAFFRON corresponds to running SAFFRON on the naı̈ve Laplace pri-
vatization of the p-values.
π ε
PAPRIKA AI PAPRIKA SAFFRON AI SAFFRON LORD Alpha-investing LapSAFFRON
FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power FDR power
0.01
3 0 .995 0 .987
0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 .638 .989 .5435 0 1.00 0 1.00
10 0 1.00 0 1.00
0.02
3 0 .936 0 .903
0 1.00 0 1.00 0 .999 0 .676 .973 .5055 0 .994 0 .993
10 0 .999 0 1.00
0.03
3 0 .708 .005 .618
0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 .982 .977 .5165 0 .958 0 .942
10 0 .999 0 .996
0.04
3 0 .569 .003 .474
0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 .999 .944 .5035 0 .905 0 .873
10 0 .998 0 .996
0.05
3 0 .394 .007 .327
0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 0 1.00 .940 .5055 0 .825 .002 .726
10 0 .990 0 .986
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS FOR DATASET-LEVEL
ATTRIBUTE LEAKAGE (CHAPTER 4)
B.1 Attribute Correlation in Datasets
In this section we provide information on how correlation cases were determined for the
datasets and attributes in Table 4.3.
Health Dataset. We measure the correlations between Gender or ClaimsTruncated
and the 133 categorical attributes and 6 numerical attributes by Cramer’s V scores and point
biserial correlation coefficients, respectively. With Gender as the sensitive attribute, we
identify 22 categorical attributes that have Cramer’s V scores greater than 0.15 and 2 nu-
merical attributes that have point biserial correlation (absolute value) greater than 0.1. The
attributes that have the highest Cramer’s V are sp10 (0.218), noSpecialities (0.212),
noProviders (0.208), noVendors (0.201). To give a overview of correlations includ-
ing weak correlation with other attributes, we identify 17 attributes that have Cramer’s V
scores within the range [0.1, 0.15] and 37 attributes Cramer’s V scores within the range
[0.5, 0.1]. The Cramer’s V score between DaysInHospital and Gender is 0.09, and thus,
we deem them as uncorrelated.
With ClaimsTruncated as the sensitive attribute, we identify 50 categorical at-
tributes (e.g., sp1 (0.42), sp2 (0.51), pcg1 (0.41), etc.) that have Cramer’s V scores
greater than 0.15, and 4 numerical attributes that have point biserial correlation (abso-
lute value) greater than 0.1. The Cramer’s V score between DaysInHospital and
ClaimsTruncated is 0.13, and we deem them as uncorrelated.
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Adult Dataset. We measure the correlations between Gender or Income and the 7
categorical attributes and 4 numerical attributes by Cramer’s V scores and point biserial
correlation coefficients, respectively. We list all the correlation factors in Table B.1, as X
only has 11 attributes. For Gender, we identify 4 categorical attributes that have Cramer’s
V scores above 0.15 and 1 numerical attribute that has point biserial correlation coefficients
above 0.1. The sensitive attribute Income has a high Cramer’s V score with 5 categori-
cal attributes and the target variable EducationLevel, as well as high point biserial
correlation coefficients with 4 numerical attributes.
Crime Dataset. Since all features are numerical, we measure the correlations by Pearson
correlation coefficients. Table B.2 shows the number of attributes that have the coefficients
within a certain range. We use 0.4 as the threshold to determine X ′. The target variable
CrimesPerPop is correlated with both TotalPctDivorce and Income, with corre-
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Table B.2: The distribution of correlation factors for the Crime dataset.
Range TotalPctDivorce Income
[0.5, 1] 15 34
[0.4, 0.5) 11 4
[0.3, 0.4) 31 22
[0.2, 0.3) 4 12
[0.1, 0.2) 14 19
lation coefficients 0.553 and −0.424, respectively.
Yelp-Health and Amazon Datasets. For Yelp-Health dataset, the point biserial correla-
tion coefficients between Specialty and ReviewRating is 0.009, hence, the scenario
corresponds X ∼ A, Y⊥A. The review text is clearly correlated with the doctor specialty
as shown in Table 4 in [70].
For the Amazon dataset, since the ProductType has 4 levels, we use the ANOVA to
test whether the differences between the means of ReviewScore across different product
types are statistically significant. The ANOVA p-value is 7.6e− 83. We conjecture that the
co-purchasing graph X is also correlated with the ProductType, and thus, the scenario
corresponds X ∼ A, Y ∼ A.
B.2 Additional Results
In this section, we present additional attack results for Health, Adult and Crime dataset with
smaller size of Daux from Table 4.2. We show accuracies for both pooled model and the
honest party’s local model and the utility increase in Table B.4. Figure B.1 complements
results in Section 4.6.4 on Amazon dataset trained with the sensitive attribute A.
B.3 White-box Attack Results
We also performed experiments where the attacker has access to the model parameters, i.e.,












































Figure B.1: Attack accuracy for the Amazon graph data when the sensitive attribute
ProductType is used during training for different numbers of output classes across dif-
ferent distributions (splits).
Table B.3: Multi-Party Setting: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting the value of the
distribution of sensitive variable A in the dataset of Phonest. We use smaller size of Daux
listed in Table 4.2, while all other settings are the same as in Table 4.4.
Datasets
(Output Classes)
Model Type Attack Accuracy
A # X ′
A Ā
Health (2) Multi-layer Perceptron
.59 .55 Gender 24/139
. 67 . 56 ClaimsTruncated 54/139
Adult (4) Logistic Regression
.73 .76 Gender 5/11
.84 .91 Income 9/11
Crime (3) Multi-layer Perceptron
.60 .56 TotalPctDivorce 26/98
.62 .60 Income 38/98
200 and 50 hidden units and learning rate 0.001. Each meta-classifier is trained based on
100 shadow models using Adam optimizer. Here, the meta-classifier takes as input model
parameters as opposed to model inferences. Table B.5 shows the results. For logistic
regression, the results are similar to those in Table 4.5 for the black-box setting. However,
the attack accuracy for neural networks (MLP) reduces significantly. This was also noted
in the work by [69]. One reason for this is that it is hard for a naive meta-classifier to
learn the structure of equivalent symmetrical weights of neural networks. Indeed, one of
the contributions of [69] is a technique for identifying this symmetry.
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Table B.4: Test accuracies of the model trained on pooled dataset and the model trained




Sensitive Attribute Pooled Accuracy Local Accuracy Utility Increase
Health (2)
Gender 85.22% 84.64% .58%
ClaimsTruncated 76.63% 73.56% 3.07%
Adult (4)
Gender 73.23% 72.46% .76%
Income 71.14% 70.43% .71%
Crime (3)
TotalPctDivorce 74.52% 72.35% 2.17%
Income 72.81% 71.30% 1.51%
Yelp-Health (2) Specialty 86.28% 80.38% 5.90%
Amazon (2) ProductType 76.80% 76.28% .62%
Amazon (6) ProductType 45.92% 42.50% 3.42%
Amazon (11) ProductType 27.94% 26.09% 1.85%
Table B.5: White-box attack accuracy for predicting whether the values of sensitive vari-
able A in Dhonest, the data of the honest party, are predominantly <5 or >5. The attack
accuracy is evaluated on 100 Dhonest datasets: half with 33:67 and half with 67:33 split
and Dadv has 33:67 split. A synthetic correlation with A is added to the variables X and
Y depending on the specific case. R corresponds to the setting where only 3 attributes are
used for training instead of all data. Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
Model Logistic Regression Neural Network
Datasets Adult Health Adult Health
Synthetic Variable A Ā A Ā A Ā A Ā
X ∼ A, Y ∼ A .90 .94 .85 .97 .54 .49 .65 .61
X⊥A, Y ∼ A .95 .93 .81 .80 .57 .53 .63 .56
X ∼ A, Y⊥A .54 .53 .50 .53 .56 .53 .54 .51
X ∼ A, Y⊥A (R) .75 .63 .76 .68 .55 .50 .55 .45
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Köpf, and M. Brockschmidt, “Analyzing information leakage of updates to natural
language models,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS), 2020.
[69] K. Ganju, Q. Wang, W. Yang, C. A. Gunter, and N. Borisov, “Property inference
attacks on fully connected neural networks using permutation invariant represen-
tations,” in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS),
ser. CCS ’18, Toronto, Canada: Association for Computing Machinery, 2018, pp. 619–
633, ISBN: 9781450356930.
[70] L. Melis, C. Song, E. D. Cristofaro, and V. Shmatikov, “Exploiting unintended fea-
ture leakage in collaborative learning,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(S&P), 2019.
171
[71] P. Kairouz, H. B. McMahan, B. Avent, A. Bellet, M. Bennis, A. N. Bhagoji, K.
Bonawitz, Z. Charles, G. Cormode, R. Cummings, R. G. L. D’Oliveira, S. E. Rouay-
heb, D. Evans, J. Gardner, Z. Garrett, A. Gascón, B. Ghazi, P. B. Gibbons, M.
Gruteser, Z. Harchaoui, C. He, L. He, Z. Huo, B. Hutchinson, J. Hsu, M. Jaggi, T.
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